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Proponents of Islamic finance often argue that the success of Islamic banks in the UK and 
Malaysia during the 2007-8 Financial Crisis is proof of the proposition that all Islamic banks 
(IBs) are immune from sub-prime-mortgage type shocks. The implementation of Basel 
practices in Saudi Arabia will be very difficult and is likely through various challenges.  
However, it is arguable that such practices may bring about change in a substantial way in the 
UAE market. Thus, this thesis will discuss features of IBs in the UK and Malaysia, and 
discuss the areas in which the Saudi market is mired in less risk than conventional markets in 
the UK and Malaysia. Using a qualitative methodology, this research sought to answer the 
primary research question, that is, “Does Saudi Arabia Need to Adopt the Risk Regulation 
Practices of Basel?” To be able to accurately answer this main question, it is necessary to 
determine whether the standardisation of accounting practices and regulatory principles can 
enhance Islamic finance organisations. It is likewise necessary to determine whether the 
Basel framework can be internalized by Islamic financial institutions to solve issues such as 
the inadequate coordination of financial markets in Saudi Arabia. The research sought to 
consider whether legal secularisation could be reconciled with Islamic models of finance in 
order to standardise banking processes across jurisdictions. It is vital to discuss this research 
problem as it is evident that Islamic banks are, by design, “safer” than conventional banks, 
which take fewer risks than conventional banking systems. Its ability to withstand the 2007-8 
Financial Crisis can serve as example to other banking systems to follow to prevent the 
debilitating effects such a crisis can provide to the global financial system and the worldwide 
economy as a whole. This paper also discusses inherent risks in dealing with Saudi banks 
caused by structural weaknesses in the Saudi economy, further caused by a lack of 
transparency. Research from the content analysis and literature review demonstrated that 
certain components of Malaysian banking and banking in the UK, including Basel 
Frameworks (I, II, and III) can be adopted by the Islamic financial model in order to improve 
the overall banking structure in Saudi Arabia. Whilst Islamic accounting standards do not 
need to be as rigorous as some Basel Frameworks discussed in the study, implications for 
positive social change in Saudi Arabia include adopting policies which specialise in clearing 
defining risk management and policies which focus on improving corporate governance and 
bolstering transparency in Saudi markets. The central argument of this research therefore, is 
that the incorporation of pertinent Basel components, as well as those from the Malaysia and 
UK banking system, into the KSA banking system, will bring about improvements to the 
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Glossary of Arabic terms 
Arbun   نو برع 
contract allowing for down payment deposit with an option of 




bai al-arbun   deposit which one loses if one opts to revoke the contract 
bai al-muajjal   ﺒﻴﻊ  ﺍﺟﻝ   
Sale for which payment is made at a future fixed date or within a 
fixed period. In short, it is a sale on Credit 
bai al-salam  
Deferred delivery sale; A type of sale in which the sale price is paid 





A contract that  refers to the  sale and purchase  
transaction  for  the  financing  of  assets  on  a  
deferred  and  an  instalment  basis  with  a  pre‐ 
Agreed payment period.  The  sale  price  will  
Include a profit margin.   
Bai`  al Inah   
fictitious sale  
 
Bai` al‐`Istisna    Contract for the making of an asset in the future 
Darūrah  
An exigency in the event that if the necessary act is not done, then it 
shall lead to the destruction of five fundamental needs 
 
Dhaman   
A  contract  of  guarantee  whereby  a  guarantor  
shall  underwrite  any  claim  and  obligation  that  
should  be  fulfilled  by  an  owner  of  the  asset.  
This  concept  is  also  applicable  to  a  guarantee  
provided  on  a  debt  transaction  in  the  event  a  
Debtor fails to fulfill his debt obligation.  






religious opinion concerning Islamic law  
 
Ghārār   
Deceptive uncertainty where details concerning the sale contract  
are unknown or uncertain.  
Haram  
an action which is absolutely forbidden and punishable  
 
I`ādat Al Shirā’   
Ijarah Thumma
 Bai`  
 
A  contract  which  begins  with  an  Ijarah  contract  
for  the  purpose  of  leasing  the  lessor’s  asset  to the lessee.  
Consequently,  at  the  end  of  the  
lease period, a lessee will purchase the asset at  
an  agreed  price  from  a  lessor  by  executing  
a purchase (Bai`) contract.   
Ijārah   Arabic term for renting and leasing 
Istisna`   
A  purchase  order  contract  of  assets whereby a buyer  will  place  
an  order  to  purchase  an  asset that will  be  delivered  in  the  
future.  In  other words  a  buyer  will  require  a  seller  or  
a contractor to deliver or      
construct the asset that will be completed in the future according to 
the specifications given  in  the  sale  and  purchase contract.  Both  
parties  to  the  contract  will decide on the  sale and purchase  
prices  as they wish  and  the  settlement  can  be  delayed  
or arranged based  on  the   schedule  of  the  work completed.   
Kafālah   
Indemnity letter issued by a guarantor - to guarantee the payment 
obligation should the guaranteed party fail to fulfil its contractual 
obligations. In other words, the issuer commits itself to pay a 
specified amount to the beneficiary in the event of non-performance 
of obligation by the guaranteed party.  
Mubādalah  











A  Mudarabah contract is a profit sharing contract in which the 
capital provider agrees to share the profits between themselves and 
the entrepreneur at an agreed ratio or percentage. Under the 
Mudarabah contract, the bank will have agreed to give the depositor 
a share of its profits in return for the investment, based on a pre-
agreed ratio.  
 
Investment financing through Mudarabah is a commitment to 
participate in the risk associated with business ventures, with the 
aim of sharing the profit generated from a given business venture. 
Parties to the Mudarabah contract will only benefit if the venture is 
successful. Should the project fail, the financier will lose his 
investment, whereas the businessman will only lose the time and 
effort expended on the project.  
In general, conditions imposed and agreed on by both parties limit 
the mobilisation of the funds raised under a Mudarabah contract, 
such as wages of entrepreneurs, types of business venture or 
investment, as well as profit and loss sharing among the funds. 
Mudarabah, unlike Musharakah, does not entitle the capital 
provider to an executive function in the management of the business 
venture.  
 
Muḍārib  Labour provider 
Maslahah  Public interest   
Maysir   Gambling   
Murabaha -  cost plus sale 
Rahn  
A contract to pledge a specified asset as security against a debt to 
benefit a community.  Whereby the creditor (Murtahin) is entitled 
to hold custody of the Zakat Alms giving asset. In the event of 
default by the debtor (Rāhin), the creditor may sell the asset.  
Riba  Interest 




A Salam contract is an agreement to purchase, at a pre-determined  
price, a specified kind of commodity not available with the seller,  
which is to be delivered on a specified future date in a specified  
Quantity and quality. The institution offering Islamic financial  
services, as the buyer, makes full payment of the purchase price  
Upon execution of a Salam contract. The commodity may or may  
Not be traded over the counter or on an exchange.  
Sukuk, كوكص 
Sukūk (certificates) each of which represents the holder’s 
(certificates) proportionate ownership in an undivided part of an 
underlying asset where the holder assumes all rights and obligations 
to such an asset.   
Tahawwut   Hedging   
Tawarruq   
Purchasing an asset with deferred price, either on the basis of sale 
contract without the disclosure of the asset cost or price and profit 
margin to the buyer) or Murābahah, then selling it to, then selling it 
to a third party to obtain cash.  Monetization of commodities 
 
Wakālah   
An agency contract where the customer (principal) appoints the 
institution off contract with the bank offering Islamic financial 
services as an agent- Wakīl- to carry out business on their behalf.  
 








Figure 1: A Mudarabah contract ........................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 
Figure 2: A Murabaha contract ............................................................................................................. 65 
Figure 3: How a Murabaha contract works ........................................................................................... 69 
Figure 4: How a traditional Wa’ad contract works ............................................................................... 72 
Figure 5: An Ijara contract. ................................................................................................................... 77 
Figure 6:  An Itsisna contract ................................................................................................................ 78 
Figure 7: BIMB Risk management framework ..................................................................................... 92 
Figure 8: BIMB Risk Management Strategies .................................................................................... 100 
Figure 9: BIMB Risk Management enabler ........................................................................................ 101 
Figure 10: The three pillars of Basel III .............................................................................................. 112 
Figure 11: Phase-in arrangements ....................................................................................................... 116 
Figure 12: Islamic banking: Origin and current state.......................................................................... 127 
Figure 13: Basel III haircut effects ..................................................................................................... 128 
Figure 14: Sources of financing by Malaysian banks ......................................................................... 148 
Figure 15: Investment projects by Malaysian banks ........................................................................... 150 
Figure 16: The composition of Malaysian banking structures. ........................................................... 152 
Figure 17: Credit risk management in Islamic banks.......................................................................... 167 
Figure 18: IFSB Published Standard on Credit Risk .......................................................................... 169 
Figure 19: An Islamic bank balance sheet .......................................................................................... 186 
Figure 20: The Saudi Bank non-performing loans .............................................................................. 209 












 17 | P a g e  
 
17 
Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research Background 
In the midst of the global financial crisis of 2008-2010, the Vatican’s official newspaper, 
Osservatore Romano, expressed in an article translated and cited by Bloomberg that “the 
ethical principles on which Islamic finance is based may bring banks closer to their clients 
and to the true spirit which should mark every financial service.”1 It further criticised the 
conventional financial system for having “grown too much and badly in the past two 
decades.” Although the Vatican sought to show the stark unlikeness between the risk averse 
religious financial system and the risk-seeking and profit-obsessed conventional financial 
system, it described Islamic finance as client-oriented and ethical; and suggested that Western 
banks could use sukuk2 or Islamic bond/financial certificates which require payment for the 
time-value of money as collateral.3  
Some active members of civil society also took a moralistic stance towards the conventional 
financial system as demonstrated in a column by Ann Pettifor in The Guardian: 
Let us make no bones about it. The financial crisis is a major spiritual crisis.  
It is the crisis of a society that worships at the temples of consumption, and 
that has isolated and often abandoned millions of consumers now trapped on a 
treadmill of debt. It is the crisis of a society that values the capital gains of the 
renter more highly than the rights of people to have a home, or an education or 
health. It is the crisis of a society that idolises money above love community, 
wellbeing and the sustainability of our planet. And it is a crisis, in my view, 
for faith organizations that have effectively colluded in this idolatry by 
tolerating the sin of usury.4 
Establishing a link between the recent financial crisis and moral deficiencies in the 
management of conventional financial institutions was not the prerogative of religious 
institutions and civil society opinion leaders. Many commentators identified unethical 
practices in the market and argued that there was a connection between these practices and 
the financial crisis. Calomiris suggested a connection between the crisis and the devious 
                                                 
 
1 L Totaro, “Vatican Says Islamic Finance May Help Western Banks in Crisis” (Bloomberg 4th March, 2009). 
2 All Romanised transliterations of Arabic words used are listed, with Arabic original text, possible alternative spellings and 
dictionary definitions, in the Lexicon. 
3 Ibid. 
4 A Pettifor , “Face to Face” (The Guardian 11 October 2008). 
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practice of issuing unrealistic and risk mortgage loans to customers with low or no income.5  
Mian and Sufi argued that the genesis of the crisis was the packaging of loans in such a way 
as to conceal the actual risks.6 Skreta and Veldkampon their part laid the blame at the door of 
specialists with unreliable ratings,7  while Posner argued that the risky investment policies of 
financial institutions led to the credit crunch.8 Brunnermeier blamed the culture of serving 
self-interests;9  and the HM Treasury attributed the crisis to the lack of effective controls at 
both the corporate and national levels.10  
Given the nefarious and pervasive consequences of the financial crisis and the ensuing 
recession, many questions were also raised about the sustainability of the conventional 
banking system and the need for appropriate mechanisms for recapitalizing and restructuring 
banks.11 Interestingly, the link between the financial crisis and moral deficiencies favour the 
recommendation of an alternative system purportedly built on ethics and benevolence, such 
as Islamic finance. Ahmed argues that the Islamic finance model may have attenuated the 
severity of the financial crisis because it encourages businesses to generate only a fair and 
legitimate profit and insulates the market from the potential systemic risks that result from 
excessive leverage and speculation.12 He also posits that Islamic banking allows credit 
primarily for the buying and selling of real goods and services and requires the creditor to 
share in the risk of default by prohibiting the sale of debt.13 Zerban et al argue that Islamic 
finance would not lead to a credit crisis because such crises are caused by the deviation from 
basic motivation of investment which is to promote social welfare and long-term growth. 
These are values that Islamic finance still promotes unlike conventional finance that focuses 
on the unabated pursuit of short-term gains through innovations and deregulation.14 Chapra 
similarly argues that Islamic finance may effectively minimise the frequency of subprime 
                                                 
 
5 CW Calomiris,  “The Subprime Turmoil: What’s Old, What’s New, and What’s Next?” (2009) 15 The Journal of 
Structured Finance 1, 6-52. 
6 A Mian and A Sufi, “The Consequences of Mortgage Credit Expansion: Evidence from the 2007 Mortgage Default Crisis” 
(2009) 124 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 4, 1449-1496. 
7 V Skreta and L Veldkamp , “Ratings Shopping and Asset Complexity: A Theory of Ratings Inflation” (2009) 56 Journal of 
Monetary Economics 5, 678-695. 
8 RA Posner, A Failure of Capitalism. The Crisis of ’08 and the Descent into Depression (Harvard University Press 2009). 
9 M Brunnermeier, “Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008” (2009) 23 Journal of Economic Perspectives 
1, 77-100. 
10 HM Treasury, Reforming Financial Markets (Cm 7667, London HMSO 2009). 
11 S Khatimada, Did the Financial Sector Profit at the Expense of the Rest of the Economy? Evidence from the United States 
(ILO 2010). 
12 A Ahmed, “Global Financial Crisis: An Islamic Finance Perspective” (2010) 35 International Journal of Islamic and 
Middle Eastern Finance and Management 4, 306-320. 
13 Ibid, p 319. 
14 A Zerban, EH Elkady and RF Oma, “Islamic Finance and Global Financial Crises: How to Keep Finance on Track?” 
(2012) Tropics in Middle Eastern and African Economies 14, 190-222. 
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mortgage crisis because it focuses primarily on brick-and-mortar businesses, injects 
discipline in the market and reduces instability by restricting short sales, sales of debt, 
excessive uncertainty and gambling.15 
As such, although Islamic financial institutions neither participated in asset-transformation 
nor dealt with large risk transmission bodies acting in a coordinated undifferentiated manner, 
they have been held by many commentators to represent a safer alternative. This point is 
reinforced by the fact during the financial crisis many conventional financial institutions 
turned towards their respective governments for help. Thiruvengadam of the Wall Street 
Journal reported at the time that a sum of $2.98 trillion was spent by the US government on 
bank bailouts.16 On the other hand, the Saudi American Bank (SAMBA) and Riyad bank, 
both of Saudi Arabia, did not show any losses, except for the reduction in profitability. Also, 
the Al-Rajhi Bank, a Gulf based Islamic banking giant, reported a small increase in profits, 
from $1.72bn to $1.73bn between 2008 and 2009.17 The policy to protect the biggest 
companies from failure through low-interest loans and subsidies is based on the idea that the 
products of these companies are universal necessities that maintain the welfare and security 
of the State.18 This is related to the principle of “too big to fail” which encourages eligible 
banks to take greater risks.19  
During the crisis many conventional financial institutions failed due to mismanagement and it 
would have been consistent with the free market capitalist theory that underpins conventional 
finance to allow the free market forces to dismantle them organically.20 Thus, the 
predominant system of finance capitalism was undermined given that there was less reliance 
on entrepreneurship and profits to hedge against inevitable risks21 and there was also much 
reluctance to endorse speculation.22 It is in this light that Islamic finance has been presented 
                                                 
 
15 UM Chapra, “The Global Financial Crisis: Can Islamic Finance Help Minimise the Severity and Frequency of Such a 
Crisis in the Future?” Paper presented at the Forum on the Global Financial Crisis (Islamic Development Bank 25 
October 2008) 
16 M Thiruvengadam, “US Bailout So Far Total is $2.98 Trillion, Official Says” (The Wall Street Journal 31 March 2009). 
17 Citigroup, 2008 Annual Report (New York Citigroup 2009); RBS, Annual Report and Accounts 2008 (Godarburn  RBS 
2009); SAMBA, Consolidated Financial Statements and Auditors Reports for the Year Ended 31 December 2008. 
(Riyadh 2009); UBS, Annual Report 2008 (Zurich/Basel UBS 2009). 
18 IB Yeagar, “How to Avoid International Financial Crises” (1998) 17 Cato Journal 3, 257-65; A Meltzer, “Asian Problems 
and the IMF” (1998) 17 Cato Journal 3, 267-74. 
19 M Miskhin, The Causes and Propagation of Financial Instability: Lessons for Policymakers, Paper presented for a 
Symposium on Maintaining Financial Stability in a Global Economy (Wyoming 1997). 
20 MA Martinez, , The Myth of the Free Market. The Role of the State in a Capitalist (Sterling: Kumarian Press 2009), 281-
282. 
21 F Boldizzoni, Means and Ends: The Idea of Capital in the West 1500-1970 (Palgrave Macmillan 2008), 128-32. 
22 T Palley, From Financial Crisis to Stagnation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012) 218. 
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by its proponents as a more reliable alternative system given that it has a strong affinity with 
central planning.  . Proponents of Islamic finance stress what they purport to be humanitarian 
values and the fair distribution of resources by the Islamic State;23 given that speculation 
(Gharar) and interest are prohibited. It is often stated that for these reasons, Islamic financial 
institutions did not take part in asset-transformation prior to the 2007 financial crisis.  
Proponents of Islamic Banking (IB) assert that it has been proven, since the crisis, that 
Islamic banking is a good alternative to conventional banking. In 2015, PwC estimated that 
“the global Islamic finance market has grown at 23% CAGR to over $1.2 Trillion and is 
expected to reach $2.6 trillion by 2017.”24 Those proponents argue that IB is at least not open 
to making the same measure of losses due to its avoidance of risky interest-based derivatives 
such as collateralised debt obligations, and this is said to be a sign of the moral purity of IB 
practices. 
Yet the author can find few studies25 that focus attention on distressed or failed Islamic 
financial institutions and their internal systematic approaches as a means of analysing failure 
through inattention to risk management.  This is odd, for despite the glowing comments of 
many academics about the moral character of Islamic banking, there are some stunning 
examples of contraventions of law, dodgy accounting, poor operational practices and Shari’a 
non-compliance which have led to the failure of IBs such as Islamic Bank Ltd (IBZA) in 
South Africa in 1997.
26
 
Prior to its failure, IBZA’s largest Shari’a non-compliance was accumulating riba-based 
property debt which, weighed against its heavy promotion of Shari’a compliance, was at odds 
with its own ethical charter and public image. 
There is substantial and substantive literature dealing with conventional bank (CB) distress 
and failure.  Muslim proponents of such literature often point to the theoretical literature on 
Islamic banking which shows IBs to be more stable. This is said to be because the 
                                                 
 
23 G Rice and M Al-Mossawi, “The Implication of Islam for Advertising Messages: The Middle Eastern Context” (2002) 11 
Journal of Euromarketing 3, 71-95; H Mirza and A Fatemeh, “Developing an Islamic Principles-Based Marketing 
Framework” (2013) 3 Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences Research 3, 189-95. 
24 J Ashruff , Islamic Finance, Creating Value (2015). Retrieved from 
https://www.pwc.com/m1/en/publications/islamic_finance_capability_statement.pdf. 
25 M Nathie, “Islamic Bank Failure: A Case Study” (2010) 2 ISRA International Journal of Islamic Finance 1, 7-34. 
26 KPMG, The Inspector’s Report (20 November, 1997), pursuant to an order by the High Court of South Africa (Registrar 
of Banks v Islamic Bank Ltd, in liquidation, Case No 25286/97). 
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endogenous linking of returns on deposits with returns on assets of an IB serves as a 
disciplinary device, increases the efficiency of the bank and the financial system and serves 
as a stabilization mechanism saving the banks from deposit runs in crisis situation. The PLS 
feature, which appears on both the asset and liability sides of the balance sheet, is claimed by 
IB proponents to add to the stability of individual banks, and to avoid the domino effect, or a 
contagion effect that can influence the entire banking system. In this way, it assists in 
maintaining the stability of the financial system as a whole.27  
But in citing the failings of CBs and decrying the moral nature of the sub-prime crisis, 
proponents of IBs often ignore the crash of IBZA, the distress of Kuwait Finance House 
(KFH), which suffered heavy losses due to large exposure to the construction industry in 
1984,28 or the distress of the Islamic International Bank of Denmark that lost more than 30% 
of its equity between 1985 and 1986 which Grais and Pelligrini29 blame on excessive risk-
taking and heavy exposure to a single borrower.  
Around September 1982 Kuwait’s Souk al-Manakh (an unofficial over-the-counter stock 
market) collapsed, which collapse was attributed to highly speculative short sales associated 
with a small group of dubious and unregulated companies –incorporated in Kuwait, Bahrain 
and the UAE.  Not long after, five banks - Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt, the Dubai Islamic 
Bank, the Khartoum-based Tadamon Islamic Bank, the Qatar Islamic Bank and Kuwait 
Finance House, lost heavily in the collapse of Bank of Commerce and Credit International, 
supposedly buying Shari’a compliant assets which in fact did not exist, and showing a 
massive failure of directorial and Shari’a oversight.30 
The collapse of Ihlas Finance House
 
in Turkey, the country’s largest IB at the time with over 
40% of the sector deposits, in 2002 was caused by the illegal misappropriation of almost 
US$1billion, virtually the entire value of the deposit base, through connected lending to 
shareholders, concealed by the rapid growth of deposits – indeed, a national Ponzi scheme.31 
                                                 
 
27 SS Ali, “Financial distress and bank failure: Lessons from closure of Ihlas Finans in Turkey” (2007) 14 Islamic Economic 
Studies 1 & 2.  
28 Nathie, N_25 above.  
29W Grais and M Pellegrini, Corporate Governance in Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services Issues and Options 
(World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4052 November 2006) 4. 
30 The Asian Wall Street Journal, BCCI Creditors Granted More Time (9 April, 1992). 
31 Grais, N_29 above.  
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Evidence shows IFH’s collapse was precipitated by a combination of risky lending, rapid 
expansion, and questionable central bank regulation amongst others.  
The Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia) had to negotiate a rescue package 
after the Bank Islam Malaysia incurred losses of about £80 million in 2005. Provision for bad 
loans were around £120 million and the gross non-performing loan portfolio was nearly £350 
million ultimately 40% of the bank was sold overseas for approximately £170 million. The 
bank returned to profitability two years later32 
The IMF reports that during approximately the same period as the financial crisis in Western 
countries, IBs in Qatar and the UAE, fared relatively worse than Conventional Banks. IBs 
hold about 27 percent of total banking assets in the subject countries.33 The IMF concludes 
that “An aggregate test for the whole sample indicates that, on average, the difference 
between the cumulative impacts of the crisis on the profitability of the two groups of banks is 
insignificant.”  However “the nonperforming loan ratio for IBs remained slightly higher than 
that for CBs.”34   
In relation to bank failures in mature economies, a report by the Basel Committee 35 finds that 
one-off failures are not tied to economic conditions but to the failure of banks’ true capital 
positions caused by accounting and valuation inadequacies as well as bad credit risk. [The 
sentences beginning with “It could therefore be argued….” and ending with “…by many 
commentators” have been deleted as recommended by examiners] 
The Qur’an favours entrepreneurship and the accumulation of wealth, since the Prophet 
(Peace and Blessings be upon Him) was an honest entrepreneur who managed his wife’s 
wealth.36 The Prophet (Peace and Blessings be upon Him) also refused to put a ceiling for 
prices in the market, preferring to leave this to market forces.37  
                                                 
 
32 AMET Ahmed and W Grais, Islamic Finance and Economic Development: Risk, Regulation, and Corporate Governance 
(John Wiley & Sons 2014). 
33 M Hasan and J Dridi, The Effects of the Global Crisis on Islamic and Conventional Banks: A Comparative Study (IMF 
Working Paper September 2010) 16-17. 
34 Ibid.  
35 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Bank Failures in Mature Economies (Working Paper No. 13 April 2004).   
36 H Hosseini, “Notions of Private Property in Islamic Economics in Contemporary Iran: A Review of Literature” (1988) 15 
International Journal of Social Economics 9, 51-61. 
37 Ibid. 
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A more reasonable argument is that put forward by Warde that although what is religiously 
permissible is not always advisable from a purely business perspective, and Islamic financial 
institutions are not somehow miraculously immune from incompetence and fraud, these 
institutions are less likely to be as adversely affected as the conventional institutions during a 
crisis.38 He gave two reasons: First, given their strong link to the “real economy” involving 
brick-and-mortar businesses, Islamic banks are less likely to be exposed to the risks created 
by institutions that gobble toxic intangible assets. Secondly, Islamic investors do not 
necessarily enter or leave the Islamic market on the basis of the profits and losses attached to 
classes of assets. Thus, Islamic institutions often have elbow room to adjust their practices 
and products.39 As will be shown below, this argument is double-edged. It does not only 
endorse Islamic finance but also promotes non-standardisation given that it is the elbow room 
or flexibility that enables Islamic banks to adjust their practices and products in light of 
changes in their environment. 
1.2 Brief History of Islamic Finance   
The process of integrating Islamic banking into the global banking system began in the 
1970s40 and it has transformed significantly since then, partly due to religious commitment 
and partly due to material change. In 2010, Davies and Green put the total capital value of 
Islamic instruments at more than $500 billion; and over the last decade this has almost 
certainly expanded at an annual rate of between 10% and 15%.41 However, the transformative 
events during this time have not allowed for certain pertinent questions to be decided 
conclusively.  
The proponents argue that the recent growth of Islamic finance in non-Muslim regions such 
as Europe, especially during the recent financial crisis shows that Islamic finance may be 
safer choice for the economies of many countries across the globe.42 This is an easy argument 
                                                 
 
38 I Warde, Islamic Finance in the Global Economy, (2nd Edition, Edinburgh University Press 2010) 173-4. 
39 Ibid. 
40 FA Al-Omar and M Iqbal, Challenges Facing Islamic Banking in the 21st Century, Proceedings of the Second Harvard 
University Forum on Islamic Finance: Islamic Finance into the 21st Century (Cambridge, MA Center for Middle Eastern 
Studies 1999) 243-53; M Ariff, “Islamic Banking” (1988) 2 Asian-Pacific Economic Literature 2, 46-62.; MK Hassan and 
MK Lewis (Eds), Handbook of Islamic Banking (Cheltenham, Glos Edward Elgar Publishing 2007); M Khan and MI 
Bhatti, “Development in Islamic Banking: A Financial Risk-Allocation Approach” (2008) 9 The Journal of Risk Finance 
1, 40-51; A Saed, Islamic Banking and Interest: A Study of the Prohibition of Riba and its Contemporary Interpretation 
(Boston Brill 1999). 
41 H Davies and D Green, Banking on the Future: The Fall and Rise of Central Banking (Princeton, NJ Princeton University 
Press 2010) 229. 
42 F Syed , Islamic Banking is not For Muslims Alone (DnaIndia, 2012). 
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to make given that there has only been one real failure of Islamic finance and that was 
precocious, during the Dubai property bubble.43 It is submitted that the small incidence of 
failure so far is a mere historical accident and a function of IF being still at the developmental 
phase. The author will argue that the coming shock in KSA can be reduced by standardisation 
and harmonisation of accounting measures which will allow for appropriate risk management 
and liquidity. This is the problem that this thesis addresses. The next section expatiates on the 
problem. 
1.3 Statement of Research Problem 
Towards the end of last century, Islamic banking emerged globally as a substantive system 
and IBs now offer products and services in competition with conventional banks (CB). The 
concept of Islamic banking is often associated with the buying and selling of Shari’a 
compliant products and the promotion of economic behavioural norms derived from the 
Qur’an.44 The system has been mainstreamed in many Muslim majority nations,45 but CBs 
still operate in parts of those nations. IBs also operate in non-Muslim countries that have 
allowed the establishment of some form of Islamic banking. As the author will show,46 the 
impact of the recent financial crisis on Islamic banks was less severe than on conventional 
banks. Beyond the obvious deduction that Islamic banks were not involved in asset 
transformation involving toxic assets based on interest,47 the fact that some commentators 
established a link between moral deficiencies in conventional banking and the financial crisis 
has given many to understand that Islamic banks may be a less problematic alternative given 
that they promote ethical finance and eschew speculation and reckless risk-taking.48  
However, the author will demonstrate49 that IBs at least in the Gulf region take just as 
speculative risks, albeit of a different sort, and ones which appear to be Shari’a compliant. 
                                                 
 
43 Ibid.  
44 HG Rammal and R Zurbruegg, “Awareness of Islamic Banking Products among Muslims: The Case of Australia” (2007) 
12 Journal of Financial Services Marketing 1, 65-74. 
45 Islamic Financial Services Industry Development, Ten Year Framework and Strategies (Islamic Research and Training 
Institute 2006). 
46 in chapters 5 and 6 
47 H van Greuning and Z Iqbal, Risk Analysis for Islamic Banks (The World Bank Washington, D.C. 2008). 
48 A Malik, MS Malik and H Shab, “An Analysis of Islamic Banking and Finance in West: From Lagging to Leading” 
(2011) 7 Asia Social Science 1, 179-85; T Rachman and M Hossaim,  “Analysis of Investment Cost: The Case of Islamic 
Banks in Bangladesh” (2013) 9 JIEBF 1; Strategic Performance Plan 2013-2015: Identifying Strategic Goals and Key 
Result Areas, Kuala Lumpu, Malaysia. 
49 in chapter 7 
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Ariff, one of the pioneer researchers in the field of modern Islamic banking, claims that a key 
selling point of Islamic banking is that it looks at overall feasibility and viability of a 
borrower’s project rather than the size of the collateral.50 This is unlike conventional banking 
where the security offered by the borrower against a loan is of utmost importance to the 
latter’s legal relationship with the bank. Hence, profitable projects which might be turned 
down by conventional banks (except may be merchant or investment banks) for lack of 
proper security would be picked up by the Islamic banks due to their ethos of profit and loss 
sharing.51  
Although the risks embedded in such projects are logically high, the Islamic banking sector 
may be said to be instrumental in economic development since the institutions invest in the 
riskier end of the markets.52  It is however perfectly in keeping with the core philosophy of 
Islamic finance, that profit, loss and risk must be shared. If one does not take a risk, one does 
not deserve to make a profit. Conventional finance is seen to unjustly place too much of the 
burden of risk on the debtor.53  Proponents argue that this is not reckless risk-taking given 
that the depositors are aware of the fact that these banks pool their resources to make Shari’a 
compliant investments that may generate a profit or result in a loss.  
Islamic banks engage in risk sharing with the depositors and borrowers rather than engage in 
risk transfer as in conventional banks. This is why some of the main concepts in Islamic 
finance include profit-sharing or Mudahraba, safekeeping or Wadiah, and joint venture or 
Musharaka. Islamic banking is also similar to investment banking and management and 
therefore has the advantage of less volatile income streams and stable earnings.54 
Despite the above advantages, a major challenge hindering the growth of Islamic banking is 
the non-existence of a prudential regulatory body or lead regulator that manages risks and 
errors at the prudential level by setting standards and entering into memorandums of 
understanding with the Shari’a boards or advisory councils of financial institutions or other 
self-regulatory bodies.55 The lack of standardisation is firstly due to underdevelopment (or 
                                                 
 
50 Arriff, N_40 above. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 I Abraham, Riba and Recognition: Religion, Finance and Multiculturalism (Paper presented to the Conference of the  
Australian Association for the Study of Religion Monash University 2008). 
54 KT Law, The Business of Investment Banking: A Comprehensive Overview (2nd Edition, London Wiley 2005) 3-4. 
55 N Ali, Islamic Finance: Current Legal and Regulatory Issues (Harvard: Islamic Finance Project 2005). 
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what El-Aksheik and Tanega calls “infancy”)56 of the sector, secondly due to the fact that 
there are no standard or universal laws per se even governing the entrepreneur’s behaviour, 
and thirdly due to under-reporting of risk factors. Islamic Juris consults have generally sought 
to distinguish between morality, religion and the law.57  
This is because despite the claim that Islamic finance is ethical finance, there is nothing 
intrinsically ethical about it in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). Fiqh is a logical normative 
discourse and its hermeneutical premise does not correspond with what may be described as a 
category of law (al-qanun al-Islami). It is a positive system of rules that has been applied 
over the centuries in different regions in varying degrees of flexibility.58 
As such, prudential regulation is particularly important here because although the risks 
associated with capital and collateral in Islamic markets are low, the risks of insolvency and 
liquidity are relatively very high.59 Thus, the absence of a regulatory framework within which 
Islamic banks may be supervised and controlled increases confusion as to the content of the 
relevant Islamic legal rules. Moreover, the conflict in opinions over Shari’a creates systemic 
risks since different Shari’a boards or advisory councils will put different interpretations on 
the applicable verses of the Qur’an, which means that there cannot be a uniform regulatory 
framework.  
There have been attempts to standardise Islamic finance. The Islamic Financial Services 
Board (IFSB) was created in 2002 to perform the role of a lead supervisory authority in the 
markets of the States involved in the body’s creation.60 It has since issued global prudential 
standards and rules for the Islamic market. However, the standards and rules on capital 
adequacy61 mirror those set under Basel II;62 except for the fact that risk weights based on the 
supervisory slotting criteria of Basel II is replaced by discretionary rules governing 
                                                 
 
56 AAA Al Elsheikh and J Tanega, “Sukuk Structure and Its Regulatory Environment in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia” 
(2011) Law and Financial Markets Review 183, 184-5. 
57 V Cattlelan, “Islamic Finance and Ethical Investments” in Khan, F.M., and Porzio, M. (eds), Islamic Banking Finance in 
the European Union. A Challenge (Cheltenham Edward Elgar 2010) 79-80. 
58 Ibid. 
59 L Errico and M Farahbaksh, “Islamic Banking: Issues in Prudential Regulations and Supervision” (IMF Working Paper 
WP/98/30 1998). 
60 AME Ahmed, Islamic Banking: How to Manage Risks and Improve Profitability (Hoboken John Wiley & Sons 2011) 36. 
61 IFSB, Capital Adequacy Standards for Institutions (Other than Insurance Institutions) Offering Only Islamic Financial 
Services (Kuala Lumpur IFSB 2005). 
62 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Conversion of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A 
Revised Framework (BCBS 2004). 
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specialised financing under the Mudaraba and Musharakaschemes.63 The IFSB was created to 
act in the same capacity as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) but its role 
seems superfluous, since it merely reiterates the rules set by the latter. In the same vein, the 
Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) based in 
Bahrain has set standards that it hopes would serve as benchmark for Islamic financial 
institutions around the world. Some commentators argue that these standards also closely 
reflect those of Basel II on capital adequacy.64 This is the same with regard to the similarity 
between the International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM) and the International Capital 
Market Association, although both associations are collaborating on setting standardised rules 
governing the floating and trading in Sukuk.65  
It is surprising that the Shari’a boards or advisory councils of Islamic banks have not simply 
been requested to implement international standards in a manner that accords with their 
interpretation of the Shari’a law. This seems to be the most practical way of achieving 
harmonisation or standardisation. There are two arguments in favour of non-standardisation. 
The first is that the lack of standards may be credited with the growth of Islamic finance over 
the past decades. If it is assumed that growth in finance and banking is directly linked to 
innovation based on freedom of contract or association,66 then the fact that Islamic financial 
institutions are not required to adopt compulsory standards may be said to have encouraged 
innovation. This contention is based on the argument that supervision by a lead regulator is 
often otiose since the financial system is based on the multiplier effect and financial leverage 
and therefore intrinsically unstable.67 Moreover, the system relies almost exclusively on 
confidence.68 Banks generally hold only a percentage of the money deposited in their 
accounts (to comply with reserve requirements) and lend the rest. Thus, given that they use 
short-term borrowing to finance long-term assets, they are often confronted with maturity 
mismatch between assets and liabilities.69 It follows from here that they can manage the 
different related risks (credit and liquidity especially) during normal times. However, during 
                                                 
 
63 N Schoon, Islamic Banking and Finance (London Spiramus 2010) 171-9. 
64 van Greuning, N_47 above.  
65 Ibid. 
66 J Ellig, “Introduction” in Ellig, J. (ed), Dynamic Competition and Public Policy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
2001) 13-14. 
67 MM Prates, Why Prudential Regulation Will Fail to Prevent Financial Crisis: A Legal Approach (Working Paper Series 
No 335 Banco Central do Brasil 2013) 5. 
68 RM Lastra, Central Banking and Banking Regulation (London Financial Markets Group LSE 1996) 69; G Simmel, The 
Philosophy of Money, translated by T Bottomore and D Frisby (3rd Edition, London Routledge 2004) 173. 
69 Ibid., 78-83. 
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times of distress or where there is a run on the banks, it is only the sustained confidence in the 
banks that will save the illiquid institutions from being overwhelmed.70 Hence, since 
depositors in Islamic banks rely on the bank’s commitment to Islamic precepts, the 
confidence is sustained even during crisis; and there is no need for standardised rules and a 
lead regulator.  
However, there is a surprising lack of evidence to the effect that non-standardisation has 
effectively encouraged innovation in Islamic finance or that the confidence of depositors 
remains strong during times of crisis because of the banks’ commitment to implement Islamic 
principles.   The mere fact that banks in the UK and in Malaysia were substantially 
unaffected by the sub-prime crisis does not mean that there is a relationship between non-
standardisation and survival.  It will be argued in subsequent chapters that the relative infancy 
of IB meant that there was little innovation of products which could have caused a crisis in 
the UK and in Malaysia; the Dubai housing bubble is proof that there are Shari’a compliant 
products that if not correctly used can lead to a similar crisis for a bank or even a whole 
economy, because of essentially the same root cause.  
To be able to determine the appropriate answers to this thesis’ research questions, it is 
necessary for this thesis to first seek to determine whether the risks in the financial system 
such as the lack of flexibility amongst institutions and the lack of unitary regulatory control 
have impeded or enhanced the development and growth of Islamic banking.  The central 
argument of the thesis is that the incorporation of pertinent Basel components, as well as 
those from the Malaysia and UK banking system into the KSA banking system will bring 
about improvements to the latter’s overall banking structure. To be able to prove this claim, it 
is vital to first consider the risks to Islamic finance prior to any presumption of Islamic 
innovation based on freedom of contract.  This central argument takes into account the risks 
of complying or not complying with international standards and the laws inherent of 
particular jurisdictions.  Once answers to such determination are achieved, the research will 
then proceed to answer the core thesis questions based on an in-depth analysis of available 
literature. 
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In interpreting the applicability of the central argument to Islamic banking, we have identified 
three abstract issues that apply to Islamic banking in general, namely,   
 The absence of an accurate measure 
 The absence of a legal framework, and 
 The incompatibility between conventional regulations and Islamic banking. 
Before we discuss each of these issues in detail below, it is important to recognize that these 
issues will need to be translated into more detailed risk factors for the purposes of concrete 
risk analysis.  There are potentially an extraordinary number of particular risk factors 
depending on the specific details of the case study in question.  These various risk factors are 
discussed in detail in Chapter 7.   
1.4 The Absence of an Accurate Measure 
As will be shown in Chapter 2, a review of the extant literature reveals that there is no 
measure by which to determine whether a product is Shari’a compliant. Compliance usually 
depends on the interpretations of the Qur’an and the Sunnah by the relevant Shari’a 
supervisory board, and these differ over time and from region to region. 
No set of legal determinations authoritatively represents the Islamic legal system. It is a 
cumulative system of juristic investigations into the Quran, represented by several competing 
schools of jurisprudential thought. These schools diverge on legal methodology and 
hermeneutical approaches but each is considered equally authoritative. 71 
Nonetheless setting standards that would govern the interpretation and implementation of the 
relevant rules remains an arduous task. Although the International Financial Reporting 
Standard (IFRS) has successfully harmonised accounting standards across hundreds of 
countries around the world,72 some Muslim scholars and academics claim that IFRS is not 
suitable for Islamic banking. Shafi and Zakaria conducted in-depth interviews of Shari’a 
officers, accountants and academics in Malaysia and captured their views on how 
practitioners of the local Islamic financial industry deal with the IFRS standards.73 The 
                                                 
 
71 KA El Fadl, “Islamic Law, Human Rights and Neo-colonialism” in C Miller (ed) War on terror (The Oxford Amnesty 
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interviewees revealed a number of concerns. First, the terminologies used in the IFRS should 
be “Islamicised.” For example, the term “interest” is used in the IFRS to refer to cash flows 
calculated over a time period, but this translates to riba which is prohibited by the Qur’an and 
should be discarded away with in order for Muslims to implement the IFRS. Also, the 
application of time value of money principle that is upheld in the IFRS is allowed under the 
Shari’a only for exchange contracts that involve deferred payment and it is prohibited in debt-
based transactions (qard). The interviewees said they were therefore reluctant to comply with 
the IFRS but complied fully with the resolutions of the Shari’a Advisory Council (SAC) of 
the Central Bank of Malaysia (BNM).74 However, these resolutions do not involve 
harmonised standards but instead comprise a list of general concepts or assumptions that are 
deemed Shari’a permissible by SAC.75  
The findings of the study conducted by Shafi and Zakaria may however be contrasted with 
that conducted by Alsaqqal and Sawan in the Dubai and Abu Dhabi stock markets that reveal 
that the benefits of implementing the IFRS in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) markets far 
outweigh the difficulties and costs.76 In fact, of the 10 most cited difficulties and challenges, 
only one concerns the disparity between the IFRS and the Shari’a. It is fair value and it is 
ranked fourth.77 The researchers also enquired about “cultural issues” and the Zakat 
(obligatory alms) requirements rank first in the list of cultural issues, while language is 
ranked second, and UAE pride is ranked third.78 The absence of consensus on what is 
permissible under Shari’a therefore raises the question of whether there really is an Islamic 
banking “system” that exists independently of the conventional system or the former is not 
simply an attempt at Islamicising the latter. In other words, the non-standardisation of rules 
may point to the fact that Islamic banking has so far been an unsuccessful (so far) attempt to 
mould conventional banking in light of the precepts of the Qur’an.  
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1.5 The Absence of a Legal Framework 
Shari’a compliant banking needs to be determined legally. In other words, the recognition 
and measurement of an Islamic financial transaction or product should defer to its legal form 
rather than worry about the ‘substance’ of it. This argument is related to the secularisation of 
the legal order under Islamic law.79 Malaysia, Turkey and Indonesia are amongst the few 
nations around the world with a predominantly Muslim population that do not have Islam as 
the religion of the State and in which there is, on the other hand, a clear separation of State 
and religion.80 Thus, the Shari’a is often regarded as the Islamic legal order and corresponds 
to the legal situation in most Islamic States.81 Nonetheless, as noted above, the Shari’a cannot 
be uniformly applied and depends on the interpretations of the relevant authorities. This 
implies that normative claims about the Shari’a based on logic (fiqh) would actually be closer 
to the legal form. The fiqh has been succinctly defined as “the mundane effort to understand, 
interpret and implement the Shari’a” or “the way the divine revelation is put into practice in 
the world.”82 However, given that the fiqh is itself not standardised, it may be difficult to 
refer to it as the legal order. This is compounded by the fact that there are no set rules 
governing the interpretation of the Shari’a or the process by which the fiqh is developed and 
established.  
Thus, the main problem as regards the legality of Islamic banking transactions and products 
stems from that of legal secularisation in Islamic States. Conventional banking transactions 
and products are not confronted with similar problems because they do not have an economic 
background. The Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt recently held that the provision of 
Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution of 1971 (as amended on 22 May 1980) to the effect 
that the principles of the Islamic Shari’a constitute the major source of the legislation, may be 
interpreted as implying that the legislators are only bound by the “definite rules” or “general 
principles and immutable sources of Islamic law” of the Shari’a. They are not bound by 
“specific rules” that are open to interpretation or independent reasoning (ijtihad) in light to 
the “change in time and clime” as long as the interpretation conforms to the overall spirit of 
                                                 
 
79 B Krawietz (ed) “Introduction” in Krawietz, B., and Reifeld, H. (eds), Islam and the Rule of Law. Between Shari’a and 
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80 Ibid., 11-12. 
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the Shari’a.83 It may therefore be said that the set of legal rules governing the Shari’a 
compliance of Islamic banking products and transactions constitute “specific rules.” This 
implies that Islamic products and transactions that are Islamic only in form and not substance 
are not Shari’a compliant.84 However, this further raises the question of which market ought 
to determine what constitutes the “substance” of Shari’a; the Malaysian Islamic finance 
market or the London and European finance market or and Middle Eastern finance markets?85 
This question fits well into the debate of substance and form.  
Some practitioners have suggested that the doctrine of ‘substance over form’ is applicable to 
all financial transactions conducted under Islamic laws and a convenient way around the 
problem of disclosure is to present the legal aspect in the notes to the accounts.86 The 
insistence on reporting requirements is based on the fact that Islamic financing is effected 
through sale or lease rather than straightforward lending as is the case with conventional 
financing. This viewpoint is also supported by verse 282 of the Qur’an: 
O ye who believe! When ye deal with each other in transactions involving future 
obligations in a fixed period of time, reduce them to writing; let a scribe write down 
faithfully as between the parties; let not the scribe refuse to write; as Allah has taught 
him, so let him write … 
Also, para 111 of AAOIFI-FAS 2 defines “reliability” as follows: 
That based on all the specific circumstances surrounding a particular transaction or 
event, the method chosen to measure and/or disclose its effects produces information 
that reflects the substance of the event or transaction. 
However, the emphasis on reporting does not solve issues such as that involving Zakat 
(obligatory alms) calculation, accounting and taxation. These calculations may be modified 
and recorded or not, depending on the circumstances. Thus, it may be argued that Islamic 
finance thrives on non-standardisation of the relevant or “specific” rules of Shari’a. To this 
extent, standardisation may be deemed to be counterproductive since it essentially entails 
imposing a given interpretation by the advisory council or supervisory board of one 
institution on other institutions operating in different circumstances.  
                                                 
 
83 Ibid, 123-124. 
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1.6 The Incompatibility between Conventional Regulations and Islamic Banking 
It has been argued that the banking rules and regulations and guidelines in the Western world 
are based on conventional banking and do not suit Islamic banking as such.87 Islamic law 
prohibits trade in pork-related products, alcoholic beverages, and tobacco, as well as 
gambling, but it permits slave-trading. Shari’a also prohibits the charging of interest (riba). 
Also, there are several persons who belong to several Shari’a supervisory boards of different 
banks and may therefore not pass the fit and proper test in the UK due to conflicts of 
interest.88   
This was not raised as a concern when the former UK lead regulator, the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA), in a briefing note published in 2006,89 identified Islamic banking as a 
growing subsector within the UK banking sector. The FSA authorised the operations of 
Islamic Bank of Britain in 2004, making it the first authorised Islamic Bank in the country.90 
The European Islamic Investment Bank was the first Islamic investment bank to get 
authorisation from the FSA.91 In the FSA’s own words, IB is an innovative financial service 
and does not justify the regulation of Islamic banks in a different manner than conventional 
banks. Thus, Islamic banks are regulated same way as any other financial institutions with 
“no obstacles, no special favours.”92 While this open and transparent approach is much 
appreciated, it does create certain problems for the Islamic Banks.  
These banks take ‘saving’ deposits but unlike a normal savings account, they do not 
guarantee a fixed income or even the full repayment of the original deposit as the funds are 
invested in profit and loss sharing schemes (Musharaka). These are non-interest bearing, 
equity-based investments which can generate a loss as well as a profit and directly conflict 
with the view that the FSA takes on saving deposits.93 The possibility of a loss means that, 
absent adequate risk management and liquidity measures, Islamic banks have much higher 
levels of insolvency and liquidity risks. They must therefore be treated differently in order to 
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ensure that these risks are mitigated. It may then be argued that standardised rules may ensure 
that all Islamic banks comply with appropriate risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio.94 They 
may also require all Islamic banks to show that they have liquidity support from a viable non-
financial institution or community. Also, where a lead regulator applies standardised rules, it 
may screen the products and contracts of all Islamic banks and ensure that counterparty risks 
are generally properly assessed for risk and then mitigated by well-organised clearance and 
settlement processes.  
1.7 Purpose of the Thesis and Research Questions 
1.7.1 Purpose of the Thesis 
It is the main purpose of this thesis to determine if Saudi Arabia needs to adopt the 
risk regulation practices of Basel. To be able to find out, the thesis aims examine the risk 
management practices and accounting standards of Islamic financial institutions in 
determining how the efficacies of Islamic financial institutions can be improved. In order to 
find out, the research will set out to achieve the following objectives: 
 Determine how issues of legal secularisation may be reconciled in Islamic models of 
finance, particularly Islamic financial institutions; 
 Determine whether risk management practices can be improved by standardising 
banking across jurisdictions; 
 Determine whether the standardisation of accounting practices and regulatory 
principles can enhance Islamic finance organisations; 
 Determine whether the Basel framework can be internalized by Islamic financial 
institutions to solve issues such as the inadequate coordination of financial markets in 
Saudi Arabia; 
 Determine whether legal secularisation could be reconciled with Islamic models of 
finance in order to standardise banking processes across jurisdictions; and, 
 Employ a content analysis among three markets, namely, Malaysia, the Islamic Bank 
of Britain and Saudi Arabia, to determine which accounting standards and risk 
management practices from each market are beneficial in improving financial and 
legal efficacy in Saudi Arabian financial institutions. 
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1.7.2 Research Questions 
The primary research question where the majority of the investigation of this dissertation is 
based is as follows: 
Does Saudi Arabia Need to Adopt the Risk Regulation Practices of Basel? 
The subsidiary questions that naturally follow from the initial research question are provided 
hereunder: 
 Why should Saudi Arabia adopt the risk regulation practices of Basel and other 
specific jurisdictions risk management practices of the UK and Malaysia? 
 Can the Basel framework and other specific jurisdictions risk management practices 
of the UK and Malaysia be internalized by Islamic financial institutions to solve 
issues such as the inadequate coordination of financial markets in Saudi Arabia? 
 How are the issues of legal secularisation to be reconciled in Islamic models of 
finance, particularly in Islamic financial institutions? 
 How can risk management practices be improved by standardising banking across 
jurisdictions? 
 Can the standardisation of accounting practices and regulatory principles enhance 
Islamic finance organisations? 
 How may one employ a content analysis across the three markets of Malaysia, the 
Islamic Bank of Britain, and Saudi Arabia to determine which accounting standards 
and risk management practices from each market are beneficial in improving financial 
and legal efficacy in Saudi Arabian financial institutions? 
1.7.3 Research Methodology 
In light of the research problem stated above, the researcher employed two distinct 
methodologies to assess the regulation of Islamic banking in Saudi Arabia so as to determine 
how the regulatory principles and guidelines may be standardised or allowed to operate 
independently in a methodical manner. The methodology that was developed and applied in 
this study optimises the use of the content analysis method to study risk contents, both in 
diversity and in depth, in three markets: Malaysia as the main focus, the UK in order to 
debunk a particular argument made in relation to the apparent success of the Islamic Bank of 
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Britain in avoiding the consequences of the 2006-8 financial crisis, and Saudi Arabia, as that 
market are the main components in achieving the central argument of this thesis. To reiterate, 
this thesis argues that the incorporation of pertinent Basel components, as well as those from 
the Malaysia and UK banking system into the KSA banking system will bring about 
improvements to the latter’s overall banking structure. 
The tools used to develop the methodology include the legal doctrinal analysis and axiology. 
This research is conducted based on a specific question:  Is the IB system of KSA sufficiently 
robust to survive the eventuation of a credit risk?  If the answer to this question is in the 
positive, then there is little need for this thesis. However, as will be shown throughout this 
study, the question cannot be answered by a simply yes or no. A detailed scrutiny of the IB 
and CB banking systems worldwide is necessary to come up with a credible answer, one that 
will help answer the primary research question. A major (although not the sole) determining 
factor will be whether the KSA’s IB system has sufficient liquidity to absorb any shock 
caused by the eventuation of such a risk. 
The apologists for IB adopt a similar methodology: they mistake historical co-incidence for 
cause and effect.  They point to the survival of IBs in Malaysia and in the UK during the 
recent sub-prime-related financial crisis as evidence of IB being a superior system to CB and 
then deduce from the fact that the Basel standards did not apply to Malaysian banks in 2007 
that Basel standards need not apply to IBs in 2015.  In so doing they draw comfort from their 
belief as an article of religious faith that IB is more humane and ethical than CB.  
Critical examination is an important tool in this thesis.   In effect, the major case study on 
Malaysia will probe the weaknesses in similar case studies in an attempt to prove that there is 
no cause and effect relationship between the particular risk and liquidity standards adopted in 
Malaysian Islamic banking prior to 2007 and its substantial avoidance of the damage from the 
sub-prime crisis.   
The minor case study on the Islamic Bank of Britain will use what little material is available 
to demonstrate that the lack of exposure to toxic assets was a historical accident, and not a 
feature of design.  It will juxtapose the failure of the Dubai property market as proof of that 
proposition.  It will demonstrate, nevertheless, that the IBB managed to make losses during 
the financial crisis which were proportionally on a par with any British conventional bank 
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and that if this is what a bank does when constrained by moderate risk controls, moving to 
less substantial risk controls is hardly going to improve profitability. 
The choices of Malaysia and of the UK, for the purpose of this thesis, is based on two main 
factors: the key importance of Malaysia as an Islamic banking hub and the key importance of 
London as a banking hub in general, which is building the number of Islamic banks and 
Islamic windows in conventional banks in an attempt to compete with other financial centres 
for the market in Islamic financial services and products.  Prime Minister Cameron seeks to 
fund much of the need for new investment in British infrastructure from Islamic banking.95 
The British Islamic banks possess £12bn in assets and this downplays those of the assets of 
banks in the Muslim states of Bangladesh, Pakistan, Egypt and Turkey. And there are also 55 
colleges and professional institutions offering education in Islamic finance in Britain – 
representing a number unparalleled anywhere else globally.96 
The legal doctrinal analysis is the traditional form of legal scholarship.97 The researcher laid 
stress on the primary sources of law: the general principles and immutable sources of Islamic 
law and applicable statutes, regulations and case law. They are analysed in order to determine 
whether they are apposite as regards the regulation of banking activities and products, and 
what changes may be made. This implies that the research approach is inductive whereby the 
researcher critically reviews the extant principles, statutes and regulations and identifies 
patterns to support a theory on the standardisation98 or methodical non-standardisation of 
Islamic regulation with international accounting standards, ISO 31000:2009 and its 
predecessors99 and the requirements of Basel I, Basel II and Basel III. It follows from the 
above that the relevant legal rules are assessed from a positivist and objective perspective. 
Thus, there is no attempt to formulate or reinforce extant ideological viewpoints which have 
guided the analysis of previous researchers. In seeking to be objective, the researcher 
therefore assessed current regulatory rules and procedures as they are applied in the EU (and 
therefore in the UK), in Malaysia and in KSA. This thesis avoids normative analyses or any 
attempt at expanding the scope of the fiqh. This is because of the need to be detached from 
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the cultural and political influences on the application of the rules and procedures.100 Hence, 
although politics and culture have played a major role in shaping regulatory policies, both in 
KSA, in Malaysia and in Western countries, the difficulty of ascertaining this role, coupled 
with the fact that this would be beyond the scope of this study, constitutes the motivation to 
carry out a positivist doctrinal analysis.  
An analysis of the Malaysian and British cases will provide a base for the thesis on which to 
analyse the preparedness of the KSA’s IB system to face similar shocks.  Firstly, those risks 
will be explained.  Secondly, it will be shown that the standards of the AAOIFI are 
insufficiently robust to identify, measure and mitigate the risks so presented.  Thirdly, it will 
be shown that international standards, including ISO 31000:2009 and those of the IASB, 
would properly identify, measure and mitigate those risks.  Along the way, it will be 
demonstrated that there is nothing particularly ethical or humane about the wholesale 
concealment of major structural flaws in the Sa’udi economy. Nonetheless, given the link 
between Islamic banking, ethics and moral values, the researcher would also defer to 
axiology. Axiology is a branch of philosophy that examines subjective judgements about 
values. Heron and Reason stated that values are guiding principles for human conduct.101 
Thus, certain values guide the legislators in enacting certain regulations, as well as the 
Shari’a advisory councils of Islamic banks in endorsing products and services. Heron and 
Reason further argued that researchers should be able to demonstrate axiological skills by 
identifying and articulating their own values as a basis for making judgements about the 
research they are conducting.102 Saunders et al also provide an interesting interpretation of 
this argument. They state that researchers should write down their own statements of personal 
values in relation to the topic they are studying.103 This will be of value not only to the 
researcher but also to the other stakeholders in the research, including the target audience, as 
well as the persons that assisted and guided the researcher.104 For researchers themselves, this 
would heighten the awareness of value judgements they would make in drawing conclusions 
from the interpretation of the data collected. For the other stakeholders, it would give them a 
clearer understanding of the value judgements that the researcher has made and with which 
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they may or may not agree.105 This methodology is subjective (as opposed to the doctrinal 
analysis) but is very important in this context because many rules governing Islamic finance 
are not based on established precepts but on the interpretation of Qur’anic verses by a given 
Shari’a advisory council in a particular bank or country.  
The assessment of regulation from both the objective (positivist) and subjective (normative) 
perspectives represent the interdependence between propositional knowledge and experiential 
knowledge,106  and to the extent that I discuss matters in KSA it is informed by the 
interdependence between propositional knowledge and my own lived experience.107 This 
chapter discussed two very juxtaposed banking structures. The first banking structure which 
was discussed is the banking structure used in Europe and other western countries. Further, 
this conventional system is profit-based and risk-seeking whilst the second structure, the 
Islamic financial structure, is risk averse and religion-based. Whilst some opponents to the 
Islamic banking structure describe it as a structure that is ethical and client-oriented, western 
structures have been described as self-interested. In summation, Islamic finance is steeped in 
prohibiting the sale of debt and conventional models encourage debt in an all-encompassing 
way. 
1.8 Summary 
In this chapter, we provided signposts of how Islamic banking survived the credit crisis of 
2008-09.  The thesis promoted by many scholars has been that Islamic banking survived 
because they had less exposure to the financial instruments that had exploded during the 
crisis.  Specifically, Islamic banking was simply not open to the business of issuing and 
trading risky interest rate based financial derivatives.  In light of this assertion which 
presumes that in effect the risk management practices of Islamic banking was the cause of 
their survival, we have formulated our research aims, objectives, central argument, research 
question and methodology so that this presumption may be examined in detailed depth.  In 
accomplishing the overall purpose of this thesis, it is essential to focus on how Islamic 
financial institutions can be improved via risk management and accounting standards, and 
whether the risk standards imposed by the Basel Accords could be used as a basis for a 
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comparative methodological framework across the Malaysian, UK and Saudi Islamic banking 
sectors.  The primary research question, i.e., “Does Saudi Arabia need to adopt the risk 
regulation practices of Basel?” and the other subsidiary questions, especially including “Why 
should Saudi Arabia adopt the risk regulation practices of Basel and other specific 
jurisdictions risk management practices of the UK and Malaysia?,” allows us to engage in the 
scholarly literature in innovative ways that are closer to market practice as practitioners 
themselves would have to adopt, adapt and evolve their Islamic banking institutions to new 
risk regulations.  It is in light of this motivation of improving the institutional practices that 
we can justifiably examine the specific risk categories and factors that effect Islamic banking 
across jurisdictions, and specifically within each jurisdiction.  It is part of this research’s 
argument that the philosophy and preferred methods of risk management practices should be 
the core of what distinguishes excellent Islamic banking from the otherwise unexceptional. 
We turn our attention now to those unique risk characteristics of Islamic modes of financing.  
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Chapter 2: UNIQUE RISK CHARACTERISTICS OF ISLAMIC MODES OF 
FINANCING 
2.1 Introduction 
As shown in Chapter 1, the expansion of the Islamic market over the recent decades has been 
met with peremptory demands for innovative products and mechanisms for hedging and risk 
management. However, unlike the conventional Western market, products and services 
offered in the Islamic market ought to be Shari’a-compliant.108 Nonetheless, these products 
and services are used within the framework of different Islamic financing schemes that seek 
to comply with different and sometimes contradictory rules of the Shari’a, while 
simultaneously expanding trade between financial institutions and intermediaries. As noted in 
Chapter 1, the products and services, as well as the schemes, are distinguishable on the basis 
of the risks inherent in them, and these risks would attach insofar as Islamic financial 
institutions provide credit or handle payments are required to offer only Shari’a-compliant 
products and services.109  
There is no steadfast paradigm, as well as any clear ideal or philosophy and this may be 
attributed to a number of reasons, including the complexity of the risk-return trade off in 
Islamic finance and the limited knowledge of risks inherent in Islamic financial products and 
services. Nonetheless, there are modes of financing that are widely used by Islamic banks in 
many Islamic markets across the world. These modes of financing have unique risk 
characteristics and this Chapter seeks to examine these unique risk characteristics. The 
emphasis on the modes of financing here is important because they are the instruments that 
provide an alternative to conventional interest-based banking, and they are implemented on 
the basis that they eventually lead to a fairer and more equitable distribution of resources in 
society.110 
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This Chapter begins with a brief examination of the concept of ‘risk’ under Islamic law. This 
is important because the concept has no direct equivalent in Arabic, and the term closest to 
risk, Gharar, is prohibited by some interpretations of the Shari’a. The unique risk 
characteristics of four modes of financing widely used by Islamic banks across the world will 
then be examined. These include the PLS financing modes (Mudaraba and Musharaka), 
Islamic savings and investment deposits, the Murabaha financing mode, and the Istisna. Prior 
to analysing the risks that these modes of financing carry, the way in which they are used by 
Islamic banks will be discussed briefly.   
2.2 The Concept of Risk or Uncertainty 
As noted in Chapter 1, the term ‘risk’ is used here to described the vulnerability of asset 
values and opportunities for the Islamic bank to generate additional income. As rational 
institutions, they ought to factor in the vulnerabilities in their operational strategies and take 
advantage of the opportunities to create additional wealth. As noted above, the term closest to 
‘risk’ in Islamic literature is ‘Gharar’ and unlike the former, the content of the latter is 
subject to much uncertainty.111 It has been held to signify some kind of uncertainty, risk or 
hazard exposing oneself or one’s property to damage without being aware of the exposure or 
damage.112 It may be related to the concept of Taghreer which means deception or 
misrepresentation.113 Thus, where a person exposes himself or his property to damage while 
aware of the exposure, he will be liable for deceiving the other party. Nonetheless, it is 
uncertain whether a transaction imbedded with risk or Ghārār would be voidable and not 
void, depending on whether the party that exposed the transaction to the risk was honest. 
What is certain is that it is ‘uncertainty or ambiguity in a contract which may render it 
void.’114 The definitions used by the Hanifi and Sha’fi Schools is also similar to that used by 
UNCTAD: ‘uncertainty over the existence of the subject matter of sale.’ However, Ibn Hazm 
of the Zahiri School emphasised the honesty and ignorance of the parties by stating that 
‘Ghārār in sale occurs when the purchaser does not know what he has bought and the seller 
does not know what he has sold.’ Given the lack of standardised rules, there is much 
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difficulty determining the degree of uncertainty that would result in Ghārār and the 
consequence of Ghārār in a transaction. 
The Qur’an does not expressly prohibit Gharar. It states as follows:  
‘And do not eat up your property among yourselves for vanities, nor use it as bait for 
the judges’ (2: 188) 
‘O ye who believe! Eat not up your property among yourselves in vanities; but let 
these be amongst your traffic and trade by mutual good will’ (4: 161). 
These passages are cited in the analysis of Ghārār because it is assumed that the term 
‘vanity’ is used in them to refer to uncertainty and ignorance.115 However, it is difficult to 
establish a link between vanity and uncertainty or ignorance. Despite the uncertainty as 
regards the meaning and content of Gharar, some previous Islamic scholars reported that it 
was prohibited by the Prophet’s (Peace and Blessings be upon Him and his Companions) 
companions in trading.116 Thus, where Ghārār is identified in a transaction, it is considered 
null and void. It has further been noted that the prohibition extends to all forms of Gharar.117 
Despite the above, it may not be said that Ghārār is the direct equivalent of risk given that all 
financial transactions are embedded with several types of risk, and there are even more risks 
inherent in many Islamic transactions. What this demonstrates is that the first obstacle to 
developing a framework for the standardisation of risk management in Islamic banking is the 
lack of consensus on what constitutes ‘risk.’ For the purposes of this dissertation, Gharar will 
be defined as excessive risk. Mehran, Morrison, and Shapiro define excessive risk as having 
an element of a breakdown in control.118 
2.3 The Profit/Loss Sharing Schemes 
There are two widely used profit/loss sharing (PLS) schemes in Islamic markets: the 
Musharaka and the Mudaraba. These are modes of financing that involve the investment in 
selected projects by banks and sharing in the profits and losses with the entrepreneurs or 
owners of the projects. The origin of Musharaka may be traced to the ‘Sharika’ which means 
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partnership.119 Thus, the Musharaka is a form of partnership or joint venture in which profits 
are shared on an agreed ratio while losses are shared in proportion to each partner’s 
investment.120 All the parties to the Musharaka are required to provide capital and take part in 
the management of the project. However, the agreement is concluded once the principal 
amount on the loan is repaid.121 A distinction should be made between the Musharaka and 
fixed income investments (bonds or money market securities) whereby the investor makes a 
loan to a corporate or government borrower who promises to pay a fixed amount of interest 
on a regular basis on a predetermined maturity date. At maturity the corporate or government 
borrower then returns the principal amount or par value of each bond to the investor.122 Given 
that Islamic law prohibits the charging of Riba, Islamic banks cannot accept fixed income 
investments.  
 Nonetheless, the Musharaka is similar to fixed-income securities that create an obligation to 
pay dividends or other form of income. In conventional financial markets, companies may 
raise money to finance acquisitions or buy equipment by giving up equity to the investor and 
repaying the principal on the loan at maturity. Similarly, in Islamic markets, the Musharaka 
mode of financing enables businesses to raise money for projects by giving up a share of the 
projects to the bank. They then share in the profit and losses in accordance with their 
contributions to the projects. The difference between the Musharaka and fixed income 
securities is that the bank investing in the Musharaka agreement does not accept any payment 
for the use of its money. However, the profits earned by the bank through the investment may 
be deemed to be a fee paid to the bank as a form of compensation for the use of its money. 
This relates to the argument on the legitimacy of the Sukuk or Islamic bond or financial 
certificate which essentially requires the payment for the time-value of money and may be 
deemed to be similar in appearance to Riba. Equally, in many cases, there is a guaranteed 
return and repurchase obligations from the issuer.123 Thus, it is uncertain whether Shari’a 
actually prohibits the payment for the time-value of money or payment for anything agreed 
by the parties as interest. However participants in Musharaka schemes, as well as Sukuk 
investors know that they are investing in assets and not currency, and rely only on the return 
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on the assets that take the form of rent. Thus, the appeal of the Musharaka and Sukuk to 
Islamic bankers and entrepreneurs depends on the fact that they are Shari’a-compliant, as 
well as enhance the productivity or value of the underlying asset. 
On the other hand, the Mudaraba mode of financing is also widely used by Islamic banks 
across the world. The term Mudaraba generally refers to an agreement between two or more 
persons whereby one person provides the finance and the other provides the expertise and/or 
labour and management to conduct a business that is geared towards making profits.124 The 
latter is called the Mudarib, while the capital provider is referred to as the Rabb al-mal. The 
Mudarib uses the funds in the manner agreed by the parties (such as to buy specific 
equipment), and then returns the principal and a share of the profits to the Rabb al-mal over 
an agreed period of time. The Mudarib might neither guarantee the capital nor the profits, 
although he may provide guarantees or financial sureties. Also, the Mudarib is not liable for 
any losses except for misconduct, negligence125 or breach of the terms of the contract.126 
Despite the fact that the parties have agreed and make purchases and payments in accordance 
with the terms of their agreement, the Mudaraba contract is not binding before the Mudarib 
begins carrying out the project and it may be terminated unilaterally by any of the parties. 
Essentially, the main difference between this particular interest-free banking product and a 
conventional interest-based banking product is that, under the latter, the profit is fixed in 
advance or is a simple linear function of some other benchmark rate, and irrespective of the 
extent to which the borrower has profited or lost money from the underlying enterprise.  In 
the former, the profits and losses on a physical investment are shared between the creditor 
and the debtor according to a formula which relies on the astuteness, judgment and hard work 
of the Mudarib - matters which can not necessarily be guaranteed. 127 
Although the Shari’a standards maintained and promoted by the Accounting and Auditing 
Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) are not observed by Islamic 
financial institutions around the world, they provide guidance that may be helpful in the 
standardisation of rules governing the buying and selling of products and services in the 
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Islamic financial market.128 According to the AAOIFI Guidelines 2008, the Mudaraba 
contract may be terminated by either party under the following circumstances: the unilateral 
act of one of the parties before the commencement of business activity; where both parties 
agree to terminate the contract; at the conclusion of the contract’s maturity date; where the 
funds for the scheme are exhausted due to sustained losses; where the Mudarib passes on; 
and the liquidation of the institution acting as the Mudarib. It is arguable that the bankruptcy 
of the person acting as the Mudarib may also lead to the termination of the Mudaraba 
contract. Although the Mudarib is not required to use the Mudaraba fund as his personal fund 
the general law of England prohibits the intermingling of trust and personal funds.129 There is 
a fatwa supporting the proposition that the Mudaraba contract requires the capital fund to be 
held as trust property,130 and if it is sufficiently clear to constitute a trust document, the 
Mudarib’s bankruptcy should not have any relation to the Mudaraba contract apart from the 
fact it may prevent him from effectively carrying out the functions of the Mudarib.  There is 
common law authority however that a bankrupt may not be a trustee,131 and the better view is 
therefore that a Mudarib ought not become bankrupt and that proper risk management ought 
require the capital to be returned in such an event.  
2.3.1 The Unique Risk Characteristics of the PLS Schemes 
Given the absence of the requirement of collateral, there is a relatively high level of risk and 
hazard that Islamic banks have to confront. They are required to have very high expertise in 
evaluating projects, taking into account the local fiscal policies and the accounting and 
auditing systems of the entrepreneurs. This even more challenging where the bank invests in 
several PLS schemes at the same time. The most pressing challenge is therefore the 
identification of specific risks to which each project is exposed.132 This implies that 
additional monitoring costs are incurred by the bank, and the depositors of the bank must be 
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prepared to take the risk of losing the entire deposit in an investment made by the bank. This 
is especially problematic given the depositors have not consented to invest, albeit indirectly, 
in the PLS scheme. Also, banks may find it especially challenging to invest in PLS schemes 
in countries where there are no credible rating institutions that monitor citizens and 
businesses and ascertains their credit rating on a consistent basis.  
Before banks enter into a financing contract, they must evaluate imperfect information about 
a prospective Mudarib whether they are creditworthy. Information supplied by an applicant 
can be difficult to verify, and other information may be hard or costly to obtain. The 
information that a prospective Mudarib provides to a bank might be sufficient to make a 
decision as to whether or not to enter into a PLS without a kafala. However, the information 
is usually incomplete – and therefore asymmetrical - in the sense that a potential Mudarib 
will know more about the risk of his proposed project, his ability to work, his state of health 
and his personal capacity, than he reveals to the bank.133  There is a further problem that a 
potential Mudarib will often have a more favorable view of his/her own abilities and 
propensity for hard work than an objective view would justify.134 
Due to this information asymmetry, poor credit decisions would result in the increase in the 
number of non-performing loans. This is particularly the case where the borrower has no 
collateral to lose.  With only his own time and effort to lose, there is nothing a bank can do to 
induce a borrower’s effort to avoid repayment problems. Thus, absent a kafala, or guarantee 
of the borrower’s behavior, loan terms may have little feedback effect on behavior, 
particularly of higher-risk borrowers who are more difficult to induce into exerting effort.135 
Ironically, it is the Islamic banking institution with a high appetite for risk that is more likely 
to invest in the PLS schemes.136 This shows that Ghārār may not be the equivalent of risk 
since there are many risks embedded in the PLS financing modes that Islamic banks use in 
lieu of the interest-based financing modes of conventional banks. The PLS schemes have not 
been challenged on the grounds that they are Gharar. They are actually promoted as models 
of Islamic banking. Islamic banking institutions investing in these schemes are however 
forced to function as universal banks whereby they provide a wide variety of financial 
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services, beyond the traditional services provided by commercial banks. These include 
receiving deposits and providing working capital finance.137 Universal banking therefore 
combines commercial banking, investment banking and insurance, and was particularly 
popular in former West Germany whereby the banks provided both short-term and long-term 
loans, made direct investments in other firms, conducted business in securities, and drew 
resources from bonds, savings certificates and time deposits.138 Islamic banks currently 
provide all these services and the advantages of one financial institution providing a range of 
financial services include lower average cost of marketing, higher output and products of a 
better quality. Where the banks have been able to communicate positive, complete and 
accurate information about their portfolio risks to stockholders, the confidence in their stock 
was enhanced.139 By expanding the scope of services, they spread the fixed cost of managing 
client relationship over a wider set of products.140 Also, they may be able to capitalise on 
their good reputation established in one product or service to market other products or 
services; and customers would also save on searching and monitoring costs.141 Also, there is 
no credit risk inherent in universal banking given that in the event of liquidation of the project 
in which the bank has invested, the bank has no liability over the debtors as it is a type of 
partnership. Thus, no capital amounts may be claimed before the obligations of the 
entrepreneur or Mudarib are met.142  
However, there are also many disadvantages. Universal banking leads to the reduction of 
competition; and financial risks are then concentrated at individual universal banks.143 This 
implies that the risks inherent in the products and services of such an institution are systemic. 
Thus, any failure would have far reaching consequences on the entire financial system. As 
such, the bank that provides a wide variety of financial products ought to have the requisite 
capacity and risk management mechanism to identify and mitigate the various types of risk 
involved. However, previous studies have shown that only the largest Islamic banks have the 
requisite capacity or the expertise to set up an effective mechanism to identify and mitigate 
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the risks.144 Determining the quality of a potential Mudarib produces various adverse 
selection problems—especially when debt is available from conventional banks.  IBs will 
attract applicants with inside and undeclared knowledge that their project is highly risky, and 
those who inflate their declared expectations of profit in the hope of being quoted a lower 
profit-share ratio by an IB.145 Consequently, IBs need have to undertake costly project 
appraisal and that cost is properly passed on to the Mudarib.  IBs also need to get a kafala for 
each loan in order to manage the risk, or to take managerial share-holdings. Secondly, the 
moral hazard problem also exists with Islamic banking after the loan is made. Relating the 
bank’s return to the Mudarib’s declared profit automatically gives the borrower an incentive, 
absent an audit (the cost of which increases the costs to the Mudarib) to under-report declared 
profit or take extra expenses and inflated wages. 146 
The study of the behaviour of some Islamic banks in the market conducted by Iqbal reveals 
that many Islamic banks actually avoid the PLS financing schemes altogether for reasons 
including the reluctance to keep detailed records of customers, the difficulty of expanding the 
banks’ operations due to limited opportunities to re-invest retained earnings, the increased 
costs resulting from the need to set up monitoring mechanisms, the unwillingness of 
depositors to be involved in long-term projects, and the difficulty of obtaining information 
about the entrepreneurial abilities of the customers.147 That is, the cost of countering 
information asymmetry is too great.  Other studies have revealed that Islamic bankers are 
reluctant to implement PLS schemes because they are deemed to have higher credit risk, 
especially as regards the payment to bankers of their due profit share by counterparties.148 
These banks are also exposed to high market and liquidity risk, as well as high volatility in 
gains or loss of capital.  
Nonetheless, the main risk inherent in the PLS financing modes that Islamic banks find 
difficult to ascertain and manage is the equity investment risk. This is the risk that arises from 
entering into a partnership with the goal of participating or providing financing for a 
particular business activity as specified in the contract. Given that it is a form of partnership 
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or joint venture, the party that provides the finance does so in for form of equity, not debt.  
Accordingly the IB shares in the business risk.149 However, in both the Mudaraba and 
Musharaka, the provider of finance is a silent partner with no control power over the 
management after the activities have commenced, rather like a limited partner in general law, 
despite the fact that in the case of failure it bears all the loss (Mudaraba) or part of the loss 
(Musharaka). As at general law, being the “limited”150 partner, the bank is highly exposed to 
the risk of capital loss. This is the risk of incurring loss due to the decrease in value of a 
capital asset (in this case, investment).151  
The equity investment risk that the IB as the financing partner faces is different from equity 
price risk, which is the risk of changes in the equity prices of investments in marketable 
securities.152 It is a risk of total equity from failure of the business, as opposed to a fall in the 
market price of a security. 
Nonetheless, in both instances, the bank is required to reduce the risk by combining its stock 
portfolio with a protection overlay for price risk management.153 According to Berenberg 
Bank: 
Protect overlay management is generally understood to be the targeted management 
of specific price risks of an underlying portfolio by means of derivatives, such as 
forwards, options and swaps. It is implemented in isolation from the underlying 
portfolio, in a separated overlay portfolio… [Whenever a] liquid hedging instrument 
is available... By clear separation of the alpha and beta management, systematic 
protect overlay management reflects the on-going progress in the splitting of the value 
chain in asset management…. As risk management [f]or a stock portfolio, its simplest 
form is ongoing hedging with put options. Trend-following futures strategies offer a 
dynamic alternative. 154 
That might work for large businesses but it won’t work for small ones which do not trade in 
an asset for which a derivative such as a forward contract might be available.  Generally it 
will work for organisations which produce goods better than those which produce services: 
there are forward contracts for wheat, wool and coffee beans but not for haircuts, bicycle 
repairs or meals served in cafeterias.  Further, even in large businesses, such a risk 
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management strategy requires detailed and accurate information about the positive 
performance of the asset or stock over the past years in order for liquid hedging to be 
possible.155 Unfortunately, previous studies have shown that it may often be difficult to 
collect such information about assets in many Islamic markets around the world that have 
large informal sectors. This is what Mannan described as ‘a vast non-corporate and voluntary 
sector’ that dominates the industry.156 However, it is interesting that Mannan then argues that 
the existence of this vast informal sector implies that the free market mechanism whereby 
resources are made available on the basis of purchasing power rather than need is not 
appropriate for Islamic economic analysis.157 This argument is however flawed: although 
different Islamic markets are comparable, due to the common pledge to abide by rules of the 
Shari’a, they are not necessarily indistinguishable because the rules of the Shari’a have been 
interpreted in diverse ways by different Islamic regulators and traders.  
One of the reasons for the diversity could be that different Islamic markets have different 
levels of development. For example, the Bangladeshi market has a larger informal sector than 
the UK market158; and the UK market therefore provides for opportunities to trade in more 
sophisticated products and services.  
The informal sector of the Bangladeshi economy, for example, employs workers producing 
more than 40% of the gross domestic product of that country, generally in industries not 
requiring high capitalisation. 159  It is difficult to see how participants in the informal market 
can even keep basic books. That is one reason why there is a problem of lack of 
standardisation or methodical non-standardisation, particularly with fatawa: less sophisticated 
markets which operate on principles of micro-lending often don’t require the same degree of 
formal oversight because of the small scale and interconnectedness of the borrower’s 
                                                 
 
155 Ibid. 
156 MA Mannan, New Frontiers of Islamic Banking in the 21st Century with Special Reference to Informal and Voluntary 
Sector Banking (Proceedings of the Second Harvard University Forum on Islamic Finance: Islamic Finance in the 21st 
Century, Centre for Middle Eastern Study, Harvard University 1999) 275; MH Hosseini and F Aidi, “Developing an 
Islamic Principles-Based Marketing Framework” (2013) 3 Journal of Basic and Applied Scientific Research 189, 190. 
157 Mannan, N_159 above, 276. A Hassan, A Chaci and SA Latiff, SA, “Islamic Marketing Ethics and its Impact on 
Customer Satisfaction in the Islamic Banking Industry” (2008) Journal of Islamic Economic 23. 
158 Asian Development Bank and Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics. The Informal Sector and Informal Employment in 
Bangladesh (Philippines Asian Development Bank 2012). 
160 Ibid., 28 
 52 | P a g e  
 
52 
community.160 As such, it is ill-advised to assume that all Islamic markets are generally 
indistinguishable.161 
In managing the equity investment risk, the bank also has to deal with the problem of moral 
hazard that arises from the fact that the bank may be risk-averse but the entrepreneur may 
have a strong appetite for risk.162 This, like a person’s skills or ability, is difficult to assess 
objectively.  The depositors are then confronted with a risk of loss of capital although they 
have not willingness accepted to invest in the project of an entrepreneur with a high risk 
appetite.  
The level of risk however reduces significantly where the parties opt for the Musharaka, 
instead of a PLS financing scheme. This is because in the Musharaka scheme, both parties 
invest funds into the project and the capital of the entrepreneur is also at risk. The moral 
hazard problem is minimised because the entrepreneur is most likely to be more cautious. 
The bank also has the option of taking active management of the project under the 
Musharaka scheme. Nonetheless, Islamic banks have been reluctant in practice to adopt both 
PLS financing modes because they carry significant credit and liquidity risk, as well as equity 
investment risk. Thus, the banks that adopt these financing modes may lose their 
competitiveness in the international or non-Islamic market because unlike conventional 
commercial banks, they are required to handle variability in costs, revenue and profitability 
by actively hedging financial risk.163 After examining the operation of several Islamic banks, 
Ferbianto therefore concludes these banks have been reluctant to adopt PLS financing modes 
for the following reasons: 
 The modes are laden with risk but the banks generally have a low appetite for risk. 
 The additional monitoring costs required from adopting and implementing  the modes. 
 The relative lack of transparency in many Islamic markets, as well as the difficulty of 
accessing information about assets. 
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 The reluctance and/or unwillingness of depositors to take risks which may be explained 
by the low level of trust between the depositors and the financial system as a whole. Thus, 
it is generally difficult for Islamic banks to find depositors that are willing to take the risk 
and participate indirectly in the PLS schemes. 
 The problem of information asymmetry due to lack of reliable credit rating institutions 
that can monitor borrowers or entrepreneurs and share information about their payment 
history. Islamic banks equally require more resources to be able to monitor their 
customers or potential customers and determine their credit worthiness, as well as which 
loans are potentially non-performing.164 
2.4 Risk of Inconsistent Fatawa 
Finally, there is a risk of a fatwa being issued which renders haram what was previously 
considered halal.  This is a risk separate from being non-compliant with Shari’a ab initio. 165 
This might affect repayments. 
For example, On Jan 28th, 2009, the Anjuman Committee166 of the town of Kolar in the state 
of Karnataka, in south India, issued a fatwa banning all Muslims from repaying their 
microfinance loans claiming that paying interest was haram. The fatwa led to immediate non-
repayment by Muslims clients. As a result, borrowers in Muslim-dominated groups faced, 
after the ban, a greater repayment burden compared to borrowers in Hindu-dominated groups.  
The relevance of a minor group of defaults on the basis of an inconsistent fatwa being issued 
cannot be grasped without an understanding of the argument over the status of sukuk and 
other banking instruments in the Gulf region after AAOIFI’s Sheik Taqi Usmani opined that 
85% of Islamic bonds were haram, 167which contradicted long-standing opinions in their 
favour: 
In the 1930s, Syrian scholar Marouf al-Daoualibi suggested that the Qur'an bans interest only 
on consumption loans, not investment loans, and in the 1940s Egyptian jurist al-Sanhuri 
argued that the Qur'an sought chiefly to ban [compound]... interest. A more extreme and 
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recent example is the opinion of the mufti of Egypt, Shaykh Muhammad Sayiid Tantawi, who 
in 1989 declared that interest on certain interest-based government investments was not 
forbidden Riba, because the gain is little different from the sharing of the government's 
profits from use of the funds, thus joining the thin ranks of prominent religious figures who 
have issued fatwas declaring clear interest practices permissible. This fatwa aroused a storm 
of controversy, with opposition from nearly all traditional religious scholars and warm praise 
from secular modernisers. Later he went even further, saying that interest-bearing bank 
deposits are perfectly Islamic, and more so than 'Islamic' accounts that impose 
disadvantageous terms on the customer. 168 
Some might argue that not all interest is riba and that interest on bank deposits and interest 
charged on loans are lawful if they are not excessive (5-15%).  They do so on the basis of the 
saying of the Companion of the Prophet (Peace and Blessings be upon Him), Umar Ibn 
Khatab who noted that the Riba related verse was the last verse revealed and that the  Prophet 
(Peace and Blessings be upon Him) did not explain it in detail. `Umar delivered a sermon on 
the pulpit of Allah's Messenger (Peace and Blessings be upon Him), saying… "I wish Allah's 
Apostle had not left us before he had given us definite verdicts concerning … various types 
of Riba."  On the basis of that saying there is a minority opinion that banks invest and their 
profits are passed on to the depositors. Since all parties are happy and no one is victimized, it 
is perfectly lawful to take interest from the bank 169   
Indeed, this appears to have been the situation at least for Muslims in non-Muslim countries 
before the establishment of accessible Islamic banking!  For example, Bilal Cleland’s 
excellent history of Muslims in Australia170 charts their integration into that society from the 
first migration of Afghan camel drivers in 1860; there is no evidence of any Muslim co-
operative banking prior to the 1980s in that country, despite Cleland’s claim of workers being 
paid, saving and giving money to charity.  There are opinions both in favour and against this 
practice: 
The relaxation of what would otherwise be a Qur’anic prescription continues for as long as it 
is found beneficial to the society, because "necessities justify that which may be unlawful." 
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There are counter-rules to prevent the misuse of the permissibility and relaxation. One such 
counter-rule, as laid down by some jurists, reads as, "one can’t exceed the permission given 
one".171 To take another example, IBs in India have mobilized only 0.37 per cent of the 
savings of Indian Muslims, and only 13 per cent of urban Indian Muslims have an account in 
an Indian IB.172 
Of the many possible and contradictory deductions which might be drawn from the facts set 
out in this section, one is that if borrowers are given a good reason which “excuses” paying a 
debt, they will. Some Hindu borrowers in the same community, hearing of the fatwa, also 
refused to repay.173   
On the other hand, the fact that some of the investments made by the compulsory pension 
fund (EPF) in deeply Islamic Malaysia are Haram does not stop Malaysians from investing 
for their retirement in it, or enjoying the profits made.174 
In summary, there are many more risks for IBs than for CBs, mainly based on the 
requirement for profit-sharing but in part on uncertainty of fatawa, each of which create a 
special risk for investors.  In the next part of this chapter I will demonstrate how these risks 
are passed onto investors and depositors in IBs. 
2.5 Savings and Investment Deposits 
These may take the form of profit sharing investment accounts and may be restricted or 
unrestricted. There may be restrictions on withdrawals before maturity date or no restrictions 
on withdrawals. In both instances, the depositors rely entirely on the bank’s ability to 
generate a profit from investments made using their deposits.175 The investment accounts are 
then required to support part or all of the losses on the asset value, and this creates a problem 
of moral hazard for the Islamic banks. Nonetheless, demand deposits are not deemed to be 
simple deposits of money that may be withdrawn without prior notice but interest-free loans 
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(Qard hasan).176 This implies that they may be invested freely by the banks, and the 
investments may generate profits or loss. As such, it is the banks and the depositors that 
generally face most of the risk. Hence, savings and investment deposits may subject to 
excessive risk-taking by the bank – on its own behalf and as agent (Wakalah) for the 
depositor - and this may threaten the solvency of the bank while deterring potential 
depositors, especially in countries like the UK and Malaysia, the subject of the examinations 
in this thesis, where depositors have a choice between IB and CB. This is supported by the 
fact that despite the cultural differences and emphasis on Islam, there is nothing to suggest 
that the depositors in Islamic savings accounts are not similarly motivated as depositors in 
savings accounts of conventional (Western) banks. Modigliani and Brumberg177 relying on 
the Keynesian notion of savings178 noted that the main motive of saving is the maximisation 
of a person’s lifetime utility or accumulation of wealth for retirement. They however stated 
other motives which include increasing the estate of one’s heirs, adjusting income to irregular 
consumption, meeting emergencies, and accumulating assets in order to reduce uncertainty 
about future income.179 Their emphasis on the accumulation of wealth for retirement is due to 
the fact that any asset on the portfolio of the individuals they observed usually satisfied more 
than one motive simultaneously.180 They then argued that their saving behaviour was 
determined by income and consumption to the extent that they became net savers during their 
working years and dis-savers during retirement.181 
Although Modigliani and Brumberg generalised their findings without necessarily taking into 
account the cultural influences on the individuals studied, it is submitted here that the above 
argument should logically be true for Muslim workers as well. Indeed this is the substance of 
the Malaysian Government’s compulsory Employee Provident Fund.182 However, Jalaluddin 
argued on his part that the Muslim saves money in order to fulfil his obligations to his family 
and the Lord under Islamic law.183 In this light, it would be important to take into account the 
social welfare dimension of saving in Islamic markets. This is because the savings are 
deemed to be investments that create opportunities for increasing the welfare of the entire 
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Muslim community.184 Jalaluddin’s argument is supported by the Qur’an (17: 29) which 
commands that individuals should ‘not spend everything so that [they] become blameworthy 
and destitute.’ Also, the Hadith from Al-Bukhari intimates that the  Prophet (Peace and 
Blessings be upon Him) used to sell the dates of the gardens of Bani Nadir and store for his 
family so much as would cover their needs for a whole year.185 Nonetheless, this does not 
imply that there is empirical evidence that Islamic customers would necessarily prioritise 
their religious obligations over emergency and future needs. The empirical study conducted 
by Haron and Shanmugam provide some support to the above argument since its findings are 
to the effect that the return from the deposit is not a major incentive for Islamic bank 
customers to maintain funds with Islamic banks.186 However, Sukmana and Yusef contradict 
the above argument because their findings indicate that there is a positive relationship 
between the level of deposits in Islamic banks and the rates of profit generated by the use of 
the deposits.187 These findings are also similar to those of a much wider study conducted by 
Rohmah using the Autoregressive Distributive Lag model. The latter study shows that the 
level of investment deposits in Islamic banks is directly related to the return on the deposits 
and national income in the long-run: for example, rentals to a bank on a shared-housing 
mortgage reflect the long-term interest rate for a conventional mortgage of the same type, and 
shares of profits from mortgage businesses therefore reflect the national average.188   Forward 
purchase contracts such as a commodity murabaha are based on the conventional profile of a 
fixed-income instrument. 
Under commodity Murabaha, an investor appoints an agent to enter into an initial purchase 
and subsequent sale of any commodity, such as metal or oil, with a third party on behalf of 
the investor. The sale is arranged at the purchase price of the commodity plus a mark-up, 
which is normally tied to an accepted short-term index, such as LIBOR. Details of the 
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arrangements may vary depending on the underlying commodity, timing of purchase and 
sale, institutions involved and settlements. 189 
Where there is a choice, persons appear to invest where the profits are, making due allowance 
for the risks, as long as the investments are not in haram industries.190 
While some studies find that the profit motive is not an important driver of the behaviour of 
Islamic depositors or investors, others show that although the latter are happy to invest in 
Islamic banks, and that their decisions are guided by the level of returns on the deposits or 
rates of profit generated by their deposits or investments. It follows that the behaviour of 
depositors in Islamic markets is driven by a variety of motives in the same as the behaviour 
of depositors in non-Islamic markets. Hence, the theory developed by Modigliani and 
Brumberg191 should also apply to Islamic depositors. Any asset on the portfolio of an Islamic 
depositor would satisfy more than one motive simultaneously.  
The asset will fulfil the depositor’s obligation under Islamic law, as well as increase the estate 
of his heirs or adjust his income to irregular consumption or meet emergencies or 
uncertainties about future income.  
It is difficult to endorse the argument developed by Jalaluddin, Kasri and Kassim, and Haron 
and Shanmugam, as shown above. This is because if the Muslim saves money mainly to fulfil 
his obligations to his family and the Lord under Islamic law, then Islamic banks would not 
have difficulty finding depositors that are willing to invest in PLS schemes as discussed in 
the previous section. Were those theorists correct, PLS schemes would not pose any credit 
risk since Islamic banks would be guaranteed of a steady flow of investment funds from 
depositors that seek to fulfil their obligations under Islamic law. Thus, it may only be logical 
to assume that although religious belief may be one of the main reasons for choosing an 
Islamic bank (together with other factors such as benefit of products offered, service quality, 
and reputation of the bank), the behaviour of Islamic depositors is largely determined by 
income and consumption to the extent that they become net savers during their working years 
and dis-savers during retirement. 
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2.5.1 Unique Risk Characteristics 
Following from the above, the rate of return on saving and investment deposits in Islamic 
banks creates uncertainty as regards the real value of the deposits. Islamic banks have to 
confront a withdrawal risk due to the fact that depositors motivated by income and 
consumption would be concerned by a lower rate of return. Thus, a lower rate of return may 
influence their decision to withdraw.192 Since under the PLS schemes, withdrawal may be 
made in full before the commencement of activity, the withdrawal risk is relatively very high 
in Islamic banking. In this regard, asset preservation with regard to minimising the risk of 
loss as a result of a lower rate of return will be very important. In other words, Islamic banks 
have to develop effective asset preservation strategies that determine the level of risk they 
face and the level of control they are comfortable with. This is important because it would be 
impossible to set up a viable banking system that does not guarantee the protection of 
depositors’ money.193 However, Islamic banks seem to provide only two options to 
depositors: savings that do not grow for depositors that require security; and savings that may 
be lost in part or entirely, for depositors that would like their savings to grow significantly. 
Thus, higher returns are only guaranteed for depositors willing to take higher risks. The 
number of depositors willing to take higher risks with their savings is logically quite limited 
in many Islamic societies given that guaranteeing deposits and paying a reasonable return on 
them is a Darurah (need);194 and shown above, the behaviour of depositors is determined by 
income and consumption.  
Depositors are in much more difficult situation than investors because the former are forced 
to rely solely on the bank’s asset preservation strategies and the legal framework within 
which the bank operates. The investors on the other hand can seek other guarantees since they 
exercise some control over the use of their money. Thus, they can monitor the use of the 
money closely and audit the projects. For the depositor, it would even be unfair to expect him 
to devise strategies for protecting his deposits. Banks ought to be set up with the capacity to 
assess investments, choose and diversity, and minimise risks, especially the risk of loss of 
capital. Hence, ideal and fair or just (Al-adl) Islamic banking would provide depositors with 
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similar guarantees, else Islamic banks would continue to be confronted with a very high 
withdrawal risk. It follows, that given the motivation of depositors, the absence of the 
guarantee of the principal amount of deposits creates an unjust system that undermines the 
interests of potential depositors that cannot afford to take any kind of risk on their deposits. 
The latter would usually be less privileged members of society and their welfare is likely to 
be reduced if they are forced to rely solely on the preservation strategies of banks and 
regulation. It further follows that the capacity of banks to mobilise resources is adversely 
affected since they only attract privileged members of society who are not risk averse. There 
is therefore a strong case for Islamic regulators to ensure that Islamic banks guarantee the 
principal amount of their deposits, or at least seek guarantees from borrowers such that there 
is an incentive for borrowers not to dissipate capital through negligence or mismanagement, 
and that there is some form of asset backing on which the bank as agent (wakil) for its 
depositors can call if the borrower is in difficulty.  
This is not the same as a bank guarantee. It is a guarantee given to a bank, not a guarantee 
given by a bank. There is a standard form of bank guarantee issued by the International 
chamber of commerce world business organisation (URDG 758) which is standardised 
internationally. Banks may issue a counter guarantee but in this case it would be issued to 
depositors. The guarantee envisaged in this section is a loan guarantee which could be used 
with respect either to debts or the conduct of an enterprise.  
Amongst the arguments that support the permissibility of kafalah on mudharabah capital are 
the following: 
Past Islamic jurists were unanimous in their opinion that when losses occur in a mudharabah 
contract, the loss is to be borne by the provider of capital and not the mudharib as the 
mudharib’s status is only as amin (trustee). A capital guarantee by the mudharib was not 
permissible.   However, if it can be proven that the loss was clearly due to the mudharib’s 
negligence or intentional design, then the mudharib is to make good the capital to the 
investor.  In British law this is analogous to a breach of a fiduciary duty. The lack of skill 
canvassed in the previous section is to be seen as negligence according to some scholars but 
not others.   
Contemporary Islamic jurists have made studies on the acceptable level of capital in 
mudharabah contracts that can be guaranteed according to the perspective of Islamic 
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jurisprudence. The main issue of concern in relation to capital guarantee is whether the 
guarantee given will cause the mudharabah contract to be nullified since it violates the 
muqtadha `aqd (the main objective of a contract).195 
They have submitted several solutions on mudharabah capital guarantee, including a third-
party guarantee based on tabarru` (voluntarily given), and a third-party guarantee based on 
qardh (debts); 
Guarantees issued by a third party who has no connection whatsoever with the mudharib if it 
is done by way of tabarru` and is not included as a condition in the actual mudharabah 
contract. 
The Shari’a Council for AAOIFI allowed for third-party kafala other than by mudharib or 
investment agent or business partner towards the liability of investment losses, where the the 
guarantee given is not tied to the original mudharabah contract. Kafala literally means 
guarantee. It is defined as a contract which combines one’s zimmah (liability) with another 
person’s zimmah.  
A guarantee exists only in respect to an established liability (fungible, non-fungible, a person, 
or an action) guaranteed by a debtor, where it is possible to collect from the guarantor, in 
respect of a guaranteed financial debt must be valid and binding liability. 196 
It is not permissible to take remuneration for issuing a letter of guarantee, if the remuneration 
is intended as consideration for the guarantee per se, since the amount guaranteed and the 
duration of the guarantee are usually taken into consideration in computing remuneration, so 
the guarantees cannot be traded. 197  They can therefore be used to secure the deposits and 
investments of depositors in IB.  
The Mudarib may for example be required by the regulator to compensate for any loss of the 
principal amount of the capital in a PLS scheme. Also, the recipient of the capital may be 
required by the regulator to repay more than the principal amount; although this may be 
deemed to be payment of Riba. But then again where banks guarantee all deposits, both 
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savings and investments, the depositors would receive a profit from the investments in PLS 
schemes. It is suggested that there is no risk of loss, and that this may then be contrary to the 
principle of Al-kharaj bi-aldama, which is derived from the Hadith and requires the 
entitlement to profit to be dependent on liability for attendant risk of loss.198 However this is 
only, is suggested, in accounts without FSCS deposit guarantees. Most accounts in the UK 
are only guaranteed to £85,000. Depositors with deposits above the limit may also receive 
additional funds in the form of a share of their savings following any distribution of assets as 
part of the insolvency process. How much they receive depends on the dividend in the 
liquidation of the bank.199 
So whilst Shari’a emphasises the importance of mutual risk-bearing in investor-entrepreneur 
relationships, the limits of the Deposit Guarantee Scheme may mean that all guaranteed 
accounts up to £85,000 are guaranteed. Hence, Islamic banks may be required by the 
regulator to guarantee the principal amount of all deposits and only a certain percentage of 
investments. As pointed above, in the absence of guarantees, Islamic banks are confronted 
with a relatively high withdrawal risk. It must nonetheless be pointed out that there are many 
deposit schemes based on contracts such as Wadi’ah Yad Dhamana (guaranteed safekeeping) 
and Al-Qard (loan) whereby the principal deposits are guaranteed irrespective of the bank’s 
profitability. This implies that some depositors may actually guarantee the full amount of 
their deposits without relying on the bank’s strategy or the regulator. However, this is only in 
cases where the banks are willing to accept such contracts.   
Because of the operation of the FCSC Deposit Guarantee Scheme, however, this does not 
present a new business model for banks – most deposits in the UK would fall under this 
scheme.  
2.6 Murabaha Financing 
This is also referred to as Tawarooq and is a fiduciary sale (Bayu-al-amanah). It is related to 
other types of sale that are geared towards fixed and secured profits such as deferred payment 
sale (Bai’ bithaman ‘ajil), the purchase with delivered delivery (Bai’ al-salam), 
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commissioned manufacturing (Bai’ al-istisna) and the Ijara (leasing).200 The Murabaha 
financing mode is set up like a buyer’s credit and used for complex structured financings in 
Islamic markets. It may also be used for securitisation, whereby assets are financed on the 
back of fees to be paid by the buyer or borrower under long-term contracts.201 It therefore 
involves the purchase of an asset by the Islamic bank from a third party broker and the sale of 
the asset to a borrower at a cost plus a specified profit. However, the borrower or customer 
defers the payment of the sale price or pays in instalments as agreed by the parties. The 
borrower may enter into a subsequent contract to sell the assets to the broker for the cost 
price. The transactions are Riba-free and therefore compliant with the Shari’a. There are 
certain obligations imposed on the seller to ensure that no interest is charged and excessive 
profits are not made. Thus, the seller must expressly mention the cost it has incurred on the 
assets for sale and sell them to another party by adding a declared profit or mark-up.202 
The Murabaha financing mode may be used by Islamic banks in different ways, depending 
on the market. However, they generally use this instrument in asset financing, buying and 
selling property, import-export and microfinance.203 Nonetheless, they are not supposed to be 
used where the PLS financing modes (Mudaraba or Musharaka) are practicable, and where 
the risks can be shared more equitably between the seller and the buyer.204 This implies that 
the Murabaha should not be the bank’s first choice of financing despite the fact that unlike 
the PLS modes, it ensures a more predictable income and carries less risks. However, it is 
uncertain the extent to which Islamic banks abide by this rule given that, as noted above, 
studies have shown that the use of the PLS financing schemes declined significantly at the 
turn of last century. Yousef for example found that the bulk of investments undertaken by the 
Islamic banks studied included short-term financing through the Murabaha and debt-based 
contracts.205 Iqbal and Molyneux also noted that many Islamic banks prefer debt-like 
instruments similar to the Murabaha to provide external finance.206  
There is a problem with the sale of the property on terms: Many modern personal property 
security laws apply to any transaction such as Murabaha that, in substance, creates a security 
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interest. In the past, courts have determined that where the transaction was in fact a financing 
one – that is, in cases including a Murabaha - the interest has to be perfected under the 
relevant personal property security regime.207 
Also, a study conducted by UNCTAD on structured commodity finance in the Islamic market 
revealed that the Murabaha financing accounted for more than half of all the financing 
provided by Islamic financing institutions across the world.208 
This has been criticised: 
Islamic liquidity funds established under Murabaha agreements expose their investors 
to a number of additional risks above and beyond those borne by [conventional] 
investors…. The structure established to manage the commodity exposure is 
operationally cumbersome and could be expensive to run. The presence of an escrow 
agent entails additional operational and regulatory/legal risks. 209  
Accordingly, Islamic liquidity funds established under Murabaha agreements are unlikely to 
be viewed as comparable with conventional MMFs or direct investments in short-term 
securities in terms of their risk/return characteristics. Investors in conventional MMFs can be, 
in turn, disadvantaged by the presence of Islamic liquidity schemes in their funds due to the 
non-transparent nature of their cash flows.210  
These risks are in no way alleviated by the many practical guidelines that the parties are 
required to follow. The bank may for example take constructive or actual possession of the 
asset before selling it to the borrower. Constructive possession is particularly important in 
banking transactions given that in many cases, the assets are intangible and do not change 
hands, and there are only cash-flows between the broker, bank and borrower. The bank is 
therefore able to buy and sell the assets and generate a profit without actual possession of the 
asset. However, the bank cannot rescind the agreement in the event of late payment or non-
payment but may charge an additional margin taking into account the time value of money 
that was not paid in time. Nonetheless, it is uncertain whether the borrower or customer may 
not challenge the charging of the additional margin as Riba, which is prohibited by Shari’a. 
This is equally the case with ay any penalties for late payment that the bank may impose.  
                                                 
 
207 I Davies, "The Reform of English Personal Property Security Law: Functionalism and Article Nine of the Uniform 
Commercial Code" (2004) 24 Legal Studies 295-321. 
208 UNCTAD, N_116 above.  
209 Arakcheev, N_168 above.  
210 Ibid. 
 65 | P a g e  
 
65 
The Murabaha contracts are attractive to banking institutions because the rate of return is 
predetermined or fixed, the evaluation and monitoring of projects does not require many 
resources, and the risk of default is low compared to the PLS financing schemes. They are 
also attractive to entrepreneurs because the rate of return is fixed along a specific payment 
period, there is no charge per se for default, and the asset or commodity that is being 
purchased is treated as collateral.211 
Figure 1: A Murabaha contract 
 
 
2.6.1 Unique Risk Characteristics 
Despite the above advantages, the use of the Murabaha as a financing mode carries several 
risks that must be taken into account by the Islamic bank. The risks include price risk, default 
risk, commodity risk and market risk. They are examined in the subsections below. 
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2.6.2 Price and Default Risks 
The price risk is based on the volatility of the price of the asset during a given financing 
period. The bank as the purchaser of the asset at spot value is required to declare the price 
and resell the asset to the borrower or customer at the same price plus an agreed profit. The 
fact that the market price may have changed significantly before the bank sells the product to 
the customer is not taken into account.212 Thus, the customer or borrower might potentially 
benefit unjustly from the transaction where the price of the asset or commodity being 
financed has increased significantly since the bank purchased the asset. Equally, the customer 
may suffer a potential loss where the market price of the asset has fallen significantly since it 
was purchased by the bank. Given the lack of standardisation, there is no steadfast Shari’a-
compliant means by which the customer or bank may avoid the loss. In practice, they are 
forced to continue with the Murabaha contract until maturity in the hope of realising a gain 
from the price margin on the basis that the price of the asset subsequently improves.213 In 
other words, they are required to continue with a bad deal and incur a loss even where it is 
evident to the parties after the commencement of the activities that they are going to incur a 
loss. This may be unduly harsh where the loss would impel the borrower or customer towards 
insolvency. The customer may be held to have worsened the insolvency by negligence or 
failure to act. It is therefore not surprising that in many cases, borrowers have terminated the 
Murabaha agreement immediately on the grounds of financial difficulty with the hope of 
subsequently entering into another contract in future where the price of the asset has 
improved.214 
The bank using the Murabaha financing mode is also exposed to the risk of default. The 
default risk is relatively very high because the payment of the asset by the customer or 
borrower is on a deferred basis. Thus, the bank ought to assess the borrower’s credit record 
before entering into such an agreement with the latter. Also, where the borrower is unable to 
pay, there are few options available to the bank. It is required to extend the payment period 
until the borrower is able to continue payment in accordance with the Qur’an (2: 280) or it 
may terminate the agreement with the obligation of the borrower to complete payment at a 
later date. The bank may also sell the asset in the market given that the asset functions as 
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collateral in the contract. The proceeds of the sale may then be used to pay all or part of the 
outstanding balance.215 In each of the instances discussed above, the bank incurs additional 
costs in order to receive full payment, but the bank might also not recover in full.  Moreover, 
the bank’s predetermined cash flow on the asset side which has been adjusted with its 
liability is interrupted, as well as its predetermined profit that was calculated on the basis of 
the duration of the Murabaha contract.  
 It makes sense for Islamic banks to carry out extensive investigations of the borrower before 
they may agree to enter into Murabaha contracts with them. It’s not only a question of moral 
integrity.  The banks should also be able to ascertain the borrower’s experience in dealing in 
commodities, or possibly using them as part of a manufacturing process, given that they may 
be faced with a moral hazard where the latter pretends to be insolvent in order to stop making 
payments.  Under the Insolvency Act 1986 (UK) there are certain procedures for declaring 
insolvency and the borrower ought be required to comply with secular law in order to so 
cease.  In such an event, the borrower’s default due to insolvency would be considered an 
‘honest’ default under the Shari’a and may enable the borrower to be released from his 
obligation to continue the contract. Thus, where the borrower does not need the asset any 
more, he may adopt the devious course of declaring bankruptcy after using the money 
allocated for payment of the asset to purchase some other asset at a lower price in the market.  
Nicholas Foster claims that there is no insolvency law known as a branch of law in Shari’a. 
216 The development of fiqh on this point will require thought by scholars and is outside the 
scope of this thesis; any breach of trust, whereby debts are not paid due to a debtor’s immoral 
default, ought however be treated as theft.  As an interim measure, a kafala will help secure 
the interest of the bank and its depositors. There is also English authority suggesting that 
English law and not Shari’a will apply in cases where Islamic finance and insolvency 
intercept.217 
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2.6.3 Commodity Risk 
Closely linked to the price and default risks is the commodity risk. This concerns the 
uncertainties of the market value of the asset or commodity in the future, as well as of the 
size of the income in the future due to fluctuation in the prices of the assets or the borrower’s 
inability to complete payment. Islamic banks have confronted this risk with the issue of 
consumer loans. It must be noted that Shari’a-compliant consumer loans are different from 
consumer loans in conventional or Western markets. The Shari’a-compliant consumer loans 
may be described as charitable loans (Qard hasan) that are provided by Islamic banks to 
consumers under Murabaha contracts whereby the banks have to take the risk that they will 
not be reimbursed.218 This is the risk that CBs take with unsecured loans such as most credit 
cards.  Islamic banks also provided cars to customers under Murabaha agreements with 
payments to be made in instalments. However, due to the strong demand for finance by 
customers in many Islamic markets, many of the customers immediately resold the cars for 
ready cash in order to pay the banks in full and make a quick profit.219 The banks therefore 
incurred high transaction costs that were not covered where the consumers immediately paid 
fully. Thus, in the absence of a standardised Shari’a-compliant option, some banks in Saudi 
Arabia decided to simply replicate the Western consumer loan mechanism in the manner that 
they deemed was Shari’a-compliant. The banks hold a small portfolio of fungible 
commodities that are sold to customers on the basis of deferred payment. The latter then 
appoints the bank as its agent for selling the same commodities, which the bank does.220 
Thus, what essentially happens is that the bank buys an asset or commodity from Party X and 
then delivers the asset to Party Y. As noted above, there are several risks as regards the fall in 
the market price and the default by Party Y. Also, Party X may fail to deliver the goods 
where they are physical commodities, or where the goods are delivered, they may be of poor 
quality. Party Y may then refuse to pay for the goods of poor quality or goods that have 
simply not been delivered. In order to mitigate this risk, the banks replicate the Western 
consumer loan mechanism in the manner that they deem is Shari’a-compliant. Thus, they 
establish an agency relationship with Party Y in its dealings with Party X. Thus, in case of the 
delivery of goods of poor quality or non-delivery of the goods, it would be as a result of Party 
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Y’s failure to ensure that Party X fulfils its contractual obligations. Also, Party Y is put in a 
position where it cannot refuse its obligations towards the bank. 
 
Figure 2: How a Murabaha contract works 
 
 
In the English case of Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf (IICG) v Symphony Gems NV 
& Ors,221 IICG and Symphony Gems entered into a Murabaha financing agreement in 
January 2000, whereby the latter was responsible for identifying precious stones and their 
sellers. On the basis of its request, IICG was supposed to buy the precious stones at the on 
spot value and sell to Symphony Gems at the declared price plus an agreed profit; and 
payments by the latter had to be made in instalments. One month after they entered into the 
agreement, Symphony Gems identified a seller in Hong Kong and upon its request, IICG paid 
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for 92,000 carats of precious stones from this seller. However, the seller failed to deliver the 
precious stones and Symphony Gems also refused to begin making instalment payments. 
Tomlinson J held that the failure of the seller to deliver the precious stones was in part due to 
the failure of Symphony Gems to make the necessary arrangements. Thus, it had to pay IICG 
as agreed under the Murabaha agreement.222 The English High Court did not enforce the 
Murabaha contract per se given that the Shari’a is not part of English law and Islamic law is 
not a choice of law in England and Wales, but an analysis of the judgment shows that 
individual elements of Shari’a could have been interpreted as terms of the contract.223  
It is unlikely, given Tomlinson J’s comments about Shari’a not being part of English law that 
English law will reach the accommodation with Shari’a that Malaysian cases have reached in 
the period after 2007.  There, cases such as Bank Kerjasama Rakyat Malaysia Bhd v PSC 
Naval Dockyard Sdn Bhd,224 Arab Malaysian Finance Bhd v Taman Ihsan Jaya Sdn Bhd 225 
and Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd v Azhar Osman226 have interpreted the Malaysian Contracts 
Act 1950227  to allow for equitable relief, in effect, if a party avoids a contract on grounds 
related to Shari’a, so that a party to such a contract must account for any benefit received to 
the other even if the contract is haram.    
 Whilst Malaysia has also solved the problem of the lack of congruence between common 
law and Shari’a by inserting new provisions into Part VII of the Central Bank of Malaysia 
Act which aim at resolving issues pertinent to Shari’a matters228, the lack of any such 
legislative changes in the UK means that in order to avoid any risk caused by a lack of a legal 
remedy for Murabaha contracts, the contractual provisions will need to be drawn to specify, 
in longhand as it were, as particular conditions of each contract, the “solutions” found by the 
Malaysians, perhaps as overarching principles of interpretation.   
A sufficient degree of clarity will be needed to avoid the terms of the contract being void for 
uncertainty.229 In Scammell v Ouston230 Lord Maugham said of such unclear cases that the 
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consensus ad idem would be "a matter of mere conjecture".  The enforcement risk with 
contracts which do not spell out the necessary Shari’a terms with sufficient specificity, are 
that the parties may well find their hopes of judicial resolution disappointed since a court 
cannot enforce a contract which it cannot interpret.231 
2.6.4 Other Risks 
 Islamic banks are exposed to other risks that may be linked to the market in which the assets 
are bought and sold. The Murabaha financing mode has given Islamic banks a liquidity 
management mechanism for tri-lateral transactions involving several banks, and sometimes 
hedge funds where the transactions are carried out in the international market.232 In local 
markets, they have enabled Islamic banks to finance working capital requirements by buying 
and selling inventories to the end users of the financing. The assets may be bought from 
broker A by the Islamic bank and then sold to the borrower on deferred payment terms. The 
latter then sells the assets at spot price to broker B who pays for the assets. Broker B in turn 
sells the assets to broker A at spot price. As such, in the end the borrower is left with cash and 
the bank is left with a payment obligation that comprises the principal and a declared profit. 
The profit, as mentioned above, is derived from the sale of the assets by the bank to the 
borrower. In international markets, the fixed-rate Murabaha products have to compete with 
retail product offerings that are based on floating benchmarks. However, the Islamic deposits 
have much shorter tenor compared with investments that are exposed to floating rate. Also, 
Islamic banks are at a disadvantage because of the prohibition of Riba, and thus the absence 
of sophisticated tools to manage interest rate risk. The tools that are required to manage any 
fluctuations such as hedging solutions ought to be Shari’a-compliant and this has been 
difficult to achieve because of the lack of standardisation of requirements. Thus, hedging 
solutions that are purported to be Shari’a-compliant generally remain unattractively priced in 
comparison to the solutions of conventional financial institutions.233   
Given the prohibition of Riba, Islamic hedging solutions are based on profit rate swap rather 
than the interest rate swap of conventional institutions that manage exposure to the 
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fluctuations of the interest rate.234 The profit rate swap is geared towards protecting Islamic 
financial institutions from movements in borrowing rates and therefore constitute a risk 
control mechanism.235 Thus, given that this hedging solution is generally Shari’a-compliant 
(does not deal with interest rates), it is acceptable in Islamic finance and may ensure that 
Islamic investors that require balance-sheet management may obtain the same benefits as 
investors in conventional institutions that charge interest.236 Through the profit rate swap, 
Islamic institutions with fixed and floating rates agree to exchange profit rates through the 
execution of a number of contracts called Wa’ad contracts. The terms of these contracts 
ensure that the swap reaches maturity.  
Figure 3: How a traditional Wa’ad contract works 
 
Thus, through the Wa’ad contract, a party unilaterally promises to exchange profit rates until 
the swap reaches maturity or expires.237 Hence, each counterparty is required to provide a 
Wa’ad ensuring that it enters into the relevant Commodity Murabaha. In this light, the parties 
can ensure that the transactions under the Murabaha will be free from the charging of Riba, 
as well as from Gharar, and any form of gambling, Maysir. The principal is not exchanged 
and the parties must ensure that it is netted off using a set off called Muqasah.238 
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Kok has suggested a series of formulas to explain the costs and benefits to each party of such 
an arrangement.  He constructs a financial derivative to mitigate some of the risks inherent in 
the underlying assets, which is a complicated method to structure an option, but has essential 
features which I summarise below. 
Underlying Shariah-compliance can only be achieved through Shariah-supervisory board. 
Kok says that further research is required to ascertain if the product structure is in fact 
Shariah-compliant.  However, based upon a broad set of Shariah-compliant screening rules 
the product abides by:  
 Commodity in question is halal 
 There are clear lines of ownership 
 Transaction contains no riba 
 Wa’ad premia to bank are justified on the basis of organisation of contract and risk 
bearing. 
There is an end hedge which incorporates an element of risk-sharing, to comply with Shari’a 
principles although the purchase of commodities does not amount to a plausible investment. 
There is a combination of the use of a mushcah, murabaha, and wa’ad but there must be 
active management of the investment sum to justify the partnership in the first place and to 
keep Shari’a compliance.   
The want for risk-sharing has meant that one additional party had to be included into the 
contact in what would otherwise be achieved with a straightforward wa’ad.  The inclusion of 
the third party, which accounts for the wa’ad element of the structure, creates additional 
uncertainty. Islamic finance requires proof of ownership of commodities before any sale can 
take place. Where possible, the structure has taken into account ownership of commodities 
before sale but the wa’ad element creates subjectivity as to whether ownership is required 
before the agreement of the wa’ad contract.239 
                                                 
 
239 SK Kok, Islamic Finance in the Global Economy: An Exploration of Risk Management and Governance within Shari’a 
Finance (Ph.D Thesis,  University of Liverpool March 2014) 244. 
 74 | P a g e  
 
74 
Rice says that there is a tension with such an arrangement, in that the complexity of the 
structure makes it too expensive to operate in comparison with a CB product of similar type: 
Capitalization on arbitrage… requires the payment of various transactions costs. In 
Islamic finance, those transactions costs are incurred due to conducting otherwise 
unnecessary transactions …as well as the additional legal and jurist fees required to 
structure a product and certify it.240 
He sees that this will lead to pragmatism amongst practitioners of IB: 
To the extent that classical Islamic jurisprudence is generally understood by 
contemporary jurists to forbid conventional financial practice, movement towards 
strict adherence to Islamic principles requires movement away from conventional 
finance. To the extent that profitability is tied to efficiency of the Islamized analogues 
of conventional financial practices, the profit motive dictates movement towards 
conventional financial practice, and thus away from strict adherence to Islamic 
principles as understood by contemporary jurists who are active in this industry.241  
As such, despite the absence of standardisation, it may be posited that there are generally 
three ways in which hedging solutions are implemented in a manner that may be deemed to 
be Shari’a-compliant. These include:  
i. the use of back to back interest free loan,  
ii. the use of Wa’ad based contracts, and  
iii. the use of Murabaha based contracts.  
The back to back interest free loans neither carry any interest nor benefit and may hardly be 
used in conventional markets or in transactions involving large amounts because they do not 
take into account the tenor and are imbedded with a high risk of loss of capital. The Wa’ad-
based contracts are more sophisticated and are widely used in some markets by Islamic 
institutions. They involve the unilateral unconditional promise by a party looking for a hedge 
to buy a specific currency at a given date in future. The other party that undertakes to sell the 
currency is not bound to proceed with the promise.242 This creates uncertainty as regards the 
promise’s commitment to the agreement. Also, a unilateral promise may not form the basis of 
a valid contract under the Shari’a as applied in many Islamic countries, as well as under the 
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law of contract of many conventional jurisdictions such as the UK. As such, the party making 
the unilateral promise has to confront a high market risk. 
With regard to the Murabaha contracts, as noted above, the bank and the customer enter into 
separate agreements whereby the bank buys an asset or commodity at spot value and sells it 
to the customer for the purchase price plus agreed profit, on the basis of deferred payment. 
Thus, both the bank and the customers eventually resell the asset or commodity in the Islamic 
market in order to recover the initial investment. Nonetheless, the cost of incorporating an 
asset or commodity in the transaction may be prohibitive thus impelling Islamic banks to seek 
other means of hedging their exposures. 
In the UK this would be subject to the provisions of the Insolvency Act 1986, but there is no 
extant fatwa or AAOIFI procedure covering insolvency. 
2.7 Istisna 
This involves a pre-paid forward sale whereby the bank purchases a good of a specific 
description and specified quantity and delivers the good at an agreed price.243 The good may 
be in the process of manufacturing and the payment may be in instalments or at various 
stages of process, depending on the agreement by the parties. The goods are therefore 
acquired by specification or order and the parties may agree not to specify the delivery date. 
However, the manufacturer would be expected to deliver the goods within a reasonable time 
after completion. These modes of financing are often used for both short and long-term 
arrangements involving the purchase of raw materials or the processing of raw materials or 
the marketing of tertiary products.244 The parties must however specify the nature and quality 
of the good and the manufacturer must commit to producing the good as described. It is 
important to note that after the commencement of the manufacturing process, the Istisna 
contract cannot be terminated by either party, except where the goods delivered do not 
correspond with the description. Where they are as described, the buyer is obliged to accept 
and pay for them and the contract is deemed to be satisfied after the goods are delivered.245 
This implies that where a party changes its mind before the manufacturing process begins, it 
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may unilaterally terminate the contract. The same applies to the PLS financing modes as 
indicated above. 
Islamic banks generally use Istisna contracts to finance high-tech industries such as the 
building of ships, trains and aircrafts.246 The instalment stage payments are then made over 
the period of the manufacturing. Thus, the bank only pays part of the cost up front and then 
makes regular instalment payments at subsequent stages of the process. Istisna contracts are 
also used for financing housing construction or the manufacture of specific equipment. The 
bank finances the manufacture through an Istisna contract. They are also used for pre-export 
finance, whereby the bank buys all goods for which an export contract has been established. 
The goods that will be exported are pre-purchased by the bank. 
In light of the above, it is not surprising that Istisna contracts are quite complex. They may be 
syndicated or structured as securitisation or include financing portions of different maturities 
and profit rates. The bank would require detailed information about the goods from the buyer 
or investor, as well as information about the security offered, such as guarantees by the 
government or parent company. The buyer and seller have to also deposit security bonds 
before the bank may allow the buyer to order the goods as its agent. The buyer then has to 
reimburse the bank by paying in instalments or as agreed by the parties. Where the buyer 
wishes to pay in instalments after the goods have been delivered, it may enter into a lease 
agreement (Ijara) with the bank. The manufacturer on the other hand is required to provide a 
performance bond, as well as a guarantee to repay the progress payments that have been 
made by the bank in the event of non-delivery or the delivery of goods that do not correspond 
with the description in the contract. The manufacturer is equally required to assign the 
insurance for the goods to the bank. The latter usually requests manufacturers to provide a 
letter of credit in favour of the party that supplies the materials to be used for the 
manufacture. This enables the banks to control the use of their funds by the manufacturer. 
The Istisna financing mode therefore has similarities to the PLS financing mode, as well as 
the Murabaha. However, it carries some unique risks that must be taken into account by the 
bank in deciding whether to use it or not. 
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Figure 5 shows an ijara contract in diagrammatic form, and is a simplified version of one 
sourced from Clayton Utz.   
Figure 4: An Ijara contract 
 
Source: Modified from Clayton Utz 
 
Figure 6 shows an Istisna’a contract in diagrammatic form. 
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Figure 5:  An Itsisna contract 
 
 
Source: Modified from Clayton Utz 
 
2.7.1 Unique Risk Characteristics 
Given the complexity of Istisna contracts and the fact that the Islamic bank has to rely on the 
manufacturer and buyer, the bank is exposed to two main risks, namely the manufacturer’s 
performance risk and the buyer’s payment risk or credit risk. The risk of non-performance, or 
counterparty risk, is the risk that the obligation will not be fulfilled. This is additional to any 
credit risk or settlement risk and any other factors that would influence the likelihood of the 
obligation of being fulfilled. If the manufacturer does not deliver the goods as described, to 
the quality and in the quantity described in the contract, and the purchaser rejects the goods, 
the bank may suffer a loss. The performance risk may also include the risk of loss due to 
improper monitoring or control. Thus, the bank has to take into account the manufacturer’s 
credit standing and ensure that the latter has no history of non-performance or 
underperformance in terms of production quality.247 There is no standard form to the author’s 
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knowledge which allows for the collection of information as to past claims or defaults of a 
manufacturer for Islamic financial purposes – which is odd, because there are detailed 
standard questionnaires used in both conventional banking for everything from applications 
for standard loans to applications for credit card merchant facilities, and also standard 
questionnaires in insurance, franchising disclosures and retail tenancies.   Such required 
disclosure would reduce risks, albeit at a compliance cost. 
Arbitration with respect of insubstantial non-compliance, such as would not enliven the rule 
in Hong Kong Fir, 248would also reduce risk.  Malaysian practice249 is to allow revision of the 
agreed price of the istisna` asset after the delivery of the asset to the purchaser if the seller 
has failed to comply with the agreed specifications. In this case, the revised price of the 
istisna` asset is subjected to the agreement of the contracting parties, but a solution may form 
part of the terms of the existing contract, for example a term of the dispute resolution process 
set up in the contract allowing an assessment of value by a referee or arbitrator in a Shari’a 
compliant manner where there is less than a specified variation from the sample or 
specification. 
The bank must also take into account the risk of non-payment by the buyer. Thus, the bank 
must also ensure that the buyer has no history of defaulting. This risk is particularly important 
because as noted above, the bank is unable to terminate the agreement in the event of honest 
default or default that is purported to be honest. Moreover, it cannot use penalty rates as 
deterrents against payments. The bank is therefore forced to rely excessively on the use of the 
commodity as collateral, which may exacerbate the buyer’s credit risk. Where the value of 
the commodity proves to be too volatile, the potential recovery value of the loan may be 
reduced significantly.250 In cases of istisna’a, it is permitted for the bank, or the 
manufacturer, to acquire kafala or rahn (collateral) from the client, and therefore credit risk 
in istisna’a should be minimal.  Taking collateral does not mitigate the risk completely, 
because collateral usually comprises illiquid assets, and determining the market value of 
these assets may be problematic particularly if they are non- fungible  such as goodwill. It is 
also hard to liquidate such assets. 
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It must also be pointed out that the buyer has no contractual relationship with the 
manufacturer. Thus, the bank is liable in the event of non-performance by either party, unless 
the bank insists on a tri-lateral agreement such as in the case of the Mubaraha contract. As 
such, where an agreement involves all three parties, the bank may only be a guarantor to the 
manufacturer or contractor once the goods are delivered, enabling the buyer to have direct 
recourse to the manufacturer.251  As was shown in figure 2, at each stage where a client can 
abandon the contract, the risk is with the bank. 
2.8 Summary 
 This Chapter has examined the unique risk characteristics of four modes of financing widely 
used by Islamic banks. It however began with a brief examination of the concept of ‘risk’ 
under Islamic law. It noted that the term closest to ‘risk’ in Islamic literature is ‘Gharar’ and 
unlike the former, the content of the latter is subject to much uncertainty. It is uncertain 
whether a transaction imbedded with risk or Ghārār would be voidable and not void, 
depending on whether the party that exposed the transaction to the risk was honest. The 
Qur’an does not expressly prohibit Ghārār and there is nothing to suggest that ‘vanity’ that is 
prohibited by the Qur’an may be interpreted to include the uncertainty or ambiguity which 
Ghārār describes. Nonetheless, some previous Islamic scholars reported that it was prohibited 
by the Prophet’s (Peace and Blessings be upon Him and his Companions) companions in 
trading to the effect that where Ghārār is identified in a transaction, it is considered null and 
void. This would however imply that Ghārār is not the direct equivalent of risk given that all 
financial transactions are embedded with several types of risk, and there are even more risks 
inherent in many Islamic transactions. Moreover, Islamic banks are required to give priority 
to the PLS financing modes and it was shown that these modes carry even more risks. The 
understanding of risk in this context relates to the ambiguities about the fulfilment of 
contractual obligations and uncertainties about the loss of capital. This is similar to Ghārār as 
defined in Islamic literature and it is therefore very unlikely that Ghārār is prohibited under 
Islamic law. Thus, what this demonstrates is that the first obstacle to developing a framework 
for the standardisation of risk management in Islamic banking is the lack of consensus on 
what constitutes ‘risk.’ It is also shown that the lack of consensus and standardisation of the 
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concept of risk constitute an obstacle to the uniform use of financing modes by Islamic banks, 
as well as the mitigation of the risks inherent in these modes. 
 The PLS financing modes were said to involve the investment in selected projects by Islamic 
banks and sharing in the profits and losses with the entrepreneurs or owners of the projects. 
The Musharaka is a form of partnership or joint venture in which all the parties are required 
to provide capital and take part in the management of the project and profits are shared on an 
agreed ratio while losses are shared in proportion to each partner’s investment. The 
Mudaraba on the other hand refers to an agreement between two or more persons whereby 
one party (the Islamic bank) provides the finance and the other party provides the expertise 
and/or labour and management to conduct a business that is geared towards making profits. 
In both instances, there is no requirement of collateral and this creates a relatively high level 
of moral hazard that Islamic banks have to confront. The depositors in the Islamic bank have 
not consented to invest, albeit indirectly, in the PLS scheme but they may lose their money 
because of a non-performing loan. Greater disclosure is properly to be required from 
entrepreneurs, although there is currently no standard requiring this.   
Also, and absent such disclosure requirements, banks are required to have very high expertise 
in evaluating projects, taking into account the local fiscal policies and the accounting and 
auditing systems of the entrepreneurs. Also, additional monitoring costs are incurred by the 
banks. Equally, since the banks have to act as universal banks, competition is reduced and 
financial risks are then concentrated at the individual universal banks. It was however noted 
that the main risk inherent in the PLS financing modes that Islamic banks find difficult to 
ascertain and manage is the equity investment risk. This is the risk that arises from entering 
into a partnership with the goal of participating or providing financing for a particular 
business activity as specified in the contract. 
The next mode of financing discussed were the savings and investment deposits in Islamic 
banks. It was noted that they may take the form of profit sharing investment accounts and 
may be restricted or unrestricted. There may be restrictions on withdrawals before maturity 
date or no restrictions on withdrawals, but in both instances the depositors rely entirely on the 
bank’s ability to generate a profit from investments made using their deposits.252  It was also 
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noted that Islamic banks using this mode seem to provide only two options to depositors: 
savings that do not grow for depositors that require security; and savings that may be lost in 
part or entirely, for depositors that would like their savings to grow significantly. Thus, 
higher returns are only guaranteed for depositors willing to take higher risks.253 This implies 
that Islamic banks have to confront a high withdrawal risk due to the fact that depositors 
motivated by income and consumption would be concerned by a lower rate of return. Hence, 
a lower rate of return may influence their decision to withdraw. 
The Murabaha financing mode was also examined. It was noted that it is set up like a buyer’s 
credit and used for complex structured financings in Islamic markets. It may also be used for 
securitisation, whereby assets are financed on the back of fees to be paid by the buyer or 
borrower under long-term contracts. Nonetheless, this mode is not supposed to be used where 
the PLS financing modes (Mudaraba or Musharaka) are practicable, and where the risks can 
be shared more equitably between the seller and the buyer. Thus, it should not be the bank’s 
first choice of financing despite the fact that unlike the PLS modes, it ensures a more 
predictable income and carried less risks. It was however noted that it is uncertain the extent 
to which Islamic banks abide by this rule given that previous studies have shown that the use 
of the PLS financing schemes declined significantly at the turn of last century and the 
Murabaha financing mode accounted for more than half of all the financing provided by 
Islamic financing institutions across the world. However, this mode carries the following 
risks: price risk, default risk, commodity risk and market risk. The Islamic bank is also 
exposed to other risks that may be linked to the market in which the assets are bought and 
sold. In international markets, the fixed-rate Murabaha products have to compete with retail 
product offerings that are based on floating benchmarks. However, the Islamic deposits have 
much shorter tenor compared with investments that are exposed to floating rate. Also, Islamic 
banks are at a disadvantage because of the prohibition of Riba. 
The last mode that was examined is the Istisna. It was shown that it involves a pre-paid 
forward sale whereby the bank purchases a good of a specific description and specified 
quantity and delivers the good at an agreed price. However, Istisna contracts are quite 
complex. They may be syndicated or structured as securitisation or include financing portions 
of different maturities and profit rates. The bank would require detailed information about the 
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goods from the buyer or investor, as well as information about the security offered, such as 
guarantees by the government or parent company. The buyer and seller have to also deposit 
security bonds before the bank may allow the buyer to order the goods as its agent. It was 
shown that the bank is exposed to two main risks, namely the manufacturer’s performance 
risk and the buyer’s payment risk or credit risk. The risk of non-performance is the risk that 
the obligation will not be fulfilled. This comprises credit risk and settlement risk and any 
other factors that would influence the likelihood of the obligation of being fulfilled. Also, 
given that that the buyer has no contractual relationship with the manufacturer. Thus, the 
bank is liable in the event of non-performance by either party, unless the bank insists on a tri-
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Chapter 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction to Methodology  
This chapter will discuss the research methodology, including, research design, research 
strategy, research method, research process, how data was collected, what data was collected, 
how was data analysed and examined and how content analysis was conducted relating to the 
case studies.  The aim of this chapter is to elucidate the relationship between the Central 
Argument (see Chapter 1) and the methodology used to create not only the theoretical 
framework but also the content analysis of the case studies.  By way of making this 
methodology explicit, it is important to note that the flow of ideas is from the central 
argument to the major abstract issues that are implied by the central argument, and how these 
major abstract issues have been translated into the specific risk factors used in the content 
analysis.  As the objectives of this research include the assessment of how issues of legal 
secularisation may be reconciled in Islamic models of finance and the determination of 
whether risk management practices can be improved by standardising banking across 
jurisdictions, the main methodology employed a content analysis between three markets: 
Malaysia, the Islamic Bank of Britain, and Saudi Arabia. As a qualitative analysis was a 
primary method, the purpose of choosing these three markets was to determine which 
accounting standards and risk management practices from each market are beneficial in 
improving financial and legal efficacy in Saudi Arabian financial institutions.  In order to 
make the logic of this methodology comprehensible, we shall first define the research design. 
3.1.1 Research Design 
The research design includes primarily the aims and objectives of the methodology and the 
various methodological components that allow us to develop a coherent structure for a 
detailed version of the Central Argument.  The specific aim throughout this work is how 
Islamic banking could be improved in Saudi given the conceptual architecture of the risks as 
defined by the Basel Accords and the experience of specific case studies embodied in the UK 
and Malaysia in Chapter 4 and 5, respectively.  This is a top-down approach and thus, the 
relatively large or more generalised ideas drive the conceptualisation of more and more 
specific components in the argument and flow of analysis.  In other words, while risk is the 
fundamental conception in the central argument, it also drives the componential structure of 
the research design.  Thus, the conceptual component of the Basel Accords is its 
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identification of generic risk categories, and for purposes of our research design, these 
generic risk categories across credit, market and operational risks, logically imply further 
specification of risks to the country and banking sector levels.  The originality of this 
methodology is that it extends the logic of the top-down approach to a specification of risks 
to both the Islamic banking level and the country level, differentiating between the two.  
Thus, the research design is to carefully carve out the most general meanings of risk to 
Islamic banking with the provenance of the Basel definitions of generic risks and the specific 
case situations that we will elucidate for the UK and Malaysia.   It is important to keep in 
mind that this research design is aimed at improving the Saudi situation both at the national 
and local level of Islamic banking.   
3.1.2 Research Strategy 
From the research design, our research strategy is to clarify the definitions and meanings of 
risk at the general level of the latest Basel Accord, i.e. Basel III, and to show how these sorts 
of generic risks are further re-interpreted at the country level and particular situational levels 
which we have called “case studies” in Chapter 4 and 5.  This means that the details of risk 
assessment and risk analysis at the level of Islamic banking in Saudi may be developed along 
the axes of the most general and universal meanings of risk as held by the international 
banking community adhering to Basel standards, and at the same time, may be compared to 
the practices used in the case studies that we have examined in the UK and Malaysia.  It is 
important to emphasize that this methodology is not a mere comparison of the de jure factors 
of each jurisdiction in relation to the regulation of Islamic banking, but that our research 
strategy is strictly focused on providing a way for the Saudi Islamic banking situation to be 
improved by means of a comparison to different logical levels, one internationally generic 
and the other, particularities of country level laws and central banking policies.  We could say 
without necessarily making a fine point about it that the methodology is fundamentally 
relational in that the components of generic risks from the international level and the country 
and Islamic banking levels are applied purposefully to make improvements to the Islamic 
banking system of Saudi. The implementation of the research strategy is captured by the 
specific steps undertaken in the research method. 
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3.1.3 Research Method 
We have employed a socio-scientific method for this dissertation.  It follows the classical 
Aristotelian scientific method of making observations of phenomena or facts, coming to a 
definition of the essential qualities of the phenomena such that one can make certain 
predictions of the phenomena.254 The observations and definitions of the facts are the models 
that we use in the research and in our work, we have developed two levels of models, one 
may be called generic and the other specific.  In both the generic and specific, our interest is 
in developing risk models that may be applicable to the Saudi situation.  We have presented 
our reflections of the Saudi situation as our primary observable phenomena, and the generic 
risk model based on the Basel Accords and the relatively more specific risk models applied to 
the country-level and company-level phenomena.  Although we have not theorised on the 
fundamental nature of risk, we have assumed that risk may be divided ab libitum to whatever 
phenomenon that may be called into question.  This flexibility in research method comes 
from the idea that the most general risk is conceptually the most inclusive, and therefore, 
other forms of risks are sub-parts of this most inclusive general risk concept.  Logically, this 
means that the various forms of risk analysis offered in this dissertation are coherent to the 
most general or most generic form of risk.     
The most generic form of risk reflects the top-down approach of the research method from 
the most general to the relatively more specific types of risks and how these various forms of 
risk analysis are applied to the Saudi situation, the UK and the Malaysian cases.  It is 
important to note that at the particular level of risk models, we have examined a large variety 
of standard risk factors in the case studies including, liquidity risk in sections 4.5 and 5.4.9, 
credit risk in section 4.6.2, operational risk in section 5.4.4, market risk in section 5.4.5, 
trading book risks in section 5.4.7, Shari’a compliance risks in section 5.4.8, compliance risks 
in section 5.4.9 and governance in section 5.3.  We list some of the major forms of risk 
analysis used as part of the research method  
3.1.4 Research Process 
Given the above research method and strategy, we undertook a research process that included 
data collection, identification of relevant data, and determined how the data would be 
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examined and analysed.   We also conducted a content analysis of the material that was 
already available in the case studies.   The data for the case studies was collected by gathering 
information from web-based scholarly literature, and official resources including government 
sources in Saudi, the UK and Malaysia, previous PhD dissertations were initially evaluated as 
well as from company financial reports in the public domain and academic journals.  After 
gathering the basic data, we performed a financial analysis of the balance sheets of relevant 
institutions, i.e, the IBB in Chapter 6 and BNM and BIMB in Chapter 5.  This analysis 
provided original insights into the genuine financial and management risks of these entities. 
The first case study is divided into two parts.  The first part assesses the Central Bank of 
Malaysia and the second, a major Malaysian retail bank, Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad. The 
format of the second case study is somewhat novel, as befits a thesis claiming to present an 
original contribution.  It looks at the losses made by IBB, and seeks to establish what the 
Malaysian banks did that IBB did not (and vice-versa), so that in Chapter 7 of this thesis, 
lessons can be drawn for Sa’udi Arabia, which is seeking to become both a centre of Islamic 
Banking and to sustain its economy in the face of falling oil prices. 
The content analysis was conducted between Saudi Arabia, the UK, and Malaysia, in order to 
answer the questions of whether the concept of risk could be used to enhance Islamic finance 
organisations and whether the Basel framework can be internalised by Islamic financial 
institutions to solve issues such as the inadequate coordination of financial markets in Saudi 
Arabia. Whilst, the following two chapters provide a study of the risk management issued 
under the Basel regime, each chapter will assess the risk management framework formalised 
under Basel III with the precise aim of assessing its relevance and utility in Islamic banking 
contexts and institutions in KSA in Chapter 7.255  
3.1.5 Content Analysis 
As the content analysis involves the analysis of three markets (ie: Malaysia, the Islamic Bank 
of Britain, and Saudi Arabia), the sample is the UK, the UAE, and Malaysia. In light of the 
research problem stated above, the researcher employed two distinct methodologies to assess 
the regulation of Islamic banking in Saudi Arabia so as to determine how the regulatory 
                                                 
 
255 The Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS) published “Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more 
resilient banks and banking systems” in December 2010. The paper was revised in June 2011 and, together with the 
BCBS’s 13 January 2011 press release entitled “Basel Committee issues final elements of the reforms to raise the quality 
of regulatory capital”, is known as Basel III. 
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principles and guidelines can operate independently in a methodical manner. The 
methodology that was developed and applied in this study optimises the use of the content 
analysis method to study risk contents, both in diversity and in depth, in three markets: 
Malaysia as the main focus, the UK in order to debunk a particular argument made in relation 
to the apparent success of the Islamic Bank of Britain in avoiding the consequences of the 
2006-8 financial crisis, and Saudi Arabia, as that market is the main topic of this thesis. Set 
against the spread and circulation of global banking standards, the following case study 
chapters will therefore, draw briefly on the regulatory structure and reforms instituted in the 
UK in the wake of their financial, as well as the limitations and failures of the UK’s ongoing 
attempts to effectively transpose, into its own domestic law, the related risk standards 
provided for under EU Capital Adequacy directive (CAD).256 The case study on UK risk 
management reforms has, it will be argued, exposed mutual risk vulnerabilities shared by 
both conventional and Islamic financial institutions. In a subsequent chapter, and by 
employing the research method and technique of comparative analysis, the thesis will 
proceed to consider the potential impacts, failures or, even, irrelevance of the Basel risk 
evaluation models in Islamic finance contexts in KSA.   The two case studies examine the 
different contexts of Islamic banking as found in the UK and Malaysia from the perspective 
of central bank authority and the private sector. To clarify the basis of the comparative 
methodology, it is important to distinguish comparisons between individual entities that 
happen to be in different jurisdictions, and the legal and regulatory contexts in which these 
entities exist.  Thus, we are not drawing comparisons between institutions or companies per 
se, but rather between the legal and regulatory contexts of Malaysia and UK wherein Islamic 
banks exist.  By comparing the legal and regulatory contexts of the two jurisdictions 
contextualised with specific institutional case studies, it is possible to make inferences about 
what type of legal and regulatory context may be more conducive for the development and 
growth of Islamic banking in Saudi. 
                                                 
 
256 CRD IV (Directive 2013/36/EU). CRR (Regulation 575/2013): Part Two (Articles 25-91) and Part Ten (Articles 465-
520).  EU rules on capital requirements for credit institutions and investment firms aim to put in place a comprehensive 
and risk-sensitive framework and to foster enhanced risk management amongst financial institutions. The Basel III rules 
have been implemented in the EU from the beginning of 2014. As a regulation, CRR will have direct application in each 
EU member state, whereas CRD IV will need to be transposed into local laws. 
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3.2 Case Study Methodology 
3.2.1 UK Case Study – IBB  
In light of the above discussion, the next two chapters proceed to offer a comparative analysis 
of two apparently distinct legal and financial systems. In the first, with relatively well 
prudential controls, Islamic banking is competing well with conventional banking.  In the 
second, it is failing, despite being bound by EU regulatory requirements.  The case studies 
highlight deficiencies in the existing risk management framework adopted by Al Rayan 
Bank, formerly known as the Islamic Bank of Britain (IBB), in the UK, despite legislative 
reform efforts and institutional restructuring of the banking regulatory authorities.  The losses 
of IBB, amounting to 25% of the Bank’s deposits, as will be seen in Chapter 6, occurred 
despite the specific rules relating to PSIAs and specific Basel II rules respecting risk 
management.  These deficiencies are particularly stark when viewed against the successes of 
the Malaysian Islamic Banking sector. 
3.2.2 Malaysian Case Study – Islamic Central Bank and BNM 
The case study on Malaysia considers the impacts of these reforms on the Malaysian IB 
sector, which remains well capitalised albeit remaining largely reliant on debt based (as 
opposed to equity based) modes of financing.257 The regulatory and institutional framework 
for managing and mitigating risks in the Malaysian IB sector is fairly well established and 
defined, relative to less developed markets in the GCC wherein enforcement related 
challenges and incoherency around the interpretation of Shari’a restriction on certain modes 
of financing continue to impede regulatory progress.258   In view of the rapid growth of 
Islamic banks operating in Malaysia, the thesis will consider the implementation of Basel 
rules in Malaysia, highlighting the apparent tension that exists between global banking 
standards and the regional standards issued by the IBSB, while throwing light on remaining 
                                                 
 
257 MRFB Ellias, Pricing of Murabahah And Ijarah Product in Malaysia: A Critical Analisis From The Shari’a Perspective 
(Tesis Sarjana, Kulliyyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Science, International Islamic University 
Malaysia 2007) 46-53. 
258  M Meera, A Kameel and D Abdul Razak, “Islamic Home Financing Through Musharakah Mutanaqisah and al-Bai 
Bithaman Ajil Contracts: Comparative Analysis” (2005) 9 Journal of The International Association for Islamic 
Economics 2, 7. 
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challenges faced by Malaysian Islamic finance institutions in the course of complying with 
these rules. 259 
3.3 Risk Management Methodologies 
A comprehensive survey of empirical findings and data supports the conclusion that many 
Islamic banking institutions have continued to retain high levels of capital,  while surviving 
the worst effects of the global financial crisis by adopting two critical strategies:  1) the 
effective implementation of global capital adequacy thresholds (the bank was well capitalised 
during the onset of the crisis) and 2) its recourse to standardised methods and criteria for 
calculating risk weighted assets (to reflect more optimal risk-return trade-offs).  The 
techniques described above are, of course, not unique to Islamic Banking. Indeed, these risk 
management techniques are in line with the raft of regulatory reform measures adopted under 
the meta-supervisory authority of the global banking regulatory body, the Basel Committee. 
The extent to which IBs have been able to minimise or prevent credit risks, relative to CBs, is 
worthy of greater consideration.   
Basel standards and procedures on capital management and risk regulation have attained the 
status of ‘soft’ law and, in this quality, have achieved near universal recognition and 
applicability.260 As such, Islamic finance institutions have come under pressure to bring their 
own practices and standards into line with global benchmarks, in response to increasing 
normative demand for minimal levels of integration and harmonisation in the domain of 
banking related risk regulation. It is also arguable that Islamic banks are likely to adopt Basel 
standards in the hopes of remaining competitive.  In the particular contexts of the UK and of 
Malaysia, there’s plenty of competition about. Southeast Asia’s three largest banks are all 
Singaporean:  DBS Group Holdings Ltd., Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp. and United 
Overseas Bank Ltd, and each easily swamp any Malaysian bank in terms of size.261 As at 
June 2010, Malaysia’s IB Islamic banking structure had accumulated a total RM303 billion in 
assets or about 19.6 per cent of the total assets of the total banking sector of RM1.5 trillion.  
                                                 
 
259 Ibid. 
260 UK Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) Policy Statement (PS7/13) Strengthening capital standards: implementing 
CRD IV, feedback and final rules (December 2013) (the PRA Policy Statement). 
261 Y Liau and E Chew, Malaysia Megabank Dream Fades as Merger Stalls: Islamic Finance (Bloomberg, 14 January, 
2015)> retrieved from http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-13/stalled-merger-puts-the-brakes-on-
malaysia-s-islamic-megabank-dream. 
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Islamic Sukuk comprised 57 per cent or RM172 billion of the total bond issuance of 
RM301.75 billion.262 
Regulatory asymmetries in the distribution of risks, regulatory burdens and fair competition 
are likely to make Islamic territories and markets less hospitable to foreign firms who may 
otherwise which to trade and operate within them.263 On the other hand, the growing market 
in Islamic finance is, as of yet, relatively embryonic and unstructured, particularly in relation 
to emerging products such as Islamic Insurance, Islamic derivatives or the growing markets 
in Sukuk securities.264 Further, as the Malaysian and British case studies show,265 Muslims in 
those countries use disproportionately small amounts of IB services where there are 
competing CB services.  
As such, and in an increasingly porous marketplace, where global flows of capital and 
finances have cross border effects, there is great need for knowledge transfer and ‘learning’, 
in respect of best practises on risk management (stress tests, internal self-regulated 
mechanisms on reporting and restoring liquidity and credit related shortfalls). This suggests 
that the restrictions on instrument type in the Dubai Islamic Bank and Emirati Islamic Bank 
models will likely to become entrenched due to local regulatory capture, possibly because of 
the immaturity of both the market and the regulatory system of the Emirates.266 Something 
that is arguably easier in the presence of a legal system that is less well-adapted to the legal 
protections and developed rules and jurisprudence of the broader and more globalised 
models.  Zulkifli writes with respect to regulations in Dubai, for example: 
[Minimalism in regulation] … is mainly practiced by the GCC countries with the 
exception of Oman and Saudi Arabia. Unlike the reactive approach, the minimalist model 
allows slight intervention on the part of regulatory authorities. The regulatory authorities 
expect IFIs to have proper Sharí’a governance system without specifying the 
requirements in details. There is no restriction on multiple appointments of the Sharí’a 
board to seat in various institutions at one particular time. Some jurisdictions in the GCC 
countries such as Bahrain, Dubai and Qatar favor the adoption of the AAOIFI 
Governance Standards. The minimalist approach prefers the market to develop its own 
                                                 
 
262 Samat, N_258 above. 
263 I Akkizidis and SK Khandalwal, Financial Risk Management for Islamic Banking and Finance (New York Palgrave 
Macmillan 2008). 
264 ALMA Gafoor,  Interest-free Commercial Banking (Apptec Publications, 1997). 
265 in chapters 5 and 6 
266 Z Hasan, Regulatory Framework of Sharí’a Shari’a Governance System in Malaysia, GCC Countries and the UK (Kyoto 
Bulletin of Islamic Area Studies 3-2 2010) 82–115 
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Sharí’a governance system rather than greater intervention on the part of regulators.267 
It is likely that competitive pressures will force banks to improve their self-regulation, and to 
this extent the position of both Malaysian and UK IBs, each of which face significant home 
pressures.  For example, BIMB’s self-regulation in the Malaysian market, where there are 
other domestic IBs is strongly influenced by its need prove the high quality of its risk 
management. With such careful risk management in place, depositors and investors are aware 
that their funds will not be wasted, even though PLS schemes allow for them to be lost, as 
BIMB’s official presentation to Bank Negara shows in the figure below. 
Figure 6: BIMB Risk management framework 
 
Source: BIMB presentation on risk management to Bank Negara Malaysia. 
 
The figure shows an elaborate framework of risk management and states the responsibilities 
of each department regarding risk. A higher level on the pyramid is equivalent to a higher 
responsibility. It also shows how in the information collected in the whole banking structure 
and to who does each department have to report. According to Ernst and Young, this includes 
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such internal infrastructure as banking software, which in Gulf States such as Oman must be 
Shari’a compliant, although this last requirement has not yet become part of Malaysian law268 
3.4 Rationale for Case Studies  
The selected case studies offer a framework of comparison, thus situating the study of Islamic 
banking institutions, specifically their exposures to credit risk, in from within a broader 
discussion of global and domestic risk regulation response. One cannot study responses to 
risk regulation and the measures taken to safeguard the solvency, liquidity and profitability of 
internationally active banks, whether Islamic or conventional, without first examining the 
global standards set and promoted by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. 
Established as a mere reporting requirement, the Basel framework on banking regulation has 
evolved, over successive phases of implementation, into a fully integrated regime for the 
supervision and implementation of standards on minimal regulatory capital, liquidity and 
disclosure requirements.269  On the one hand, such standards though voluntary and strictly 
speaking only binding upon the OECD member states that have formally incorporated these 
standards in their domestic legal systems, have progressively hardened to form a strong 
compliance pull on non-member states, and influential players in the banking industry. 
Conversely, despite the development of global standards, the vast majority of banking 
institutions remains subject to the laws of their domicile.270 The tools used to develop the 
methodology include a legal doctrinal analysis and axiology. This thesis is based upon a 
specific question:  Is the IB system of KSA sufficiently robust to survive the eventuation of a 
credit risk?  A major (although not the sole) determining factor will be whether the KSA’s IB 
system has sufficient liquidity to absorb any shock caused by the eventuation of such a risk.  
The apologists for IB adopt a similar methodology: they mistake historical co-incidence for 
cause and effect.  They point to the survival of IBs in Malaysia and in the UK during the 
recent sub-prime-related financial crisis as evidence of IB being a superior system to CB and 
then deduce from the fact that the Basel standards did not apply to Malaysian banks in 2007 
that Basel standards need not apply to IBs in 2015.  In so doing they draw comfort from their 
belief as an article of religious faith that IB is more humane and ethical than CB. Critical 
                                                 
 
268 Retrieved from http://emergingmarkets.ey.com/islamic-banking-assets-with-commercial-banks-in-the-gcc-reached-
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269 DK Tarullo, Banking on Basel: The Future of International Financial Regulation (2008); C Brummer, “How 
International Financial Law Works (and How It Doesn’t)” (2011) 99 Geo. L.J. 257. 
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examination is an important tool in this thesis.   In effect, the major case study on Malaysia 
will probe the weaknesses in similar case studies in an attempt to prove that there is no cause 
and effect relationship between the particular risk and liquidity standards adopted in 
Malaysian Islamic banking prior to 2007 and its substantial avoidance of the damage from the 
sub-prime crisis.   
The minor case study on the Islamic Bank of Britain will use what little material is available 
to demonstrate that the lack of exposure to toxic assets was a historical accident, and not a 
feature of design.  It will juxtapose the failure of the Dubai property market as proof of that 
proposition.  It will demonstrate, nevertheless, that the IBB managed to make losses during 
the financial crisis which were proportionally on a par with any British conventional bank 
and that if this is what a bank does when constrained by moderate risk controls, moving to 
less substantial risk controls is hardly going to improve profitability.   
The choices of Malaysia and of the UK, for the purpose of this thesis, is based on two main 
factors: the key importance of Malaysia as an Islamic banking hub and the key importance of 
London as a banking hub in general, which is building the number of Islamic banks and 
Islamic windows in conventional banks in an attempt to compete with other financial centres 
for the market in Islamic financial services and products.  Prime Minister Cameron seeks to 
fund much of the need for new investment in British infrastructure from Islamic banking271.  
The £12bn in assets of Britain’s Islamic banks are said to dwarf those of Muslim states such 
as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Turkey and Egypt. And there are also 55 colleges and professional 
institutions offering education in Islamic finance in Britain – more than anywhere else in the 
world. 272 
The legal doctrinal analysis is the traditional form of legal scholarship.273 The researcher laid 
stress on the primary sources of law: the general principles and immutable sources of Islamic 
law and applicable statutes, regulations and case law. They are analysed in order to determine 
whether they are apposite as regards the regulation of banking activities and products, and 
what changes may be made. This implies that the research approach is inductive whereby the 
researcher critically reviews the extant principles, statutes and regulations and identifies 
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patterns to support a theory on the standardisation274 or methodical non-standardisation of 
Islamic regulation with international accounting standards, ISO 31000:2009 and its 
predecessors275 and the requirements of Basel I, Basel II and Basel III. It follows from the 
above that the relevant legal rules are assessed from a positivist and objective perspective. 
Thus, there is no attempt to formulate or reinforce extant ideological viewpoints which have 
guided the analysis of previous researchers. In seeking to be objective, the researcher 
therefore assessed current regulatory rules and procedures as they are applied in the EU (and 
therefore in the UK), in Malaysia and in KSA. This thesis avoids normative analyses or any 
attempt at expanding the scope of the fiqh. This is because of the need to be detached from 
the cultural and political influences on the application of the rules and procedures.276 Hence, 
although politics and culture have played a major role in shaping regulatory policies, both in 
KSA, in Malaysia and in Western countries, the difficulty of ascertaining this role, coupled 
with the fact that this would be beyond the scope of this study, constitutes the motivation to 
carry out a positivist doctrinal analysis.  
An analysis of the Malaysian and British cases will provide a base for the thesis on which to 
analyse the preparedness of the KSA’s IB system to face similar shocks and it will also 
determine whether the Islamic model can adopt Basel standards to follow more conventional 
methods of banking, which in turn, may solve inconsistencies in the Islamic finance model.  
Thus, risks that Malaysian and British financial institutions take will be explained.  In 
addition, it will be shown that the standards of the AAOIFI are insufficiently robust to 
identify, measure and mitigate the risks so presented.  Lastly, it will also be demonstrated that 
international standards, including ISO 31000:2009 and those of the IASB, would properly 
identify, measure and mitigate those risks.  Along the way, it will be also be illustrated that 
there is nothing particularly ethical or humane about the wholesale concealment of major 
structural flaws in the Sa’udi economy. Nonetheless, given the link between Islamic banking, 
ethics and moral values, the researcher would also defer to axiology. Axiology is a branch of 
philosophy that examines subjective judgements about values. Heron and Reason stated that 
values are guiding principles for human conduct.277 Thus, certain values guide the legislators 
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in enacting certain regulations, as well as the Shari’a advisory councils of Islamic banks in 
endorsing products and services.  
The assessment of regulation from both the objective (positivist) and subjective (normative) 
perspectives represent the interdependence between propositional knowledge and experiential 
knowledge,278  and to the extent that matters in KSA are discussed, it is informed by the 
interdependence between propositional knowledge and my own lived experience.279 
3.5 The Global Framework on Risk Regulation and the Basel Accords 
In an integrated market, banking institutions are exposed to a number of risks with severe and 
wide-ranging implications for shareholders, investors and stakeholders alike. Risk 
management, is the general term given to the set of corporate governance approaches used to 
preserve and restore value (of assets).  
Banking institutions are exposed to five broad categories of risk: i) credit default risks which 
arise from defaults on lending agreements;280  ii) underwriting risks, faced by insurers and 
guarantors who assume risks on the liabilities side; within a complex supply chain involving 
multiple agents has the effect of making the origin of risk more difficult to establish281; iii) 
liquidity risk impacting the solvency and long term interests of banks and its shareholders282; 
iii)  market risks including interest and of rate of return risks which impact the profitability 
and competitiveness of banks;283 iv) operational risks involving  external and internal 
pressures and changes which affect the day-to-day operation of a particular bank with adverse 
impacts on certainty of financial outcomes and that bank’s capacity to retain profits and 
absorb losses;284 and finally v) institutional risks involving transactional costs which may 
stem from, amongst other factors, regulatory and administrative burdens, e.g. accounting and 
reporting requirements as well conflicts of law and procedures among different states 
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281 Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC) 
282 Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision, 2008, Retrieved from www.bis.org/publ/bcbs144.htm. 
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(leading to investor uncertainty and divergence in judicial outcomes and dispute resolution 
procedures).285 
The above defined risks are to some extent an inevitable feature of a globalised market place, 
characterized by transnational flows of finance, investment and capital---the effects of which 
can no longer be contained within state borders.286  It is this feature as well as the pathologies 
of the financial system that appear to be a perpetual and cyclical state of crisis, which 
explains its enduring interests to academics, managers and regulators alike.287 
The accelerating trend towards decentralisation, de-regulation (or self-regulation) and 
liberalisation from the late eighties is commonly attributed as a significant, if not primary, 
cause and determinant of the 2007 financial crisis.288 In the aftermath of the crisis, the 
question of whether re-regulation of the financial industry is the best way and means of 
correcting systemic failures and ‘gaps’ in the banking sector have, of course, resurfaced with 
haste. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision was established in response to 
increasing demand for minimal banking standards.289  The creation of this body lead to 
perhaps the most comprehensive set of reform instruments for risk management known to the 
banking sector: the Basel accords.290 Under the ambit of this global regulatory architecture, 
banking sector has been progressively made subject to the standards formulated by the Basel 
Committee since 1988. Though attempts have been made to mitigate forms of credit and 
liquidity risk through the introduction of global capital and liquidity related risk management 
standards, most notably in the form of the Basel Accords, the existence 291 of uniform rules 
and corporate governance standards remains, to a large degree, wanting. This chapter will 
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proceed to investigate and test these issues in the Islamic banking context through the use of 
two case studies. 
3.6 Discussion of Methodological Challenges and Restrictions  
The experiences of individual banks and the national regulatory architecture set in place to 
address questions of risk are highly variegated.  This caveat aside, this thesis attempts to draw 
broad and general conclusions by way of assessing the EU framework on capital adequacy 
and management, focusing on the UK’s and Malaysia’s implementation of Basel standards, 
and comparing these with the application and operation of global standards in the Islamic 
finance context. Two methodological challenges are presented as a result: the first is the 
similarities and difference between national responses and measures between states. The case 
study on the UK is of course not representative of EU states as a whole, and any conclusions 
drawn from the study are likely to be over-inclusive.292 These methodological challenges are 
to some degree unavoidable given the scope and dimensions of the line of enquiry I have 
chosen. Consequently, the UK case study will demonstrate the need for stringent risk controls 
in the face of calls by some Islamic theorists for a relaxation of the same because, those 
theorists opine, Shari’a compliance alone is necessary to ensure the integrity of the Islamic 
Banking, as if moral purity alone would safeguard the interests of depositors.293   
The experience of BIMB is clearly to the contrary; the writer found no legislation requiring 
the publication of information such as the strategies appearing below and can only assume 
that, because BIMB publishes material of this nature and its competitors apparently do not (or 
at least the writer could not locate any despite a diligent search) that BIMB publishes its 
strategies as well as its disclosures to maintain a competitive edge.  The writer has found 10 
separate, clearly worded documents including many easy-to-comprehend diagrams.   
This is unsurprising, given the competitive nature of the sector and the predominance of 
ethnic Chinese in the Malaysian economy. Malaysia’s ethnic Chinese form a well-defined 
29% of her population. The Bumiputera in Malaysia comprise the politically predominant 
                                                 
 
292 UK Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) Policy Statement (PS7/13) Strengthening capital standards: implementing 
CRD IV, feedback and final rules (December 2013) (the PRA Policy Statement). 
293 F Dierick and others, “The New Basel Capital Framework and Its Implementation in the European Union” (2005) ECB 
Occasional Paper 42.  
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Malays and other indigenous groups, constituting 67 per cent of the population in 2010,294 
and have a protected position under the affirmative action provisions of the Malaysian 
Constitution.295  Singam estimates that the Chinese controlled 60% of the private, corporate 
and domestic share capital of Malaysia’s economy prior to the financial crisis, absolutely 
dominating majority business and economy in the region.296   
It seems reasonable to draw the inference that Islamic banks, in order to compete, have to 
appear as well-managed as the international banks operated by the Chinese both in Malaysia 
and offshore.  BIMB has attracted much custom and its annual reports show it to be 
profitable.  
Unlike BIMB, the bank formerly known as Islamic Bank of Britain, and now known as Al 
Rayan Bank does not, in its documents dealing with pillar 3 disclosure under Basel,297 
include anywhere near the same amount of detail – merely 20 pages - and indeed includes 
only one diagram.  It appears that IBB simply does not wish to compete in terms of 
excellence in corporate governance with other British banks and, as I will demonstrate in 
chapter 6, its loss of funds equivalent to 25% of customer deposits between 2004 and 2009 
indicates that it either has rather bad risk management or rather bad corporate governance, or 
both.  Its appeal, that it is an Islamic Bank, has, as I demonstrate, failed to garner significant 
patronage from Britain’s 2.7 million-plus Muslims, less than 50,000 of whom have become 
customers. 
 
The challenge with the study of IBB is that there is simply not enough material, either 
published by IBB or apparent from other researchers, to draw definitive conclusions.  This in 
itself is illustrative, as if the directors felt that there was no need to expand on available 
knowledge outside the bare legislative minimum. 
The following figures illustrate the various strategies of methods used by the Islamic Bank of 
Malaysia to manage risk. 
                                                 
 
294 HA Lee, “Affirmative Action Regime Formation in Malaysia and South Africa” (2014) Journal of Asian and African 
Studies 10. 
295 See in particular Article 153. 
296 K Singam, "Corporate Governance in Malaysia" (2003) 15 Bond Law Review 1, Article 13.  
297 Retrieved from http://www.alrayanbank.co.uk/media/153392/pillar-3-disclosure-document-31-dec-2012-final.pdf. 
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Figure 7: BIMB Risk Management Strategies 
 
Source: BIMB presentation on risk management to Bank Negara Malaysia. 
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Figure 8: BIMB Risk Management enabler 
 
Source: BIMB presentation on risk management to Bank Negara Malaysia. 
 
Figure 8 shows what are the strategies that can be taken at a management level to identify, 
minimize and report risk. Figure 9 shows a more technical approach to risk management and 
presents what are the methods to quantify risk of every type. 
As the writer will demonstrate in Chapter 5, sweeping claims or criticisms cannot be made in 
connection with the, arguably, limited applicability and transferability of such standards in 
Islamic markets. Indeed, Malaysia has been selected primarily due to its mixed nature: 
Islamic and conventional banks operate in parallel. IBs in Malaysia stand at the forefront of 
several important standards setting functions, specifically their attempts to reconcile Islamic 
Finance Service Board (IFSB) standards with global standards developed under the Basel 
framework.298 However, at present, the banking sector in Malaysia remains heavily reliant on 
debt modes of financing, exactly the mode of financing which distinguishes conventional 
                                                 
 
298 Islamic Financial Services Board (2005a) Capital Adequacy Standard for Institutions (Other than Insurance Institutions) 
Offering only Islamic Financial Services. December, http://www.ifsb.org/standard/ifsb2.pdf. 
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banking from Islamic banking.299 In many respects, it is only by examining equity or non-
debt based modes of financing that the Basel framework, specifically on credit risk 
regulation, can be subjected to critical scrutiny. The argument employed in the foregoing 
analysis is that Islamic banks, as a general trend, have and continue to remain well leveraged 
even at the apex at the 2008 crisis. Nonetheless, this thesis proceeds from the premise that 
IFIs remain susceptible to additional kinds of credit risk exposures. These additional risks 
arise directly from the specific Shari’a related requirements that govern the operation and 
conclusion of Islamic contracts and instruments- namely the risk and profit sharing (and 
interest forbidding) conditions which they (are in theory) required to satisfy. 
Of course Basel is not the only form of regulation and the advantage in the hermeneutical 
analysis of Islamic Bank of Britain as against the Malaysian case study - using what we know 
about one to fill in the gaps in the other - is that there is, Islamic regulation aside, a 
remarkably similar regulatory framework borne of the fact that Malaysia was a British colony 
until 1958. Accordingly Malaysia has a Bankruptcy Act 1967 with an interesting twist: a 
person who becomes bankrupt either with insufficient book-keeping records, possibly with a 
“lavish lifestyle” or otherwise with debts of more than twice his or her assets cannot be 
discharged until he or she pays a dividend of at least 50 piasters in the dinar.300 In England 
and Wales, bankruptcy is governed by Part IX of the Insolvency Act 1986, and now the 
majority of bankruptcies will be discharged after only 12 months.301  The greater 
consequences of bankruptcy in Malaysia vis-à-vis the UK may indicate a greater prudence in 
those who might suffer it in the former, leading to greater prudence.  
Banking institutions active in Malaysia have emerged as key actors in the development and 
growth of Islamic debt markets, including the emerging market in Islamic derivatives. 
However, the share of non–debt based instruments that form part of the financial profile of 
Malaysian banks remains, as yet, trivial. As such, the case study on Malaysia is supplemented 
by a broader discussion on the adaptability and propriety of global and regional standards as 
applied to specific financial instruments and modes of financing.  In doing so, this chapter 
highlights the particular risks to which IBs are more greatly exposed compared with 
                                                 
 
299 H Hasan, “Islamic Property Financing in Malaysia: Appraisal and Practical Recommendations” (2011) 2 International 
Journal of Business and Social Science 2. 
300 Act no 360 of 1967, (MY), s 33.  http://www.agc.gov.my/Akta/Vol.%208/Act%20360.pdf. 
301 Enterprise Act 2002, (UK) Part X. 
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conventional systems, and vice versa. The advantages of this as against the GCC minimalist 
approach will be demonstrated.302 
3.7 Summary 
In this chapter, we provided a general methodology with specifics on research design, 
strategy, and process that included identification and determination of which data would be 
examined and analysed. Since our methodology interfaces with risk management approaches 
of the Basel Accords, it is important to keep in mind that the facts of our case studies were 
initially evaluated in terms of the risks found in the company financial reports as reported in 
the public domain and academic journals. We performed a financial analysis of the balance 
sheets of relevant institutions, i.e, the IBB in Chapter 6 and BNM and BIMB in Chapter 5 
which gives us the fundamental data to assess the risks of the Islamic banking institutions.  
The methodology is not that far away from the practice of risk management as it practiced by 
corporate finance analysts and other professionals in the engaged in assessing the legal and 
financial risks of companies.  This practice-oriented methodology has provided original 
insights into the genuine financial and management risks of those entities and forms a firm 
basis for further investigations into the nature and types of risks that Islamic banking 
institutions may have. 
 
 
                                                 
 
302 See chapter 5 
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Chapter 4: THE LIMITS OF BASEL IMPLEMENTATION IN ISLAMIC 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
4.1 Introduction:  Basel II as a General Framework for Risk Management 
Regulators remain preoccupied with risk management approaches and discourses owing to 
the duality of the ends and objectives it is presumed to serve: on the one hand, the 
stabilization of expectations around market value and, on the other hand, the protection of 
public (e.g. consumer) interests. Indeed, it is these aims that led to the creation of the BCBS 
in 1974.303  The governing board of the Basel Committee comprises representatives from 
each of the G10 countries.  The meta-regulatory role of the Basel committee and other global 
supervisory bodies cannot be understated given their standard setting functions.304 In global 
economies, the demand and need for a general body with broad supervisory powers and 
authority to set and monitor standards grows more pressing, not least of the disparate or 
‘contagion’ effects of global flows of finance and capital. The actions (or collapse) of a bank 
can trigger profound effects not merely on the solvency of that individual institution but 
equally for interlinked firms and businesses that depend on credit and liquidity of that bank, 
as well, ultimately, as the stability of economies and markets as a whole. 305 Also, because so 
many banks purportedly follow the Basel standards, there may arise a regulatory risk of 
synchronization. 
4.1.1 BASEL I: The Introduction of a Global Framework for Regulating Banks 
The Basel Accord (Basel I) can be seen as a globalisation and internationalisation of 
regulation within the Conventional Banking system or the group of banks that do their 
business in Western Europe and in the United States.306 Western Banks are based on the 
conventional banking theories that state that banks realize profits by purchasing deposits at a 
low interest rate and then reselling them at a high interest rate, because of their competitive 
                                                 
 
303 The Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking Sector (Consultative 
document 2009). Retrieved from  www.bis.org; MS Barr and GP Miller, “Global Administrative Law: The View from 
Basel,” 17 (2006) Eur. J. Int’l. L. 15; The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Convergence Of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework (2006); HS Scott, (ed.) International Finance: 
Transactions, Policy, and Regulation (2006) 306. 
304 The Basel standard will apply to all banks in the European Union and the U.S. 
305 A Ackerman, “Jamie Dimon Says Regulations Will ‘Stifle’ Economic Growth” Wall St. J. Deal J. Blog (Apr. 5, 2011) 
retrieved from http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/ 2011/04/05/jamie-dimon-says-reuglations-will-stifle-economic-growth/.  
306 A Wignall and P Atkinson, “Thinking Beyond Basel III: Necessary Solutions for Capital and Liquidity” (2010) OECD 
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advantage at gathering information.  Conventional banks have some advantages over Islamic 
banks, such as a long history, the use of interest which account for a large part of the 
revenues, not sharing losses with customers, asking for collateral and utilizing large amounts 
of capital.307 Subject to the requirements under Basel I, banks are required to observe 
minimal capital requirements. These requirements are designed to minimise and prevent 
credit risks. Otherwise put, Basel I represented a comprehensive and somewhat novel attempt 
to introduce stricter and more transparent levels of institutionalised capital management and 
responsibility among key banking institutions operating in key OECD countries.308 The 
governing logic and rationale of the Basel regime was the advancement of internationally 
convergent and minimally harmonised standards for regulating the way financial institutions 
measure risks in order to assess and calculate the minimum levels of capital they should 
conserve and hold in reserves in order to have acceptable levels of institutional liquidity and 
reduce their risk exposures.  
As indicated earlier, banks remain largely subject to the laws and procedures of the country in 
which they operate. Regulatory diversity across states and individual banking institutions can 
create asymmetries in the actual management of risks, including the methods by which those 
risks are measured (as a proportion of certain categories of assets and the total capital 
structure of the bank as a whole) as well as the ways in which banks calculate minimum 
capital requirements as a percentage of their risk weighted assets.  The absence of clear and 
consistent rules and procedures can also generate broader effects on the stable functioning of 
markets as a whole, contributing to market uncertainty or unfair competition, for instance, 
through the unequal distribution of costs associated with complying with regulations in one 
state, relative to another. This is where the importance of the Basel provisions is made 
apparent, as the minimum capital requirements and the risk valuation can help banks to better 
manage their resources.  
From one perspective, Basel I clearly represents a baseline rather than the attempt to instantly 
globalise best practice in a way that might effectively require Islamic banks to adopt a 
Western model of banking. This approach was taken forward by the Basel II agreement. 
However, one can argue that the Basel baseline fails to adequately reflect important 
                                                 
 
307 S Mohamad, T Hassan and B Mohamed, “Efficiency of Conventional Versus Islamic Banks: International Evidence 
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differences in the structure and principles underlying Islamic finance relative to conventional 
banks.309 One key difference, as discussed in previous chapters, is caused by IB following the 
principles of Sharí’a. This set of rules and guidelines prevent accepting interest or fees for 
loans of money.310 Also it is forbidden to invest in businesses that provide goods or services 
that are contrary to Islamic principles, such as pork or alcohol. Following the principles of 
Sharí’a  results in differences in the assets and liabilities structure of IB, because over 60% of 
their funding derives from profit sharing investment accounts that are usually based on a 
Mudarabah, a profit sharing and loss bearing contract.311 Furthermore, transactions with 
commodities and real assets in Islamic finance are a source of additional operational risks and 
an immediate issue is how to separate commercial transactions from financial intermediation 
in order to ensure stability in this segment. 
The profit and loss statement and the balance sheet are also clearly different, as shown in the 
table below: 
Table 1: Classification of Islamic banking using financial statements312 
Financial statement  Conventional bank Islamic bank 
Profit & Loss Net interest income 
+ Financial services income 
+ Capital gains 
- Operating expenses 
- Amortisation of goodwill 
- Charge for doubtful loans 
= Gross Profits 
- Income taxes 
= Net Profits 
Net income 
+ Financial services income 
+ Capital gains 
- Operating expenses 
- Amortisation of goodwill 
- Charge for doubtful loans 
= Gross Profits 
- Income taxes 
= Net Profits (from profit 
shares, services fees and 
excess over all expenses) 
 
As the table above indicates, conventional bank reports net income on loans and subtracts the 
interest paid to the depositors and capital providers. The difference is that an Islamic bank 
does not accept or pay interest but reports net income from profit-shares agreement and fee 
                                                 
 
309 Mohamad, N_318 above. 
310 Vide fn Error! Bookmark not defined. 
311 Sundararajan, N_322 above.  “Profit Sharing Investment Accounts--Measurement and Control of Displaced Commercial 
Risk (DCR) in Islamic Finance” (2011) 19 Journal of Islamic Economic Studies 1, 41-62. 
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incomes from activities similar to sales or leases. Profit share income may be from different 
forms of lending activities such as profit shares (mudarabah) or joint-venture (musaraka) or 
some other specialized form of finance. 
 
The items in the table are similar, but the entire report is conditional on income reporting that 
avoids interest and is not related to activities prohibited by Islam. Bonds are called sukuk 
bonds and contain no obligations to pay interest coupons as is the case in conventional bonds. 
In exchange, the issuer has some assets that provide rental incomes and from those the 
investor is paid. The equity can also be called musharaka fund, but it means the same as 
equity. 
4.1.2 BASEL II: Objectives, Rationale and Structure 
Following widespread criticism of Basel I, the BCBS undertook a series of far-reaching 
amendments to the first of the accord. The second of the accords, or Basel II as it is 
commonly known, was initially published in 2004 in light of concerns over the expanding 
debt financed markets in securities, credit swaps and derivatives. Accordingly, the amended 
standards under the second agreement represented a more rigorous attempt by the Committee 
to integrate Basel capital standards with national regulations, once again in pursuit of 
minimally harmonised, robust and coherent capital measurement and capital adequacy 
requirements. 313  Again, the Basel Committee established guidelines and qualitative 
benchmarks for assessing the amount and quality of capital that banks ought to retain and 
conserve in order for them to reduce, manage and counter the effects of a range of risk 
exposures---liquidity, operational and macroeconomic.314 The public demand for 
strengthened regulation and risk supervision of banks, however, was to be balanced against 
another no less compelling set of imperatives which lie at the core of the conventional 
banking system: profit maximisation, free market competition and the effective functioning 
of financial markets.315 The main purpose of Basel II was to set out standards for the 
regulation of the capital of the internationally active banks. However, Basel II failed to 
reduce liquidity risks and also amplified it by allowing hybrid financial instrument to be 
                                                 
 
313 International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards of the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (Press Release October 27, 1998). 
314  Revisions to the Basel II Market Risk Framework (March 2009) Retrieved from http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs148.pdf; 
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treated with the same certainty reserved for equity. The financial crisis of 2007-2008 made it 
clear that Basel II was not effective, because the requirement for tier 1 capital did not 
discourage, limit or prohibit excessive hybridization. 
Basel III, as opposed to Basel II’s broad definition of tier 1 capital,316 includes restrictive 
definitions of tier 1 capital,317 a new leverage ratio,318 a new capital surcharge for 
systemically important banks,319 a framework for counter-cyclical capital buffers,320 
measures to limit counter-party credit risk321 and short and medium-term quantitative 
liquidity ratios.322 Basel III strengthens capital adequacy by increasing the quantity and the 
quality of capital held by banks.323 A weighted common equity capital ratio of 4.5 percent is 
set in place and a conservation buffer of 2.5 percent.324 If a bank falls below the conservation 
buffer, it will face restrictions on paying dividends and discretionary bonuses.325 In this way, 
Basel III sets an effective floor of 7 percent. 
Were the cause of the 2008 meltdown solely a failure of the design of capital ratios in Basel 
II, one might understand that the architects of Basel III would concentrate solely on a reform 
of the architecture.  But as Baltali and Tanega, point out, 
Shortly before Northern Rock was declared insolvent and taken over by the UK 
government in 2007, it had reported the highest capital ratio of any leading British 
bank…just fifteen days before its bankruptcy on September 15th, 2008, Lehman 
Brothers boasted a Basel-type tier 1 capital ratio of… almost three times the 
regulatory minimum.326 
Though first published in 2004, the Basel accord was not fully adopted and implemented into 
the national legal system of many key G10 and OECD countries, including crucially the US 
                                                 
 
316 Bank for Int’l Settlements Basel Comm. On Banking Supervision, International Convergence Of Capital Measurement 
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317 Bank for International Settlements, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III: A global regulatory framework 
for more resilient banks and banking systems, (June 2011), [hereinafter Basel III: Capital], ¶¶ 49-56. Retrieved from  
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf. 
318 Ibid. at  ¶¶ 151-67. 
319 Ibid. at  ¶ 32. 
320 Ibid. at  ¶¶ 136-51. 
321 Ibid. at  ¶¶ 97-121. 
322 Ibid. at  ¶¶ 34-47. 
323 Ibid. at  ¶ 7. 
324 Ibid. at  ¶¶ 50, 129. 
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and UK till after 2008. 327 In capsule, the governing logic and rationale, which together 
animate the Basel II agreement, can be reduced, in general, to the following rule or principle: 
the greater the risk to which the bank is exposed, the higher the levels of capital which a bank 
must hold as a means of safeguarding its solvency and overall stability. This is better than 
fractional-reserve banking, where banks accept deposits and hold reserves for a fraction of 
the deposit liabilities. However, in both cases, if a bank run is experienced, the liquidity risk 
is not eliminated and the bank can find itself in a position of being unable to meet its 
obligations.328 
As part of the general raft of measures intended to enhance the risk sensitivity of banks, the 
qualitative capital requirements introduced in Basel I were now supported by with two 
additional pillars which sought to empower the BCBS with increased powers of supervisory 
review and market discipline. 329 In a second innovation, the regulatory framework of the 
BCBS now established a closer link between credit risk and other types of risk namely 
market and operational risk by integrating each of the factors these into the calculation of 
minimum capital requirements, 330 although, as the case study of the IBB in chapter 6 will 
demonstrate, possibly with insufficient attention to the fact that it is difficult to measure a 
change in governance culture.331 A third reform was aimed at promoting a responsible form 
of self-regulation on the part of internationally active banks themselves ----thereby reducing 
the scope and probability of competitive inequality resulting from, for example, high 
regulatory-compliance costs. To this end, Basel II introduces a set of exemptions for banks 
with advanced management and auditing capabilities by enabling them to design and 
implement their own internal risk management systems.332 This has a particular impact on the 
Islamic banking community, as the ability to manage potentially much greater exposure to the 
asset types and equity based finance of Islamic banking can appear fundamentally different to 
the debt-based asset portfolio of Western banks. Again, as the case study in chapter 3 and 
chapter 6 show, this did not prevent IBB from making massive losses, although conversely in 
Malaysia as the case study in chapter 5 will demonstrate, the competition in the banking 
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system between Islamic and conventional banks has produced a governance structure 
designed to make investments in IBs as profitable as investments in other banks. 
4.1.3 BASEL II: Political Economy in Relation to Islamic Finance 
In the discussion of self-regulation and reform, it is important to discuss the political 
economy of Basel II in relation to Islamic finance. For instance, it is arguable that a 
challenging task facing regulators of the financing industry is to avoid excessive influence 
against Islamic interests by those who they are supposed to be regulating. For instance, some 
critics point out that the heavier the regulation and the fewer the amount of players in the 
financial industry, the greater the incentives are for the industry to try and “influence” the 
regulators of the financial industry.333 Further to this point, as regulatory costs generally 
create a countervailing lobby against regulation, regulators become persuaded by the bankers’ 
position.334 In addressing the research question of whether the Basel framework can in fact be 
internalised by Islamic financial institutions, the Islamic position first needs to note the mis-
match between points of regulation and the points of market failure that regulation should be 
addressing. The Islamic financial structure is so intertwined with religious influence that its 
pervasive nature is seen in the way that regulations are adopted, and thus, politically 
motivated. It is also arguable that the more market failure and regulation miss each other, the 
more likely that regulators and regulation alike will be more susceptible to excessive 
influence, more so than their more conventional counterparts seen in the West. 
4.2 BASEL III: A Landmark for Banking Regulation 
Basel II sought to address the above shortcomings with some success. In the aftermath of the 
financial crisis, the Basel Committee has issued a further set of reforms under the Basel III 
framework.335  The core proposals of the Committee are fleshed on in the policy document 
“Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems”. 
Basel was published in June 2011. While, once again, the regulatory proposal contained 
within that document  constitutes a ‘soft’ disciplining instrument which remains non-binding 
on member and non-member states of OECD and non OECD states until formally 
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implemented in national law, its ‘normative pull’ is significant.336 Indeed, Basel III was 
cemented as a de facto global standard through its formal adoption and recognition by the 
European Union337 and the United States.338 It has proven to be the global standard for risk 
assessment and risk measurement for internationally active banks in the world. Most of the 
Saudi banks already conform to the Basel capital adequacy requirement, having a capital 
adequacy between 11% and 16%.339   
Drawing its impetus from the effects of the financial crisis, global stakeholders in the 
international banking complex seized upon the pressing need to improve the sector’s capacity 
to manage risks and absorb losses stemming from known and unknown financial and 
economic shocks and stresses.  Furthermore, since 2010, national authorities presiding over 
conventional and Islamic banking organisations have taken legislative steps to implement 
global regulatory banking standards and protocols, with the aim of subjecting banking 
institutions domiciled or operational in their territories to strengthened risk management and 
corporate governance disciplines. In capsule, the Basel III framework established four sets of 
reforms intended to the redress the ‘gaps’ in banking regulation and risk exposures. 
These reforms can be summarised as follows: a) New Capital adequacy thresholds: it 
increases the threshold minimum capital ratio that banks are expected to institute and observe 
to 8%340 ; b) Classification of risks: the delineation of relatively strict and detailed eligibility 
criteria on for different types of capital held by a bank ( e.g. the capital structure of a bank) as 
a proportion of its risk weighted assets (RWA),341 c) Loss Absorption measures: the 
introduction of measures intended to facilitate greater loss absorbency of unredeemed 
stock,342 d) Liquidity related rules: the institution of new rules designed to limit the build-up 
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of excessive leveraging343 e) enhanced supervisory process for capital planning  (Pillar 2) and 
f) strengthened market disciplines against abuse and stricter disclosure rules (Pillar 3). 344 
Figure 9: The three pillars of Basel III 
 
Unlike the previous accords, and as the above diagram suggests, Basel III is focused on 
mainly the risk of “bank run” by requiring different levels of reserves for specified financial 
products. In the above figure the pillars of Basel III are illustrated, along with the main 
regulations of each one. Instead of replacing the previous accords, Basel III works alongside 
them. The third pillar especially has a role in increased market transparency. In this way, it is 
easier to see problems with the assets or organization structure of financial institutions before 
they happen. 
4.2.1 New Definition of Own Funds and Regulatory Ratios 
The new framework makes significant advancements on Basel I and Basel II, specifically by 
formulating new guidelines on risk computations; new capital and solvency ratios and a slight 
modification of capital structure classifications (Tier 1 and Tier 2). The Basel III has 
significantly redefined capital under the new framework. Renewed importance has been 
                                                 
 
343 Bank for International Settlements, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III: The Liquidity Cover Ratio and 
the liquidity risk monitoring tools, (January 2013), [hereinafter Basel III: Liquidity Cover Ratio], ¶ 1, Retrieved from 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs238.pdf. 
344 Bank for International Settlements, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Review of the Pillar 3 Disclosure 
Requirements, (June 2014). Retrieved from http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs286.pdf. 
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given to forms of capital grouped under Tier 1, representing the banks’ own capital including 
hybrid capital and common equity. 345 
New rules and criteria have also been formulated in respect of Tier 2 capital. As to the above 
outlined reforms, for instance, require banking institutions to strengthen the loss absorbency 
of Tier 2 instruments. Under the Basel III framework, a guideline is issued for assessing the 
trigger point at which financial institutions and instruments should be deemed non-viable and 
correspondingly converted to common equity, regulated under Tier 1, or otherwise written off 
from the balance sheets.346  This rule responds to the financial liabilities absorbed by national 
governments and taxpayers (rather than shareholders) through ‘toxic’ debt accrued from non-
viable instruments and asset and the rescue operations that resulted from government bailouts 
and (quasi) re-nationalisation of banking assets and liabilities. The result is that certain 
financing instruments, for instance issuances without loss at the point of viability, are 
excluded from Tier 2. Tier 2 under Basel III consists of hybrid instruments with a maturity of 
not less than five years.347 Most instruments defined as Tier 2 capital will tend to have a 
longer maturity. However, regulatory amortisation will apply in the final five years to 
maturity.   Tier 2 securities usually carry cumulative costs, for instance loans or preference 
shares issued by states (involving structured distributions which have the characteristic of 
being non-viable at the point of loss absorption, non-deferrable and cumulative).348 
 The Basel Committee has noted that banks have become very skilful at developing new 
instruments to generate Tier 1 capital.  Under the Basel II framework, instruments which are 
more accurately regulated under the Tier 2 capital but which are used to generate Tier 1 
capital are made subject to stricter capital requirements, namely such forms of capital cannot 
be in excess of 15% of a banks’ total Tier 1 capital. This requirement will be phased under 
Basel III to reflect the enlarged definition and classification of Tier Common Equity 
Capital.349 
                                                 
 
345 Basel III: Capital, ¶ 52. 
346 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel II: International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
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346 Ibid. 
347 Basel III: Capital, ¶ 58. 
348 Basel III: Capital, ¶ 57. 
349 Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, Consultative Document: Strengthening the Resilience of the Banking Sector 
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Interestingly, perhaps in light of the greater involvement and input of market actors, as 
mandated under Basel III, the framework formalises additional risk weighting requirements 
relating to securitized assets, the use of general market indicators on the value correlation of 
assets, disclosure of off balance counterparty credit risk in the trading books, credit valuation 
of risk charges and so on.350  Further discussion as to the regulatory definition and application 
of these financial measurement tools and benchmarks fall outside the scope of this discussion. 
However, it is worth noting that these additional requirements will have a profound impact on 
the bank’s risk weighted assets, and the means by which an institutions stock portfolio is 
assessed and calculated.  The difficulty is that as governance of a borrower is hard to 
measure, the risk weighting to be given to an investment in a PLS arrangement with a 
borrower, or in a sukuk, may well be misleading in an Islamic context, which provides 
lessons for KSA as will be discussed in chapter 7. 
For example, as Arakcheev, Baklanova and Tanega point out,  
Islamic liquidity funds established under Murabahah agreements conduct commodity 
settlements on a daily basis. Therefore, the cash accumulated in the … account needs 
to be reinvested daily. [This] process ……….entails significant operational risk.351 
Indeed, the more assets held by a bank on its trading book, the more risk weighted assets it 
will be required to hold as a proportion of its total capital under both tier 1 and tier 2. 352 This 
has a particular impact on IBs due to the much higher amount of assets held through both 
direct equity holding and via permitted instruments. 
4.2.2 Capital Buffers 
The new Basel rules also established requirements on the capital buffer which banking 
institutions must hold in reserves. The buffer requirement takes two forms: a countercyclical 
buffer and a capital conservation buffer, both regulatory ‘backstops’ intended to prevent 
against unsustainable leveraging practices and liquidity shortages.353 Capital conservation 
buffers is assessed as 2.5% as a proportion of the banks Risk Weighted Assets.354  The 
                                                 
 
350 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Progress Report on Basel III Implementation (2011) Retrieved 
fromhttp://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs203.pdf; Allen & Overy, Ibid..; DE Getter, U.S. Implementation of the Basel Capital 
Regulatory Framework (April 9, 2014). Retrieved from https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42744.pdf. 
351 Arakcheev, N_168 above.  
352 Basel III: Capital, ¶ 94. 
353 DE Getter, Macroprudential Oversight: Monitoring Systemic Risk in the Financial System (CRS Report R40417).  
354 Jackson, N_347 above. 
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regulatory purpose served by the capital conservation buffer is the strengthened capacity of 
banks to absorb losses during periods of financial and economic stress. 355 To supplement this 
backstop measure, thus securing adequate level of institutional liquidity on the part of banks, 
a countercyclical buffer with a conservation range of 0% – 2.5% of common equity or any 
other fully loss absorbing capital is also established under Basel III.356 The ratio percentage 
applied under the countercyclical buffer is assessed in accordance with specific regulatory 
and financial conditions of each individual state.357  The latter of the above mentioned 
regulatory buffers is therefore State-rather-than-institution dependent to reflect different 
macro-monetary and fiscal contingencies, primarily with the systemic aim of protecting 
banks from exposures to macro market and regulatory risks associated with, for instance, 
lenient credit or short loan initiatives (as well as other factors leading to excessive credit 
growth).358 
Under the capital buffer requirements, internationally active banks will be able to continue 
operating even if capital conservations thresholds are triggered as they experience losses. 
However, should their reserves dip into this regulated conservation range; banking 
institutions are required to observe quantitative restrictions on their distributions and pay-
outs. Accordingly, where banks do not hold adequate capital for this buffer, Basel III restricts 
the distribution of dividends, share buybacks or bonus payments until the required 
conservation buffer thresholds are restored (2.5% of Risk weighted assets).359  Furthermore, 
if minimum capital requirements are breached, banks are now subject to strict supervisory 
sanctions and disciplining mechanisms: so, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 6, IBB needed 
a capital increase of £20 millions in the form of a share placement to the Abu Dhabi Islamic 
Bank to prevent insolvency.  
The following figure shows what are the minimum levels of different indicators that have to 
be met by financial institutions and what are the dates for implementing them. 
 
                                                 
 
355 Basel III: Capital, ¶ 122. 
356 Basel III: Capital, ¶ 136. 
357 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, (2011), Global Systemically Important Banks: Assessment Methodology and 
the Additional Loss Absorbency Requirement. 
358 Latham and Watins, Regulatory Capital Reform under Basel III (2011 Report) Retrieved from 
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Figure 10: Phase-in arrangements 
 
Source: Bank for International Settlements, available at: www.bis.org/press/p100912b.pdf. 
 
The requirements will not be introduced all at once; an adjustment period will be given to 
financial institutions with intermediary targets for capital requirements, leverage ratio and 
more. As it is shown in the figure, as 2019 grows nearer, the requirements will be increasing 
steadily until the final targets are attained and the risk of the financial institutions that follow 
this framework is diminished substantially. 
4.2.3 Liquidity Rules 
The capital framework is supplemented by new simplified, non-risk based rules on liquidity 
conservation, specific those comprising the Liquidity Coverage Ratio. The new rules operate 
to reduce and constrain the build-up of risky and unsustainable leverage in the banking 
sector, while introducing measures intended to enhance the solvency and stability of banks 
against shocks, including liquidity disruptions.360 Furthermore, the framework sets introduces 
new rules aimed at encouraging banks to use stable and reliable sources of finance and 
funding as part of their risk profiles. The relevant criteria is defined and formulated under the 
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Basel guidelines on Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR).361 Cumulatively, this standard aims to 
improve the ability of the banking system to absorb losses through internal institution of 
higher capital requirements and buffers.362 
The formula for the liquidity cover ratio is: 
 
This ratio has to be over 100%.363 
The formula for the net stable funding ratio is: 
 
This ratio also has to be over 100%.364 
The two ratios discussed have distinct but complementary rationales. The first, the LCR aims 
to enhance bank’s short-term liquidity profile but requiring banks to hold buffer reserves 
which can cover any temporary funding shortages over a 30 day period.  The Net Stable 
Funding Ratio (NSFR), by way of contrast, addresses medium and long term considerations, 
namely the institutional liquidity of banking institutions under stress over a period of one 
year. The NSFR ratios have been the subject of some controversy. Since banks are profit 
driven entities, rules on liquidity retention may limit banking short term trading capacity (e.g. 
short selling, subject to regulatory authorisation, and so on). 365 This also effectively renders 
emergency liquidity problematic in some respects, as the existence of liquidity that is set 
aside for crises may effectively be barred from use unless and until that liquidity requirement 
is eased. In addition, the assumptions under which the ratios are set are based around WB 
stress modelling. 
This risk and stress modelling and the Basel reforms are presented in order to examine their 
suitability in an Islamic environment. Even if they are not tailored specifically for Islamic 
                                                 
 
361 Bank for International Settlements, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III: The Net Stable Funding Ratio, 
(October 2014), [hereinafter Basel III: The Net Stable Funding Ratio], ¶ 1. Retrieved from 
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362 Morgan Stanley Research Paper on European Banks (April 2011). 
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financial institutions, these reforms contribute toward a healthier banking system worldwide 
and their importance can't be understated.  
Table 2: Summary of Basel reforms and framework for implementation 
Regulatory Element Proposed Requirement 
Higher Minimum Tier 1 
Capital Requirement 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio: increases from 4% to 
6%366 
The ratio will be set at 4.5% from 1 January 
2013, 5.5% from 1 January 2014 and 6% 
from 1 January 2015 
The total capital comprising tier 1 and tier 2 
must be at least 8% 
New Capital Conservation Buffer »» Used to absorb losses during periods of 
financial and economic stress367 
»» Banks will be required to hold a capital 
conservation buffer of 2.5% to withstand 
future periods of stress bringing the total 
common equity requirement to 7% 
(4.5% common equity requirement and the 
2.5% capital conservation buffer) 
»» The capital conservation buffer must be 
met exclusively with common equity 
»» Banks that do not maintain the capital 
conservation buffer will face restrictions on 
pay-outs of dividends, share buybacks and 
bonuses 
Countercyclical Capital Buffer »» A countercyclical buffer within a range of 
0% - 2.5% of risk weighted assets and other 
fully loss absorbing capital will be 
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implemented according to national 
circumstances368 
»» When in effect, this is an extension to the 
conservation buffer 
Higher Minimum Tier 1 
Common Equity Requirement 
»» Tier 1 Common Equity Requirement: 
increase from 2% to 4.5%369 
»» The ratio will be set at 3.5% from 1 
January 2013, 4% from 1 January 2014 and 
4.5% from 1 January 2015 
Liquidity Standard »» Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR): to 
ensure that sufficient high quality liquid 
resources are available for one month 
survival in case of a stress scenario.370 
Introduced 1 January 2015 
»» Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR): to 
promote resiliency over longer-term time 
horizons by creating additional incentives for 
banks to fund their activities with 
more stable sources of funding on an ongoing 
structural basis371 
»» Additional liquidity monitoring metrics 
focused on maturity mismatch, 
concentration of funding and available 
unencumbered assets 
Leverage Ratio »» A supplemental 3% non-risk based 
leverage ratio which serves as a backstop to 
the measures outlined above372 
»» Parallel run between 2013-2017; 
migration to Pillar 1 from 2018 
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Minimum Total Capital Ratio »» Remains at 8%373 
»» The addition of the capital conservation 
buffer increases the total amount of 
capital a bank must hold to 10.5% of risk-
weighted assets, of which 8.5% must 
be tier 1 capital 
»» Tier 2 capital instruments will be 
harmonized; tier 3 capital will be phased out 
 
If the above framework is adopted in Islamic finance, there will be advantages and 
disadvantages. The disadvantage is that the accord is made with conventional banking in 
mind and risks caused by the specific features of Islamic banking, such as profit sharing, will 
remain the same. However, as was previously shown in Table 1, the balance sheets of Islamic 
banks have a similar asset structure and they are susceptible to the same risks. In this way the 
positives outweigh the negatives, because implementing the Basel framework in Islam will 
lead to greater financial stability. 
4.3 Criticisms of the Basel III Framework  
Under the landmark Basel III framework, all banks subject to the national implementation of 
the Basel regime are expected to gradually phase in higher capital requirements over an 
implementation phase than began in 2013 and runs through to 2019.374   In part a response to 
unsustainable forms of leveraging, the Basel III reforms are designed to facilitate more 
responsible lending practices in the economy, and to mitigate banking exposures to market, 
credit and operational risks moving forward.  
The capital rules and amendments promulgated under Basel III have not avoided criticism. 
Indeed, there is some debate as to whether the revised capital structure standards effectively 
support the Basel Committee’s proclaimed commitment to strengthened capital resilience and 
market stability. One criticism relates to the “threshold deduction rule” which exempts three 
categories of major types of investment in the calculation of common equity tier capital 
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thresholds: mortgage related financial services and equity rights, short term and deferred tax 
assets resulting from imbalance in taxation rates and common shares held in unconsolidated 
financial entities.375 By removing these the list of countable assets, the Basel Committee 
undermines the spirit and purpose of its own regulatory reforms, specifically the risks of 
excessive and double leveraging in the banking industry.376 
From a top down perspective, the Basel framework, including the revised rules issued under 
Basel III, do not yet appear to be particularly well adapted to the regulatory particularities of 
Islamic financial structures and the contracts and principles that underpin them. If one can 
make the claim that Basel III has now been crystalised as an international standard, questions 
are raised as to the extent to which the component elements of the Basel framework can be 
adapted to Islamic banks and the IFSB standards.377 As Chapra has argued: “Since the 
existing architecture of the conventional financial system has existed for a long time, it may 
perhaps be too much to expect the international community to undertake a radical structural 
reform of the kind that the Islamic financial system envisages. However, the adoption of 
some of the elements of the Islamic system, which are also a part of the western heritage, is 
indispensable for ensuring the health and stability of the global financial system.” 378 
The most important of the reforms concern the newly revised Basel III capital requirements. 
Thus the next section offers a more theoretical discussion of the some of the key challenges 
faced by Islamic finance markets in the implementation of the Basel accord. 
4.4 Analysis of the Basel Reform and their Implications for IFIS 
The next section will reflect briefly on the perceived impact of the Basel framework on the 
existing regulatory architecture. Perhaps the greatest regulatory gain of the revised Basel 
architecture with respect to emerging Islamic finance market concerns its potential to spread 
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and consolidate good governance practices on transparency, auditing and reporting and 
disclosure.379  
At the level of institutional change and structure, conventional banks are now subject to 
stricter and more costly reporting and disclosure requirements. Under Basel II, supervising 
authorities are able to pierce the veil of a bank’s financial statements, to the extent that they 
are adequate and accurate, with the aim of scrutinizing their capital structure and adequacy. 
In Chapter 7, the writer will discuss the difficulty this poses for Sa’udi banks; against the 
well-documented statements of the BIMB, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 5, there is little 
transparency in the IBB as shown in chapter 6. 
Moreover, as Basel standards gain near universal recognition, regional actors with 
supervisory and standard setting authority, such as the Islamic Finance Services Board have 
had greater impetus to standardize their own capital adequacy and risk mitigation strategies 
and approaches. Sharí’a  guidelines on compliant finance and banking practices are also 
partially codified in the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOIFI’s) accountancy Standard (standards 1) and accounting Standard 
(standards 2).380 By extension, the Basel framework establishes a global benchmark, while, in 
theory, being sufficiently open and revisable so as to enable regional actors such as the IFSB 
to adapt and devise their own standards and practices which are more adapted to regulatory 
practices of Islamic markets, structures and instruments.  
As part of the Basel package of reforms, requirements on minimum common equity have 
increased 3.5 times from 2 percent to 7 percent which factor in an additional capital 
conservation buffer. The NPVL trigger poses operational challenges for traditional banking 
institutions, though perhaps less so for Islamic banking institutions given that capital 
structure of the former tends to be held in the form of common equity capital.381  
Nonetheless, whether for Islamic or conventional banks, banks are likely to experience 
challenges in determining when the trigger threshold for non-viability has been reached. This 
determination will fall to the relevant regulatory bodies with discretion to decide conversion 
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or writing off an instrument will result in more adverse effects still, namely that such actions 
will lead a particular institution to itself become non-viable or operational. In such cases, that 
authority may recommend that further public investment or support into tier II capital assets 
may be favourable as against the alternatives. However, such tests, and the power vested in 
the relevant authority to apply it, are subjective and therefore liable to attract administrative 
law related criticisms of possible arbitrariness, uncertainty and lack of transparency. In the 
leading case of Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission,382 it was recognized that 
although a decision-maker may have the jurisdiction to enter into the inquiry, actions (or 
omissions) done in the course of the inquiry, including acting subjectively rather than 
objectively and therefore failing to consider all that is relevant or considering matters which 
are irrelevant,  may subsequently result in the decision-maker exceeding jurisdiction during 
the process of reaching a decision.  
 On the other hand, an objective “trigger” test for assessing when ratio levels fall under 
acceptable levels and applicable to all possible scenarios cannot be easily designed. This may 
present jurisdictional issues when a banking institution forms part of a broader conglomerate 
or banking group and correspondingly issues financial instruments under Tier 2 for its 
recognition under the consolidated capital of the group or conglomerate to which it belongs 
(in addition to its own capital base). Where this occurs, discretion to avail of the NVLA may 
also be given to home regulator in which the company is seated.  In such an event, there may 
be a conflict over which authority is to have the final say over whether a particular capital 
instrument is subject to the conversion or writing off or ‘winding up’ safeguards: the home or 
host regulator or regulators, particularly if there are subject to differing assessments as to the 
continued viability of a financial institution or instrument. 383 Furthermore, Islamic banks 
have less developed risk management capacities than more established conventional banking 
structures. The Basel framework is applied on a consolidated basis to internationally active 
banks. In this way, the risk of a whole banking group is examined.384 The framework 
recognises the need for suitable capitalisation on a stand-alone basis, but it does not prescribe 
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how to measure the solo capital requirements that are left to the individual supervisory 
authorities.385 
Ideologically, Islamic banks utilise Islamic modes in financing and indeed Islamic modes of 
contracts, each subject to distinct, non-uniform disclosure and auditing rules. Moreover, 
Islamic banks cannot rely upon on the western system of trading in debts thus allowing them 
to profit from the difference in interest rates between deposits and loans in a conventional 
bank. Under Sharí’a  principles, the rationale underpinning Islamic banking is directed to the 
maximisation of shareholders’ and depositors’ wealth since each are treated as joint partners 
with the bank.386 Moreover, the Hadiths, Islamic guidance, on banking prescribes that Islamic 
financial arrangements prevent forms of main usury and monopoly towards the overarching 
goal of economic and social development for Islamic societies. With respect to the 
relationship with depositors, Islamic banks are not compelled to return investment deposits or 
guarantee a certain interest for the depositor, incurring certain risks for the depositor or at the 
very least reducing incentives for forms of equity investment, since banks bear no liability for 
losses in cases of default or non-performance.  This, as will be demonstrated in chapter 5, has 
led to an increase in efficiency in the Malaysian BIMB; loss-making banks do not gain 
depositors when there is a viable alternative.  If the loans do not comply with Sharí’a 
principles, depositors, including sovereign creditors, are exposed to credit default exposures. 
Otherwise, depositors bear loss and receive profit without the participation of the bank. 
Hence, there are fundamental differences in instruments, fiduciary responsibilities and market 
orientation found in Islamic banks and conventional banks, which necessarily entails 
differences in the nature and size of risks faced by each of them.387  However, CBs generally 
score better in efficiency measures than IBs 388 and inefficiency is itself a corporate 
governance risk to investors.  This will be revisited in the lessons to be learned by Sa’udi 
banks in chapter 7 when learning from the Malaysian and British examples presented in 
chapters 5 and 6. 
A critical examination of the relevant literature and empirical studies suggests that 
conventional understanding and strategies for managing credit risks are not fully applicable 
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when transposed to Islamic structures and markets. As commentators have suggested, where 
in the case of the Islamic financial market “lending operations have been replaced with 
investment and partnership contracts, credit risk management becomes more important and 
critical.”389 Therefore, credit and counterparty risks posed to Islamic institutions are distinct 
from those faced by conventional banking models, in part because such institutions do not 
permit access to conventional derivative instruments and associated risk management 
techniques owing to Sharí’a  considerations.390 Furthermore, Sharí’a compliant markets in the 
issue of, for instance, Sukuk trust certificates and prospectuses (issued by sovereign actors 
who are moreover, exposed to credit risks) are still relatively nascent.391 As such, given the 
apparent absence of general and coherent legal framework for regulating these markets, 
counterparties may lack the necessary rights and remedies in the event of default of breach of 
contract, or, otherwise, enjoy access to the kind of sophisticated risk management 
mechanisms familiar to conventional banking systems. 392 Risks concerning credit and 
counterparty have been discussed in the previous chapter. However, because IB lack the 
financial instruments WB commonly use, mitigating these risks is difficult. Perhaps it would 
be a good idea for IB to use Islamic forms of guarantee as are done in Malaysia, such as 
kafalah, in order to limit their exposure to these types of risks.  
4.5 Liquidity Risk 
Liquidity risk is defined as the exposures faced by individual banking institutions should they 
fail to satisfy and fulfil financing commitments and contractual obligations, on the liabilities’ 
side. These may include the repayment of dividends or restoration of deposited funds due 
counterparties. These exposures may result from market disruptions, for instance credit 
shortages and downgrade which may in turn reduce the liquid assets available to the bank in a 
given period. Diversity in sources of funding reduces such risks, as does a well-managed 
asset profile in which speculative sources of funding are appropriately balanced the amounts 
of liquid cash held in reserve.   
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The new structural rules on liquidity conservation proposed under Basel III as discussed 
above are designed to curb the very forms of excessive, under regulated and high risk 
leveraging profile of major Anglo-American banking institutions that later catalysed the 2008 
financial crisis.393  Otherwise put, the Basel II framework provides for regulatory ceiling on 
permitted range of balance sheet derivatives and repos. Regulatory netting of this kind is 
clearly in the public interest of consumers and stakeholders in the conventional banking 
system. In the light of the above, a report issued by Federal Reserve indicates the projected 
growth of Risk Weighted Assets additional to increases made under Basel II requirements 
ranges in the estimates of between 10 and 30%.394 This is because of the capital structure of 
European and American banks, the diverse financial instruments in which they European deal 
and trade on the assets and liabilities side, as well as the amount and volume of assets 
recorded on their trading books compared with major aspects of Islamic banks. 
Such reforms will, nonetheless, have a more muted impact on Islamic finance markets, where 
banking institutions are prohibited from taking short positions from the outset, owing to their 
violation of Sharí’a  principles. Historically, Islamic banks have already proven to be well 
capitalised in respect of their risk exposures and, moreover, due to Sharí’a related restraints 
unable to finance their commercial ventures through leveraging. Due to their corporate model 
and capital structure of Islamic banks, moreover, Islamic banks lack market access, including 
investments in financial instruments such as credit derivative swaps, Repo, bonds, interest 
rate swaps and so forth.395 
A case in point, a capital adequacy report pooled from 18 banks in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis in 2011 indicates that capital held by Qatari institutions remained at 22.8 %, 
more than double than minimal requirements under Basel. 396 As further evidence, a later 
Morgan Stanley report on the aggregate consequence of Basel implementation on three major 
Qatari institutions highlights the limited effects of its capital based reforms.397 In other words, 
the risk profiles (market, credit and operational risks), aggregate increase or decreases in 
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capital retention and conservation and pre-financial crisis internal models for computing and 
measuring risk ratios remain largely unmodified and unaffected by the 2010 Basel reforms.398 
Based on general trends, it appears that Islamic banks will hold relatively low amounts of risk 
weighted assets compared with their conventional counterparts. Certainly, the risk weighted 
increases are projected to be relatively stable relative to trends predicted in traditional 
financial system; particularly with respect to investment and debt financed instruments traded 
in secondary markets e.g. credit derivatives, interest rate swaps.  
Figure 11: Islamic banking: Origin and current state 
 
Source: E&Y – World Islamic Banking Competitive Report 2011-2012 
 
On the whole, data captured on banking institutions domiciled and operative in markets in, 
among others, Qatar and Malaysia indicate that Islamic Banks remain well capitalised even at 
the peak of the financial crisis. In contrast, potential for conventional banking systems in 
Europe and the US to raise and retain funds will be significantly impacted by the Basel III 
reforms. Indeed, banking systems in these regions will be required to oversee far reaching 
changes to their business models, risk profile and funding strategies.399  Of course, the actual 
impact of the Basel III regulatory capital standards cannot be fully quantified with accuracy, 
and will continue to depend on the risk and capital profiles of individual banking institutions 
and the regulatory structures in which they are embedded.  
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The graphic below shows the haircut effect Basel III had on certain banks. The haircut is the 
percentage by which an asset’s market value is reduced for the purpose of calculating capital 
requirements, margin and collateral levels. It is debatable if these haircut effects influence 
financial market procyclicality.  
 
 
Figure 12: Basel III haircut effects 
 
In light of the above, the Basel approved Net Stable Funding Ratio400 and Liquidity Coverage 
Ratio401 may function to place undue regulatory burdens on Islamic banks, namely by 
requiring them to retain levels of liquidity for wholesale funding of their commercial 
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activities in excess of the risk exposures faced by such banks given the unique and risk averse 
quality of Sharí’a compliant trading portfolios of Islamic banks. To clarify, IBs do not have 
access or exposure to the very lending based operations and debt funded instruments and 
markets (derivative based markets or specific operations such as short selling) that the Basel 
III rules on liquidity and funding requirements are specifically designed to temper and 
constrain. 
4.6 Why Credit Risk Remains the Greatest Challenge to the National and 
International Standardization and Regulatory Efforts 
This thesis attempts to look at the Basel reforms in order to assess the actual application of its 
standards and procedures in connection with the variety of practices, modes of financing and 
ideological orientation of Islamic banking institutions, with the particular emphasis of what 
Sa’udi banks can learn from the success or otherwise of the implementation of the Basel 
mechanisms in IBs in Malaysia and Britain, particularly in terms of bank profitability. 
Islamic banks cannot adopt Basel III without tailoring it to the regulatory standards and 
accounting practices as enshrined in the AAOIFI’s market discipline and disclosure or the 
Islamic Financial Services Board rules on capital adequacy. Moreover, it is only by assessing 
actual practices of Islamic banks that we are moved to consider whether Islamic banks are 
better insulated against risks exposures than conventional banks and whether such strengths 
can be linked to the specific ideological or architectural specificities of Islamic banking 
regimes, including the ethical dimensions of Islamic banks and its, presumptively, more 
conservative, less speculative approach to managing risks.402 Islamic finance markets and its 
provision of Sharí’a -compliant financial services continue to hold attractions for Muslims 
and non-Muslims alike. 
In the modern economy, debt markets are a central driver of financial markets.  Indeed, the 
funds generated from credit and lending arrangements effectively finance the banking sector. 
As a starting point, it is important to establish the key indicators by which to assess the level 
of risk posed to the banks which are object of this case study and to, therein, evaluate the 
successes and challenges they face. According to mainstream financial thinking, namely the 
set of assumptions that have conventionally be formulated in terms of the Capital Asset 
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Pricing Model  (CAPM), 403 the level of risk is proportional to the level of return, meaning 
that high risk will yield high return for the investor and vice versa.404  If this model is taken to 
be accurate and based on sound assumptions, any financial institutions, in order to remain 
profitable and solvent, should seek to generate returns that can offset the risks involved in 
contracts and transactions (for instance, those resulting from lending and borrowing 
policies).405 There are several problems with CAPM, such as not being able to explain the 
variation in stock returns, because low beta stocks may offer higher returns than it was 
expected.406 Also it is assumed that investors prefer lower risk to higher risk at a certain 
expected return, but this is not true because risk as defined in CAPM also gives the 
opportunity to investors to win more, so it is reasonable to assume that some investors will 
prefer higher risk. Further, it is conventionally assumed that market portfolio does not include 
works of art or real estate, just stock indexes, so the real market portfolio is not present.407 
4.6.1 Managing Credit Risk 
The next section briefly examines the novel challenges faced by the growing industry in 
Islamic banking, focusing on one particular category of risk: credit risk. Credit risk is the 
catch all term used to assess the possibility and probability that an asset or loan becomes 
irrecoverable owing to instances of debtor default or other factors delaying the settlement or 
agreement.408 Credit risk can also be understood as the risk that occurs when the value of a 
credit portfolio alters due to unforeseen changes in the credit-honouring ability or quality of 
the issuer, contracting party or trading partner.409 For others, credit risk arises when the bond 
issuer, borrower or country party defaults on a credit agreement and is unable consequently to 
satisfy the terms of a lending contract by repaying the sums they owe. 410 Others describe 
credit risk in the following ways: the point at which a debtor defaults on a loan, a bond 
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issuers’ failure to make good on payments owed to the bondholder or the failure to make 
good on a promise payment in the context of a trading arrangement.   
Irrespective of slight difference in scholarly definitions and identification of credit risk, the 
case studies below suggest that most financial institutions and the products they offer will 
contain aspects of the above defined types and sources of credit risk. These risks can have 
severe impacts on the value of a financial institution’s assets and its continued stability and 
solvency. In the broader picture, statistics suggest that credit risk represents around 70 
percent of the aggregate risk faced by banks while the remaining 30% can be attributed to 
operational and market related risks.411 Indeed, as the case study on Europe and the UK 
regulatory responses to the crisis and its subsequent implementation of Basel reforms will 
demonstrate, credit risk was a key catalyst of regulatory reform, the partial re-nationalisation 
of near insolvent banks and the increased powers of the Bank of England. The principal 
regulatory challenge, therefore, is to determine the extent and severity of risks related to 
particular types of instruments and modes of financing, and, secondly, to assess whether there 
is a correlation between the structure and products of banking institutions and their capacity 
to mitigate and manage such risks. 
In conventional banking, lending operations are, according to the above definition, 
considered to be an activity which entails some degree of credit risk.  The situation changes 
when we consider Islamic financial institutions. Islamic banks are subject to the supervisory 
authority of the Islamic Financial Services Board which defines credit risks in more open 
ended terms as the risk that arises from the possibility that counterparty won’t honour their 
obligations under a relevant agreement.412 This definition has been accepted by the Islamic 
Financial Services (IIFS) and consequently applied to specific and sui generis Islamic 
contracts such as Murabahah, Diminishing Musharakah and Ijarah ,  covering the risks 
relating to financing of account receivables (Murabaha contrast) and leasing related payment 
receivable agreements (Ijarah agreements).413 
4.6.2 The Limitations of Basel Credit Risk Assessment Standards and Approaches in 
the Islamic Banking Context 
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Significant questions are posed as to the extent to which the minimum capital requirements of 
Islamic banks should be measured in accordance with “one size fits all” techniques devised 
under Basel II accord. One general criticism is posed to the extent to which the Basel reforms 
have a direct effect on the internal culture of particular banking systems and institutions. 
Basel III has been criticized for its paper burden and risk inhibition by the Institute of 
International Finance, an organization of several banks that stated that it would hurt their 
business and economic perspectives. The OECD estimated that implementing Basel II will 
reduce the annual GDP growth in the US by 0.05 – 0.15%.414 After all, the Basel framework 
was the product and response of global crisis in macro monetary management. The 
committee’s response to such ‘gaps’ was the creation of generally applicable capital 
standards to be implemented with the oversight of the relevant supervisors. The underlying 
aim of the global banking regulation framework is to facilitate the stability of the financial 
system as a whole, rather than of particular financial entities, or the internal capacity of less 
developed banks to implement risk management techniques such as stress testing.415 Even 
where the solvency of specific banks is addressed by regulators, it is through the particular 
lens of how that bank’s capital resilience, or lack thereof, will impact on other banks which 
transact with it as linked actors within a multi-layered financial system.416 
From a legal-normative perspective, the above analysis implicates the largely procedural 
nature of the disclosure requirements and the minimal harmonisation of capital adequacy 
framework formalised under Basel. Given that Basel accords were primarily designed to 
regulatory needs and demands of its member states, OECD and G10 countries, and, more 
broadly, to accommodate regulatory diversity across states, banking institutions and financial 
markets, this procedural emphasis of the framework is perhaps inevitable.417 This reinforces 
the criticism that the Basel framework does not take into account the differences between the 
Islamic modes of financing and the conventional banking instruments and capital 
structures.418  Certainly, the capital structure of banks, on both liabilities and assets side, is 
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sufficiently different from conventional banks to raise questions over the utility and 
applicability of the risk and capital measurements proposed under the Basel framework. For 
instance, while conventional banks manage both claims made by a bank which are balanced 
against payments and distributions on the balance sheets of a bank, Islamic banks have a third 
component which represents neither a claim on the part of the bank part nor a share of the 
owners’ equity.419 This section investigates these forms in further detail below. 
The Basel capital regulation framework draws its relevance from two interrelated   
assumptions: 1) to offset risks, banks must hold and conserve enough capital and 2) such 
risks are broadly comparable to the liability and equity claims made on the bank relative to 
the assets held by that bank as reflected on the balance sheet. Thus, the working assumption 
on which the Basel framework is based is that the more claims placed on the bank as an 
inverse proportion of the capital it retains at any one moment in order to finance its various 
obligations, the greater that bank’s exposure to risk (e.g. shortages in liquidity and defaults on 
credit payments). This model may be reflective of the steep rise in leveraging, and the pre-
2010 absence of standards for regulating capital conservation over financial cycles in CB.420 
Yet, on the other hand, the assumptions on which such a model is based are not directly 
applicable to Islamic banking in several important ways. For instance, in IB, funds deposited 
may be used by banking authorities as part of a profit-sharing agreement, such as the 
previously discussed Mudarabah contract.421 Similarly, the bank may hold unrestricted 
deposits as an investor in an agency contract. The bank receives compensation from its initial 
investment in the form of a lump sum or as a percentage of the profits generated from a 
particular project of public investment enterprise (for instance sukuk contracts).422 
These two different types of contracts cannot be classed as liabilities, conventionally 
understood, since they do not constitute a claim on the bank. Indeed, the AAOIFI standard 2 
(on disclosure rules) specifically precludes banks from treating these as liabilities. Liabilities 
on the payment side of the balance sheet, as defined under this code, represent only those 
claims made on a bank which creates binding obligations. Subject to the regulatory rules 
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governing restricted and unrestricted deposits for each of these types of contracts, both 
deposit based arrangements can generate commercial losses and profits. However, crucially, 
the bank is under no obligation to return the original principal to third party investors, or act 
as a guarantor in the event of default or non-performance of the terms of the contract by the 
counter party. 
Another set of deposit holdings concern unrestricted deposits which, in accordance to the 
above mentioned Islamic accounting codes, can be treated as a “liability” for the purposes of 
a bank’s disclosure and accounting responsibilities.  This is because the source of financing is 
of a hybrid nature: investment in these profit sharing arrangements may derive from the 
banks own capital or outsourced from external streams of financing, the later of these 
creating strict liabilities. 423The bank then takes the total capital merged from both sources 
and uses or reinvests those sums on a discretionary basis. These forms of investment are 
subject to the specific rules governing “equity of unrestricted investment account holders”.424 
The AAOIFI’s Financial Accounting Statement sets on rules of disclosure in the above 
respect, which requires transparency on  “disclosure of the balances of these deposits, 
additions and withdrawals of their holders, profits/losses from operations during the 
period…… whether as a percentage of balances invested, a share of net profit or a given 
lump sum.”425 
4.6.3 Asset Structure of Islamic Banks 
 
The next section will briefly examine, specific modes of Islamic modes of financing in order 
to assess how such takings are accounted for on the balance sheet, and the qualitative impacts 
they have in the weighing of risk in the context of Islamic banking practices. It will subject to 
criticism and challenge the Basel frameworks ongoing emphasis on capital adequacy at the 
expense of other risk exposures of relevance to the sound functioning of Islamic and 
conventional institutions and intermediaries alike.426 
Data gathered from 7 Islamic banks from the years 2000 and 2001 suggests that banks have 
fairly distinct assets and accounting practices.427  Their financial statements indicated that the 
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majority of claims and assets stemmed from murabahah claims, investments musharakah and 
mudarabah, investment in securities, investment in real estates (sukuk), and investments in 
leased assets. The study suggests that while Islamic banks have failed to establish and apply 
uniform accounting and auditing standards, many states have taken steps to disclose 
information relating to their credit weighted assets, as well as their capacity to fulfil capital 
adequacy thresholds.  
4.6.4 Debt Financed Instruments 
The most common mode of Islamic financing relates to agreements in which debt is owed by 
beneficiaries to a transaction. These include sale of commodities and the Islamic contract 
known as ijarah. One such sale based transaction as discussed concerns murabahah, and can 
take the form of a lump sum which matures at a future date or sums payable in instalments. In 
a murabahah contract, banks may make claims on state sovereigns, public sector entities, 
other banking institutions, and insurance or securities companies, retails agents and so on.  
On the accounting side of matters, these receivables are assessed at net value after 
deductions.  Moreover, according to the AAOIFI-FAS 2: “Short-term and long-term 
murabahah receivables shall be recorded at the time of occurrence, at their face value. 
Murabahah receivables are measured at the end of the financial period at their cash 
equivalent value, i.e., the amount of debt due from the customers at the end of the financial 
period less any provision for doubtful debts.”428 
Debt financed modes also include Istisna contracts which are entered into by three parties on 
the terms of the provision of future debts in addition to the profit gained by the bank by 
beneficiary parties. Payments are received by the contractor, in addition to the bank profit, 
and are issued in instalments (sometimes having different maturities at different stages of the 
transaction). AAOIFI-FAS 10 stipulates that received payments recouped through financing 
of Istisna contracts by crediting parties should be treated as equivalent to other claims 
registered on the balance sheets of a bank.429 
Other exchange and sale based Islamic modes of financing include the musharakah contracts. 
IBs may prefer this instrument as an alternative of murabahah because of its reduced risks. 
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Musharakah contracts, notably, allow scope for the financing Islamic bank to “buy out”, thus 
releasing them from any future financial obligation, at the point of which debt documents are 
received. In effect, the banks acts as guarantor of a documentary credit which creates 
temporary futures claims with a “procedural”430 counterparty. Once commercial documents 
have been provided, the bank is released from any further liability.  
Salam contracts constitute another Sharí’a compliant mode of debt financing. Here, the bank 
lends sums expressed in cash amounts to a customer (in accounting terms this is documented 
as a sum of the principal debt expressed as a cash value). However, the bank cannot profit 
from the lending arrangements. 431Accordingly, two contracts are operating in parallel for the 
purposes of auditing and accounting: one concerns the claims made by the bank on return of 
the nominal value of a loan, and second, the Salam entry on the ‘outgoing’ side of balance 
sheet in which any changes on the real value of the loan at maturity (due to inflation, pricing 
increases and so on) are deducted or reduced from the total balance to be paid by the debtor 
party so as to ensure that no profit accrues to the bank.  
4.6.5 Equity-based or Non-debt Creating Islamic Financial Modes 
Non debt financing modes of finance include mudarabah and musharakah432. In these types 
of instruments, and an expression of their non-debt creating character, the beneficiaries are 
not liable for payment of the principal debt, or any returns on the amount credited to them, 
save in circumstances when there is fault or negligence on the part of the debtor counterparty.  
As per the rules stated in the AAOIFI-FAS1, which governs requirements relating to the 
disclosure and auditing of financial statements, any arrangement based on the above contracts 
must be recorded on the balance books as non-debt creating investments rather as a debt 
owed by a beneficiary.433 As to the substantive regulation of financing governed by 
mudarabah and musharakah contract, the AAOIFI‘s financial standards No. 3 and 4 
expressly preclude their interpretation and application as a debt creating instrument which 
creates liabilities for the beneficiary. Rather, for the purposes of a bank’s balance books these 
must be earmarked as investments and be disclosed as through financial statements which 
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reflect any profit and losses at specific stages at which a particular project or transaction is 
financed.  Thereafter, if payments are settled either partially or wholly at a date prior to being 
recorded on a financial statement, subsequent entries must reflect any remaining losses or 
gains and document remaining balances until such point as the outstanding amount if fully 
satisfied. The standards applicable also take consideration of unanticipated decreases in the 
market value of commodities or assets financed under musharakah and mudarabah, or for 
any losses stemming from the default of the counterparty.434 
Prominent scholars such as Chapra and Khan 435have detailed exhaustively the unique types 
of credit risks inherent, or implicit, in, IB structures and contracts.  The injunction on these 
debt derived instruments, structures and instruments discussed in chapter 2 create market 
barriers for prospective investors and consumers wishing to avail of such products and 
services, with possible adverse impacts on the competitiveness of Islamic markets and 
institutions, relative to their conventional counterparts. Moreover, counterparties are more 
likely to default on agreements. Agency costs may also be higher in Islamic Profit-Sharing 
arrangements.   For instance, risk exposures may include the counter party risks or the 
accounts receivable on trading books held to maturity.  In the above respect, Salam contracts 
risks exposures may arise from counterparty’s failure to supply commodities on time or to the 
agreed quantity. Likewise, as discussed in chapter 2 and 3 parties to Istisna contracts are 
subject to various performance related risks436, including the possible failure of the bank to 
honour the conditions of a contract, or the subcontractors’ unwillingness or inability to render 
required services under contract.   
 
4.6.6 Analysis 
The unique nature of Islamic contracts and financial products suggest credit risks and 
complexities which are not rendered explicit or adequately captured by traditional risk 
management strategies and approaches, including those advanced under Basel II.437 Indeed, 
IB institutions are exposed to other kinds of externalities than envisioned under the Basel 
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framework. To take one further example instance, under the principles of Sharí’a law, Islamic 
banks are not permitted to impose penalties on a counterparty who has defaulted on 
agreement, in contrast with conventional banking institutions with the power and ability to 
sanction non-payment through charges or by recovering overdue interest. 438 The absence of 
this sanctioning power is evidently open to abuse by a contracting counterparty in the 
knowledge that default on a payment will not incur any further penalty or charge.  
The prominent scholar Khan 439 has argued that the possibility and practice of counterparty 
default remains the greatest risks to Islamic financial institution; a risk for which there 
remains an absence of appropriate mitigating strategy or punitive remedy except 
administrative measures used to bar that party from continuing to operate. 440These 
administrative measures foreclose the possibility of selling off or compensation for losses 
incurred by the bank on default, exposing that bank to significant risk. Indeed, the absence of 
a remedy may ultimately be a central impediment to the growth of the Islamic finance 
market, stifling investor security and confidence and undermining the stability and solvency 
of particular institutions and economies as a whole.  Information gathered on risk perception 
by Islamic banks on the relative risks involved in different mode of Islamic financing are, by 
turns, highly revealing. Those instruments which rely most heavily on the Sharí’a-endorsed 
profit sharing, including musharakah and mudarabah are perceived to carry the highest 
risk.441 That is because the beneficiaries are not liable for payment if there is no fault or 
negligence from their part, so it is an investment that does not create an obligation of 
payment.442 
There are numerous other reasons why musharakah, mudarabah and profit and loss sharing 
contracts in general are risky, such locking capital for a long period of time in conditions of 
uncertainty, the process of estimating a return rate is difficult especially when there is 
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government participation and these returns are low. The entrepreneurs may also contribute to 
the problem, by not disclosing information in a proper and timely manner, by having low 
ethical standards and by having unsuitable management skills. There is also operational risk 
cause by inconsistencies in accounting standards and extra expenditures caused by 
monitoring the projects. 
As discussed above, while the RWA held by European and US banks will increase as a result 
of Basel III, Islamic banks will due on quasi trading books may be subject to greater effects, 
owing to the fact that such contracts deal in the trade and exchange of commodity structured 
products, the pricing of which will be dictated by the stability or volatility of the markets.  
Market related indicators endorsed under Basel II and III or otherwise used to evaluate 
economic stress may also have direct impacts on price fluctuations of assets and commodities 
traded on the Islamic stock markets. 443 
From a legal-regulatory “conflicts of law” perspective, a number of challenges are presented 
by the fact that supervisory bodies in different countries tend to rely on their own Sharí’a 
experts, resulting in judicial conflicts and the issuance of contradictory statements or 
judgements on the permissibility of a given instrument. Thus, financial products that are 
permissible in some countries may well be decreed against principles of Sharí’a law in others. 
Such disparity could impede the cross-border trade and use of Islamic products and thus stunt 
growth in this industry. It could also result in competition obstructing forms of regulatory 
arbitrage.  The AAOIFI has, in the above regard, emerged as a dominant player, particularly 
in its attempt to pursue greater harmonization of Sharí’a -based rulings across jurisdictions.444 
Looking at this in more detail, it is apparent that the emphasis in Basel III is largely on capital 
adequacy. A question however remains around how much the buffers and leverage ratios 
designed to ensure a robust model of capital adequacy enforcement for a debt based 
Conventional Banking model can be held to apply as effectively to the fundamentally asset 
and equity backed IB model. 
The central change in Basel III is the heavy enforcement around liquidity risk, with banks 
now forced to meet liquidity requirements that are based around a partially equity-driven 
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method of testing capital adequacy for all banks. Yet this arguably presents risks due to 
different conceptualisation of banking models; if Basel III is written for fundamentally debt-
based banking operations, it is perhaps unsurprising that it addresses the risk of that rather 
than the risks around equity based banking and the inability to take on many forms of debt. 
This has very specific impacts on the assumptions around buffers, leverage ratios and 
liquidity risk, largely because it appears a base assumption in the Basel III documents that 
these will be matched by a more traditional exposure to debt. 
The IFSB must, of course, deal with Basel III as a condition of entry to the international 
banking markets; it is impossible to conceive of a modern banking institution obtaining both 
large/institutional investor support and reinsurance without doing so. The liquidity risk 
mitigation identified and required by Basel III reforms must therefore be integrated with the 
needs of IB institutions and their fairly unusual balance sheets and operational requirements. 
Because they are following Sharí’a  principles, IB products have different risks from those 
belonging to WB and a Basel III amendment has to be created that expresses the exact capital 
risk requirements for this type of market. 
As noted above, Tier 1 assets must be above 6% of RWA, Tier 1 and 2 above 8% RWA, and 
at least 75% of Tier 1 assets must be common equity tier 1. Tier 3 has been eliminated, but it 
is perhaps notable that the less mature review of asset quality in IB is likely to result in 
considerable issues around mark to market valuations and tier quality assessment.445 
The bank obviously has access to bank capital and demand deposits in the usual way, but 
differs from the usual emphasis in Conventional Banking due to the heavy emphasis on profit 
sharing investment accounts. These do not correlate perfectly with Western investment 
accounts, in that both unrestricted investment accounts (UIA) and restricted investment funds 
(RIA) do not necessarily attract management fees. 
Both RIA and UIA are commonly offered through a Mudarib contract, meaning that the bank 
has no fees for management in the standard Wakalah/agency contract model that would be 
used in most Western banking. This has several obvious and non-obvious impacts on both the 
quality of the asset and the valuation of that asset for market value and tier assessment. Banks 
often offer profit share on UIA that is not based on the performance of the underlying assets, 
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but is more commonly the equivalent of an index linked return. This has several risks for the 
bank. Firstly, the bank is exposed to loss to an unusual degree; in the event that the assets 
invested in differ in a major way from index performance, a liquidity issue exists that does 
not at all apply in the Wakalah/agency model. Secondly, the technique of mitigating loss by 
passing the IBs share of profit as a Mudarib to the account holder means that a withdrawal of 
investment may leave the bank considerably out of profit in the immediate quarter, something 
that appears inconsistent with such a core asset for liquidity management. The reserves 
needed are referred to in the 3 and 4 IFSB as Profit Equalisation Reserve (PER) and 
Investment Risk Reserve (IRR). These are both essentially designed to cover losses for the 
account holder by offering funds from the bank, reducing volatility of the investment. This 
presents the IB system with two familiar problems, and one major issue with assessment of 
the underlying instruments. 
Firstly, in the same way as an interest-bearing account presents investment risks for the bank, 
the UIA is an acceptance of risk due to loss mitigation through the use of the PER and IRR. 
This risk therefore applies to the shareholders and institution, and presents much more of a 
liquidity issue for a bank that deals primarily in equities than might be expected for a Western 
bank. The issue here is that IBs tend to lend to the IB served sector, a specialized market 
under various Islamic jurisdictions. Because the risk is not diversified, there can be more 
problems than usual in the case of a bank run. This inability to diversify risk though the use 
of a debt portfolio to match the equity portfolio arguably increases systemic risk for the bank, 
and indeed it is notable how little of the risk that applied to IBs in areas such as Dubai/UAE 
was correctly evaluated. An example of this is shown in the Al-Tamimi446 assessment of the 
UAE’s national and foreign banks risk just prior to the Dubai crash, and whilst it is clear that 
many of the Western banks were also underpricing systemic risk it is notable that the IBs in 
the area were doing so whilst providing the same equity-based portfolios following Basel III 
standards. In this way, it can be seen that the lack of portfolio diversity that created 
overexposure to certain sectors and market risks in the Western market crash was present in 
the bailed out Dubai IBs.447 This is crucial given the requirements of balancing that Basel III 
                                                 
 
446  H Al-Tamimi, A Hussein and FM Al-Mazrooei, "Banks' Risk Management: A Comparison Study of UAE National and 
Foreign Banks” (2007) 8 The Journal of Risk Finance 4, 394-409. 
447 MM Hasan and J Dridi, The Effects of the Global Crisis on Islamic and Conventional Banks: A Comparative Study (IMF 
Working Papers 2010): 1-46. 
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introduces; IBs have an obvious disadvantage in that they have massive restrictions on 
effective exposure to the debt markets for religious regulatory reasons. 
One response to this is the holdings of high quality liquid assets (HQLA). These assets can be 
converted into cash with negligible to no loss of value, and whilst these cannot be explicitly 
or implicitly used to secure or finance transactions, they obviously provide a non-cash short 
term source of liquidity. These are assessed as reserves, cash, and Basel II 0% risk rated 
marketable securities. These can decrease in value, but crucially offer potential exposure to 
value increases during a flight to quality. This is however an extremely expensive way to 
balance the risks of such dependence on the equities market, and offers little of the ability to 
adjust to risk that can be provided by a balanced portfolio.448 In specific Islamic transactions, 
especially in Musharakah and Mudarabah contracts, the bank is more of a business partner 
than a company that provides financing. A large part of the risk of the borrowing company is 
supported by the bank. In this way, there is a large counterparty and liquidity risk and HQLA 
can make the bank’s balance sheet look better even after unfavourable events. 
There are key governance principles that have to be respected by banks in the case of 
musharakah and mudarabah contracts, such as ensuring that the management of the Islamic 
banking institutions have adequate resources and qualified personnel with sufficient 
knowledge and understanding of the concept, application and risk associated to them. 
Ensuring that the bank has enough resources for these exposures is a priority and HQLA are 
helpful in this matter. Even in the case of Istisna contracts, which is essentially a forward 
contract, having HQLA is welcomed, in the case there are large difference between the 
forward price and the spot price of the delivered goods that may affect the performance of the 
banks. 
4.7 Summary 
This chapter serves as a comprehensive analytical summary of the major risk factors required 
by the Basel Accords and shows how Islamic finance products may be assessed under a Basel 
risk management framework.  Basel Accords are standards that apply to all internationally 
active banks and thus, include Islamic banks that are connected to the global market place. As 
we argued in Chapter 3, banking institutions are exposed to a number of risks with severe and 
                                                 
 
448 Hassan, N_318 above; van heuring, N_47 above.  
 143 | P a g e  
 
143 
wide-ranging implications for shareholders, investors and stakeholders alike and a large 
portion of these risks for banking institutions are defined with the Basel framework.  In 
Chapter 4, after detailing the risk framework of Basel, we then examined some of the major 
Islamic financial products to illustrate how Basel risk policy, measurements and regulatory 
supervision are likely to be significant considerations of Islamic banking policy and 
management.  
In brief, Basel technical risks are now major considerations and part of the normal features of 
a globalised market place, characterized by transnational flows of finance, investment and 
capital where the risk transmission effects can no longer be contained within state borders. 
Given the increasing trend to interconnectedness and the pathologies of the financial system 
that we mentioned in Chapter 3, the question arises whether the minimal banking standards 
established by The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision providing the most 
comprehensive set of reform instruments for risk management known to the banking sector 
can improve the risk management of the Islamic banking sector.  Though attempts have been 
made to mitigate forms of credit and liquidity risk through the introduction of global capital 
and liquidity related risk management standards, most notably in the form of the Basel 
Accords, it is reasonable to hypothesize that only at the local level and by a content analysis 
that we will be able to perceive and determine whether risk management may succeed in 
Islamic banking institutions.  We turn now to examine this hypothesis by investigating the 
details of risk and risk management in the Islamic banking through two Malaysian case 
studies. 
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Chapter 5: TWO MALAYSIAN CASE STUDIES: BANK NEGARA MALAYSIA 
(BNM) AND THE BANK ISLAM MALAYSIA BERHAD (BIMB)  
5.1 Introduction 
This case study examines the types of risks to which Malaysian Islamic Banks are exposed in 
general. However, in order to examine these issues in greater depth and detail, the case study 
will focus on two particular banking institutions; the Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB) 
and the Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM).449  The reason for including BNM in this analysis is 
due to the fact that the primary function of the BNM is to issue currency and complete 
banking activities. The secondary function of the BNM is to behave as an adviser the 
Malaysian Government to regulate the country’s financial institutions. The justification 
behind including the BNM in the analysis is motivated by legislation in Malaysia passed in 
1958 and in 2009. In 1958, the Central Bank of Malaysia Act 1958 was passed. In 2009, the 
Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009 was instated, which repealed the Act of 1958. The main 
differences in the Acts are the bank’s regulatory powers. For instance, a side by side 
comparison between the two Acts illustrates that up until 2009, the Bank functioned primarily 
as a financial institution. Prior to 2009, the Bank of Malaysia functioned as an organisation in 
which to issue currency in Malaysia, keep reserves safe, act as a banker/financial adviser to 
the Government, promote monetary stability and a sound financial structure, and to promote 
reliable operation of national payment settlements in Malaysia, as outlined in section 4 of the 
Act. As these functions are arguably inherent in most banks, these primary functions notably 
shifted in 2009. In 2009, the primary functions of the Bank were to formulate and conduct 
monetary policy in Malaysia, to regulate and supervise financial institutions subject to laws 
enforced by the Bank, to provide oversight money and foreign exchange markets, to exercise 
oversight over money and foreign exchange markets, to exercise oversight on a progressive 
and inclusive financial system, and to act as a financial agent of the Government. The 
inclusion of regulatory principles of the Bank to include the term “agent” earmarks a shift 
and an elevated nature in the Bank. The 2009 Act was instated in order to positively earmark 
powers and autonomy of the Bank, which did not exist in 1958. In addition, the governance 
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framework of the Bank strengthened with the accountability and transparency of the Bank. 450 
Further, it is arguable that 2009 marked a new era in Malaysia which brought greater powers 
to the Bank of Malaysia.451 From a historical standpoint, the case analysis would be oddly 
muted in the advancements of Malaysian banking if the BNM were not discussed in the wider 
discussion of Malaysia banking, simply because the Bank has taken on a more regulatory role 
than conventional banking in recent years. Thus, the next sections of the analyses will include 
the structure and operational role of the BNM. 
In the first section, the chapter sketches out the background and financial landscape in which 
the Malaysian banking system operates, highlighting the prudential regulatory reforms 
implemented with particular focus on capital adequacy. The BNM has developed several 
guidelines on the implementation of international standard and has, moreover, sought to 
reconcile these with other relevant national and regional standards, including the IFSB 
standards, to which its banking operations are made subject.452 As part of this analysis, the 
chapter will highlight any tensions or divergences in the Basel framework and standards 
issued by the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB).   The chapter will therefore proceed to 
examine how Malaysian banks have sought to implement IFSB and its standards and 
integrate these with requirements related to Basel II and Basel III. This will prepare the 
ground for an assessment of the credit risk management strategies of Malaysian banking 
institutions, the merits of these systems, and the relative strengths and weaknesses of the 
regulatory framework, informed by a comparison with the UK framework both pre- and post 
the break-up of the FSA in 2012-3.  
5.2 Why Choose Malaysia? 
Malaysia is nominally a Muslim-majority country, with a 54% per cent of its 28 million 
strong populations self-identifying themselves as belonging to the Islamic faith. Yet under 
20% of banking assets are held in the IB sector, and strong cross-border flows particularly 
with Singapore453, a State of Malaysia prior to independence in 1965454, mean that 
                                                 
 
450 The explicit addition of ‘financial agent’ of the Government to the 2009 Act denotes a shift in the purpose of the Bank. 
The 1958 Act contained no discussion on the Bank as a “financial agent,” but rather outlined the functions of the bank as 
an “adviser” and “banker.” 
451 Governance, Communications and Organisational Development (2009). The Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009. BNM. 
http://www.bnm.gov.my/files/publication/ar/en/2009/cp05_001_whitebox.pdf  
452 IFSB (2005), Capital Adequacy Standards for Institutions (Other than Insurance Institutions) Offering Only Islamic 
Financial Services, Kuala Lumpur: IFSB. 
453 Equity, DBS Bank (Singapore) Group Research.  5 Aug 2014  
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Singaporean banks compete for ordinary business with Malaysian ones whether CB or IB, for 
the approximately $350 US billion revenues that the Asia-Pacific banking sector is projected 
to generate in 2015 from the 41% of the global market expected to be centred in the region.455 
The reason for selecting Malaysia is the best and most appropriate case study by which to 
assess and evaluate the claims made in preceding chapter relates to the relative stability of 
Sharí’a  compliant Islamic financial institutions, particularly in relation to its sound 
implementation of risk management standards and strategies, relative to those established in 
other Muslim countries. For instance, countries such as Saudi Arabia have yet to establish a 
robust Islamic legal framework dedicated to banking supervision and risk management. Other 
countries such Iran, Bahrain and the U.A.E have yet to fully internalise and enforce corporate 
governance related rules and procedures.456 
The competition both between Singaporean and Malaysian banks on the one hand, and 
Islamic and conventional banks on the other, is the main instructive factor in choosing 
Malaysia.  The instructive value for KSA is clear: banking in the KSA will be a competitive 
industry, and investors have a clear choice of whether to invest in a KSA bank, or, for 
instance, a British or UAE bank, each of which will be Shari’a compliant. 
Malaysia was, moreover, a somewhat pioneering actor in evolving Islamic finance market, in 
being the first South-East Asian country to establish a Sharí’a  compliant legal and financial 
framework in which Islamic banks could flourish and compete within its domicile.457  
However, as the study shows, this experience is not the only reason that Malaysia has 
experienced substantially higher levels of growth compared with other Islamic finance 
institutions operating in the same sector.458  
A further reason, consequently, for selecting Malaysia as the choice of case study relates to 
its seeming capacity to withstand global stresses and shocks, even in the face of the contagion 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
454 For general historical data on the financial history between the two countries see 
http://www.mas.gov.sg/~/media/MAS/Monetary%20Policy%20and%20Economics/Education%20and%20Research/Res
earch/Economic%20Staff%20Papers/2000/MASOP018_ed.ashx 
455 McKinsey on Payments September 2012, 14 
456  H Fathiyah,  Capital Structure and Performance of Islamic banks and IBS Commercial Banks in Malaysia (Presented at 
the National Seminar on Islamic Banking and Finance, KUIM 29-30 August 2006). 
457 See for examples BNB reports on Financial Reporting and Corporate Governance related requirements First Level 
Executive, Prudential Financial Policy Department, Bank Negara Malaysia and 
http://www.bnm.gov.my/guidelines/01_banking/02_financial_reporting/Financial%20Reporting.pdf and 
http://www.bnm.gov.my/guidelines/01_banking/04_prudential_stds/Ft_Proper_Criteria_280613.pdf 
458 Khan, N_431 above; Khan and Ahmed, N_431 above. 
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effects of the most recent financial crisis. Malaysian banks have continued to remain stable 
even in the face of systematic and unsystematic risks. This resilience can be attributed in 
large part to the institutional liquidity of the banking sector. On the whole, banking 
institutions have operated with high levels of capital adequacy, and, moreover, significantly 
above the regulatory minima proposed at each successive phase of Basel, Basel II and Basel 
II implementation.   
The Malaysian banking sector has established itself a highly successful niche market, 
demonstrated by high levels of growth from year to year. On one view, this success 
highlights consistent demand by Muslim consumers for alternatives to conventional banking 
initiatives and products.  On another view, it highlights the ingenuity of Malaysian bankers 
and regulators in developing Shari’a compliant products, possibly ahead of the competition. 
Finally, it demonstrates that a stable legal environment is necessary for the proper 
establishment of a bond or sukuk market where there is strong legal protection for depositors 
and investors.459 In the broader picture, net financing has increased substantially over two 
business cycles (from 2007-2011 and from 2011 to current), rising from 7.1 percent at the 
end of 2000 to 17.8 percent at the close of 2010. 460In nominal terms, net financing amounts 
to RM1 325 billion, which reflects a significant increase over the past five financial years. 461 
Figure 11, taken from the official source of Bank Negara, because of its official provenance, 
shows the sources of financing by Malaysian banks.   
                                                 
 
459 Singam, Kamini (2003) "Corporate Governance in Malaysia," Bond Law Review: Vol. 15: Iss. 1, Article 13. 
460 Balin, B.J., (2008), Basel I, Basel II, and Emerging Markets: A Nontechnical Analysis; Bank Negara Malaysia, (2014, 
2012, 2011), Annual Report ; Fathiyah, N_468 above. 
461 Hamim Syahrum Ahmad Mokhtar, Syed Musa Alhabshi and Naziruddin Abdullah 2007, “Determinants of Islamic 
Banking Efficiency in Malaysia” Paper presented to IIUM International Conference on Islamc Banking and Finance, 
IIUM Institute of Islamic Banking and Finance, 23-25 April 2007. Harker, P. T. and Zenios, S.A. 2000, “Performance of 
Financial Institutions: Efficiency, Innovation, Regulation” Cambridge University Press. 










Source: Bank Negara Malaysia462 
 
                                                 
 
462 Bank Negara Malaysia. Capital adequacy framework for Islamic banks – Disclosure requirements (Pillar 3). 
BNM/RH/GL 007-18, 2007. 
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Non-performing loans (NPL) have been also been on a downward trend in recent years, with 
the industry reporting a gross NPL ratio of 2.69 percent in 2011. Since 2007, the ratio has 
been decreasing with the NPL ratio in 2014 being less than half of the ratio in 2007.463 For 
instance, assets raised overseas increased from RM3.3 billion in 2002 to RM258 billion in 
2010. The rapid and steady growth of the Malaysian sector has been attributed to, among 
other factors, product diversification, including expansion of new and innovative Islamic 
financial instruments and products, including capital markets including the Takaful---the 
Sharí’a  compliant--- insurance based market and the growing market in Sukuk products.  Its 
market penetration may, additionally, be in part linked in turn to growing investor confidence 
in the risk regulatory capabilities and international management systems of the Malaysian 
banking sector and supporting legislation464, reflecting the continuous attempts by institutions 
such as the BNB to undertake capacity building initiatives and implement corporate 
governance practices.465    
 
The below figure shows investment projects by Malaysian Banks, and is taken from the 
official source of Bank Negara.  
 
                                                 
 
463Muhammad Syukri Bin Shamsuddin ,Basel III Implementation: Challenges and Opportunities In Malaysia In Basel III 
Implementation: Challenges and Opportunities (Chapter 6).  http://www.seacen.org/content.php?id=54&pid=702003-
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Figure 14: Investment projects by Malaysian banks 
 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia466 
A further reason why Malaysia was chosen for the purpose of a case study relates to its 
hybrid nature: despite being governed by principles of Islamic law, the Malaysian banking 
sector shares many features in common with conventional banking: it is professional 
managed, subject to professional standards including internally devised corporate governance 
approaches and policies, prudential (regulated) supervision, and is, more generally, orientated 
to free market competition. Finally, the country was selected due to the availability of data on 
regulation, risk management and accounting practices from 1997 to 2014.   
Viewed in the above light, Malaysia provides a useful frame of reference for the development 
of the immature systems of other Muslim countries. However, notwithstanding the apparent 
success of the Malaysian Islamic finance banking sector particularly with reference to its 
implementation of capital adequacy standards and ratios, the Malaysian banking sector is not 
without its limitations and challenges. These will be discussed below.   
 
                                                 
 
466 Bank Negara Malaysia. Capital adequacy framework for Islamic banks – Disclosure requirements (Pillar 3). 
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5.2.1 Institutional and Regulatory Framework 
The hybrid Malaysian financial sector has proved itself adaptive and competitive in the face 
of the changing demands of a global economy since its inception. Islamic Malaysian financial 
institutions, some of which are subsidiaries and affiliates of conventional banking structures, 
operate according to a legislative framework467 in accordance guiding principles of Sharí’a 
law. In Malaysia, commercial banks represent the most prevalent banking institution in the 
industry. To date, 19 domestic commercial banks operate in Malaysia. Those banks provide 
familiar services which including taking deposits, approving and issuing loans and advance to 
their customers, the provision of credit card services, facilitating leasing options and 
underwriting of private debt securities.    
It has been suggested that: 
Islamic bank products [in Malaysia] are modelled after existing conventional bank 
products. For every conventional product there is a corresponding Islamic substitute 
with Sharí’a compliance. Islamic banks offer ‘differentiated’ products by simply 
adopting conventional risk and return profile, subject to Shari’a constraints. Thus, the 
products offered by Islamic banks, in the first stage of evolution, are very similar but 
not identical to that of conventional banks.468 
 
Capital held by commercial banks account for 58 percent of the market share, while the 
remaining locally incorporated internationally active banks account for 20% of assets in the 
relevant sector.469 Investment banks domiciled in Malaysia, on the other hand, are involved in 
trading operations including the bonds and equities market, underwriting services, mutual 
funds and the general provision of fee based advice and financing activities.  Investment 
banks will also accept deposits, providing these exceed RM500,000.  Moreover, many of 
these banks and their affiliates have joined forces to form corporate groups. Thus a number of 
domestic Malaysian banks have affiliates in the sector, including investment and IB branches 
and subsidiaries. Others have affiliates in the insurance sector, offering takaful (Islamic 
insurance) as well as other services.  
                                                 
 
467 Banking and Financial Institutions Act 1989 covers all banks, whilst additionally for Islamic banks,  the Islamic Banking 
Act 1983 came into effect on 7 April 1983. 
468 Ariff, Mohamed Islamic Banking In Malaysia: Industry At Crossroads INCEIF Research Bulletin no 3, 24 June, 2014. 
http://www.inceif.org/research-bulletin/islamic-banking-malaysia-industry-crossroads/ 
469 Muhammad Syukri Bin Shamsuddin ,Basel III Implementation: Challenges and Opportunities In Malaysia In Basel III 
Implementation: Challenges and Opportunities (Chapter 6) at 184                            .  
http://www.seacen.org/content.php?id=54&pid=702003-100328. 
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Islamic banks have a substantial presence in the evolving Malaysian banking context, 
accounting for 18% of banking assets, equivalent to RM 353 Billion.470  Indeed, Malaysia has 
emerged as a key competitor and asset holder in the Islamic finance market. In the last 
statistics produced, and outside the bloc of gulf countries, Malaysia holds ten percent of 
market share in the IB sector.  To some extent, this is supported by exchange controls: From 
1 September 1998, the Malaysian Government implemented a series of measures to insulate 
the economy from the risks and vulnerabilities of the external economic developments and to 
effect a stable exchange rate regime.471 The overall composition of banking structures 
regulated under the supervisory control of the Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) is represented 
in the following figure. 
 
Figure 15: The composition of Malaysian banking structures. 
 
Source: IMF. List of acronyms: DFI, Development Fund. Labuan is a tax free island which is 
part of Malaysia - their equivalent of the Isle of Man or Guernsey. NBFI is non-Bank 
Financial Institution.   
Broadly speaking, the government of Malaysia has adopted a highly interventionist, “top 
down” stance in the development and evolution of the Malaysian banking sector.  Prior to 
1989, all Islamic finance institutions were requirement to submit to perhaps the first 
                                                 
 
470 Khan, T. and Ahmad, H. 2001. Risk Management An Analysis Of The Issues In Islamic Financial Industry. Occasional 
Paper no.5. Jeddah: IRTI, 2001. http://www.pdf-finder.com/RISKMANAGEMENT-AN-ANALYSIS-OF-ISSUES-
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471 Bank Negara press release, Measures to Regain Monetary Independence,  1 September 1998  
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comprehensive Islamic regulatory instrument of its kind --- the Islamic Banking Act 1983. 
This Act established the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia or BNM); this 
regulatory authority is endowed with principal supervisory- rule making, administering and 
enforcing—powers for regulating Islamic Banks subject to its jurisdiction.472 In this capacity 
has authority to issue licences to individual banks and sanction non-compliance with 
minimum capital adequacy requirements. At a policy level, BNM is authorised to set and 
modify general rules and standards on banking practices nationally.  
The 1989 Act has since then been superseded by two key constitutive instruments: the 
Financial Services Act 2013 which governs conventional financial institutions and the 
Islamic Financial Services Act 2013. Investment banks are furthermore subject to the 
regulatory rules and controls enacted under the Capital Market and Securities Act 2007, 
which is administered by the Securities Commission Malaysia.   
Among one of its most distinctive features, and a potential factor of the relative success of its 
Islamic finance institutions, markets and products, is the support Malaysian banks receive 
from the state government and from public stakeholders. It should be noted, however, that of 
the banks that operate in Malaysia, conventional or Islamic, none are nationalised or directly 
owned by Government. Nonetheless, internally domiciled banks do benefit from 
comparatively high levels of state and private interest by various interest groups. One 
instance is the injection of liquidity by state linked initiatives and corporations such as the 
Employment Provident Fund (EPF)473, the government-run pension agency which has 
investment income of RM10.63 billion (£1.79 billion on 1 July 2015) for the first quarter 
ended 31 March 2015, on total investment assets of RM663.75 billion, a year-on-year growth 
of 20.33 per cent compared with RM8.83 billion recorded in Q1 2014.  Islamic financial 
institutions hold 40% of EPF funds (approximately £45 billion), and it is submitted that 
although the figure held 10 years ago was somewhat less, it together with the exchange 
controls of 1998 provided a cushion to the shocks of the financial crisis.474   
                                                 
 
472Fathiyah, N_468 above; Archer, N_256 above. 
473 Retrieved from http://www.bnm.gov.my/files/publication/ar/en/2005/cp08.pdf 
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The next section will focus on the implementation of the Basel framework in the Malaysian 
finance market, focusing on two Islamic financial institutions: the Bank Islam Malaysia 
Berhad BNM and BIMB. 
5.2.2 The Application of Basel Capital Adequacy Framework in Malaysian Banks 
 
The Basel I framework was first adopted in Malaysia in 1989. It was later revised to 
incorporate reforms designed to limit market risk exposures as set forth in the regulatory 
instrument the Market Risk Amendment. Under a further set of state amendments, the 
national adoption of the Basel framework was once again amended and revised to reflect the 
proposals contained in Approach for Credit Risk, Basic Indicator Approach and Standardised 
Approach for Operational Risks of the Basel II package.475 Other reforms implemented under 
Basel II include the Pillar I guidelines on the Internal Ratings-Based approach for Credit Risk 
and Internal Models Approach for Market Risks; the procedures associated with the 
supervisory Review process and disclosure requirements elaborated under Pillar 3. 
The  trend and capacity of  the Malaysian banking system to hold capital in excess of Basel 
minimum requirements has remain stable over the past decade. Indeed, the banking as whole 
in Malaysia has exceeded a 15% capital ratio threshold over the past 4 years.476 Testament to 
the above Malaysian Islamic Finance Institutions was reported to have stood at 22.2% as of 
September 2014, while its Core Capital Ratio (CCR) accounted for 21.7 percent.477 This 
figure is commensurate with nominal holdings of approximately RM47 billion in excess 
minimum 8% capital thresholds.478 Indeed, even at the summit of the financial crisis in 2008, 
Malaysian banks maintained relatively high levels of liquidity, with the average RWCR 
amounting to 13.1 percent. 479  




475 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, (2012), a Framework for Dealing with Domestic Systemically Important 
Banks. 
476 http://www.bnm.gov.my/guidelines/01_banking/01_capital_adequacy/12_nt_007_25.pdf.188; Malaysia Treasury 
Department, (2011), Statistics for GDP of Malaysia 2005- 2011. 
477 Muhammad Syukri Bin Shamsuddin, Basel III Implementation: Challenges and Opportunities In Malaysia In Basel III 
Implementation: Challenges and Opportunities (Chapter 6) at 184                            .  
http://www.seacen.org/content.php?id=54&pid=702003-100328 
478 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, (2012), A Framework for Dealing with Domestic Systemically Important 
Banks 
479  ibid 
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In keeping with general financial trends in Malaysia, the capital structure of most banks 
operating in Malaysia, including Islamic banks such as BIMB and the BNM discussed below, 
largely consists of common equity, which as discussed above is constitutive of Tier 1 capital 
(which is subject to stricter capital ratio and buffer requirements as per the Basel framework).  
In contrast with counterpart institutions operating in the UK and the United States, for 
instance, Malaysia banks are according to some authors’ estimates, projected to retain capital 
levels double the minimum levels specified under the Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1), and 
this, moreover, even after the capital conservation buffer is factored in. Once again, this 
excess is attributed to prudent profit and liquidity retention regulatory strategies.480 
Malaysian banking institutions have, in other words, been able to safeguard their assets and 
retain high levels of institutional liquidity due to a strategic policy of prudential earnings 
retention and increased reserves.  To some extent this is a combination of the effect of 
exchange rate controls and the high savings in the government-sponsored Employee 
Provident Fund.481 According to the Bank for International Settlements, increasing reserve 
requirements is less distortionary to an economy than direct controls on bank lending, and 
costs the authorities very little. It appears to be the large amount of national savings that in 
part ensures that the Malaysian banks have a sufficient profit to absorb any detriment caused 
by their high capital reserves.482  Furthermore, the Malaysian banking industry has proved its 
responsiveness to the Basel framework approved risk management and supervision 
recommendations as formulated under Pillar 2 and 3.483 Nonetheless, commentators have also 
suggested that the Malaysian banking institutions will however, like many CBs, experience 
decrease in their capital ratios, particularly in Tier 1 capital, as the Basel III framework is 
fully rolled out.484 This is even assuming that Malaysian banks are not affected by 
unexpected unsystematic pressures, or otherwise reform their internal banking activities and 
balance sheet profiles, for instance through the introduction of new financial instruments or 
                                                 
 
480 Bank Negara Malaysia. Capital adequacy framework for Islamic banks – Internal capital; Adequacy assessment process 
(Pillar 2). BNM/RH/GL 002-22, 2002. 
481  World Bank, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/15548/multi_page.txt?sequence=2, 21 
482  CGFS Papers No 33 Capital flows and emerging market economies Committee on the Global Financial System January 
2009, 53  http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs33.pdf 
483  Bank Negara Malaysia, BNM/RH/GL 001-33 Prudential Financial Policy Department Risk-Weighted Capital Adequacy 
Framework (Basel II) – Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process (Pillar 2) 
484 Bank Negara Malaysia, (2011), Annual Report. Bank Negara Malaysia, (2011), Financial Stability and Payment Systems 
Report.   
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through reducing their risk weighted assets.485 Decreases in capital ratios, relative to previous 
levels, is linked to the new capital measurement models formulated in Basel III under which 
fair value gains previously assessed under Tier II are now deducted from the common equity 
Tier 1, in contrast with Basel II where deductions were calculated as a risk weighted 
percentage of a given Bank’s total capital.486  However, this computational change will have 
the greatest impact on bank with relatively low capital ratios to begin with.  The BNM and 
BIMB, the key institutions focused on in this case study, as suggested above, relatively high 
ratios in excess of the 8 per cent regulatory minimum.487 
Preparing the ground for a larger assessment of the extent to which the Basel framework is 
sufficiently responsive to the particularities of Islamic finance sector, and the principles 
which underpin it, the next section considers to which global standards, including those 
developed by the BCBS, AAOIFI and IFSB to protect the rights of PISA holders. Under the 
Basel framework, capital charges are applied only to operational risks under Basel thus 
failing to factor in additional credit risks unique to Islamic contract and PSIA agreements 
(e.g. lack of penalties in event of debtor default). Both Bank Negara488 and the IFSB489 has 
established a different formula for calibrating the risk weight of assets financed by Islamic 
banks depending on nominated contracts. The BNM in particular has issued guidelines which 
seek to integrate the Basel recommendations with the local standards issued by the IFBS.490  
In particular, these standards provide the specific treatment for the computation of credit risk 
weighted assets for seven classes of Islamic contracts undertaken by Malaysian IBs. Some 
Islamic banking products may carry different titles and have variations in contractual 
structures which have led BNM to require that, for the purpose of computing the risk-
weighted asset amount, IBs focus on the risk structure and exposure of the products.491 
                                                 
 
485 Bank Negara Malaysia BNM/RH/GL 001 - 21 Prudential Financial Policy Department Risk-Weighted Capital Adequacy 
Framework (Basel I – Risk-Weighted Assets Computation), 3 
486 Khan, T. and Ahmad, H. 2001. Risk Management An Analysis Of The Issues In Islamic Financial Industry. Occasional 
Paper no.5. Jeddah: IRTI, 2001. http://www.pdf-finder.com/RISKMANAGEMENT-AN-ANALYSIS-OF-ISSUES-
INISLAMIC-FINANCIAL-INDUSTRY.html 
487 Bank Negara Malaysia, (2011), Monthly Statistical Bulletin, December. Bank Negara Malaysia, (2011), Financial Sector 
Blueprint 2011-2020.  
488 Bank Negara Malaysia,BNM/RH/CP 028-11 Prudential Financial Policy Department Operational Risk Management Page 
2/23, 27 June 2014, 
http://www.bnm.gov.my/guidelines/01_banking/04_prudential_stds/Operational_Risk_Management.pdf 
489 Archer, N_256 above.  
490 Bank Negara Malaysia,Capital Adequacy Framework (Basel II - Risk Weighted Assets) 27 June 2013 
 http://www.bnm.gov.my/guidelines/01_banking/01_capital_adequacy/3_gl_caf_rwa_010713.pdf 
491 Bank Negara Malaysia,Capital Adequacy Framework (Basel II - Risk Weighted Assets) 27 June 2013 para 2.47, p. 
22 http://www.bnm.gov.my/guidelines/01_banking/01_capital_adequacy/3_gl_caf_rwa_010713.pdf,  
 157 | P a g e  
 
157 
At the same, IFSB standard setting practices represent an attempt to introduce a clear legal 
framework, supervisory review, transparency and other good governance and risk 
management elements into Islamic finance, dealing amongst other things with higher 
regulatory expectations for more transparency, and the need for the effective management of 
risks and capital.492  
While countries such as Saudi Arabia lack the legal infrastructure to properly monitor and 
implement such measures, Malaysia, BIMB and BNM, the banks used for the case studies 
suggest positive developments in this respect.  At a time where the competitive financial 
landscape is being redrawn by advances of technology, new institutional arrangements, the 
evolving international regulatory reforms, changing operating models, rising consumer 
expectations and increased competition, 493 IFSB standards are evolving to ensure the pursuit 
of an effective functioning and sound Islamic financial structure, post-crisis.  The IFSB has 
made significant advancements in leading the efforts to review specific measures put forward 
by the Basel Committee for possible adoption in Islamic finance.494  
5.2.3     Assessing Malaysian IFIs 
As a general point of scholarly enquiry and interest, the case study also implicates questions 
of a constitutional nature. Islamic financial institutions operating in Malaysia are subject to 
the rules and standards developed under the Basel framework, as are all other financial 
institutions in Malaysia.495 However, they are also subject to the rule and decision making 
authority of yet another, this time local and context-specific, standard setting body: the 
Islamic Financial Services Board. 496 The questions posed but not yet answered is: How do 
the rules and standards generated by these distinct (one global, one local) regimes co-exist? 
Do they co-exist and overlap (is there comity or constitutional coherence?) Or, alternatively, 
                                                 
 
492 Governor Dr. Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor’s Welcoming Address at the 10th IFSB Summit 2013 - The Future of the 
Islamic Financial Services Industry: Resilience, Stability and Inclusive Growth16 May 2013. 
http://www.bnm.gov.my/index.php?ch=en_speech&pg=en_speech_all&ac=465, reprinted Gateway magazine (South-
South Information Gateway), June 2013, 12 http://www.ssig.gov.my/wp-
content/uploads/2013/08/BuletinSSIG_24thEdition_June2013.pdf 
493 To show that I’m not being Islamocentric, this quote comes from the Australian Submission to the Financial System 
Inquiry March 2014, pp 43 ff. http://fsi.gov.au/files/2014/04/Reserve_Bank_of_Australia.pdf  
494 Governor Dr. Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Governor’s Welcoming Address at the 10th IFSB Summit 2013 - The Future of the 
Islamic Financial Services Industry: Resilience, Stability and Inclusive Growth16 May 2013. 
http://www.bnm.gov.my/index.php?ch=en_speech&pg=en_speech_all&ac=465 
495 Bank Negara Malaysia, BNM/RH/NT 007-25 Prudential Financial Policy Department Islamic Banking and Takaful 
Department Implementation of Basel III 
496 Islamic Financial Services Board   Capital adequacy standard for institutions (other than insurance institutions) offering 
only Islamic financial services, 2005a. Available at: www.ifsb.org. 
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does the relation between two regime represent a paradigmatic constitutional conflict 
(“constitutional pluralism”), or in private law terms, a conflict of laws. If so, does or should 
the standards of one regime take precedence or claim ultimate authority over the standards 
and decisions of the other? This questions will be assessed in a less theoretical, and more 
practice orientated register, namely by way of discussion of the extent to which Islamic 
standard setting bodies have been able to customise and adapt the Basel standards to the 
financial, contractual and regulatory specificities of Islamic finance, markets and structures---
and, crucially, the extent to which ‘gaps’ and divergence remain.  In the above light, the next 
section will consider the Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) adoption and refinement of the 
Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) standards and guidelines on capital management and 
risk reduction. 
The application to Saudi Arabia is clear. Faced with international competition, Malaysia has 
strengthened its market share in IB by its strict regulation, its strong capital buffers and by a 
standardised approach to Shari’a which provides authoritative fatawa which support new 
innovations in financial products and services.497  KSA must do the same.  As will be seen in 
chapter 7, having sukuk which a leading scholar says are not Shari’a compliant, and having a 
weak regulatory structure without the backing of the rule of law, is not likely to provide a 
banking centre which can compete with Malaysia or with the UK. 
5.3 Reconciling the Regulatory Standards of the Basel Committee and the Islamic 
Board of Financial Services: The Case of the Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad 
(BIMB) 
 
The following section examines the implementation of Basel II and III by BNB. Specifically, 
the BNM addressed the question how to appropriately measure and set capital adequacy 
ratios of bank licenced under the relevant constitutive instruments, including, namely the IBA 
1983 (IBA) and Banking and Financial Institutions Act 1989 (BAFIA) respectively. The 
BIMB was the first Islamic Bank to be established in Malaysia in 1983, under the auspices of 
the IBA 1983. As Central Banker, Bank Negara Malaysia emerged as a central actor in the 
                                                 
 
497 For an example of a new and innovative financial product, the  Mubādalah al-Arba`ah Profit Rate Swap (PRS), see the  
Product Standard for that product appearing in the Malaysian IFSB  Islamic Financial Services Industry  Stability Report  
2013  Appendix 3. 
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development and circulation of IFSB standards, infusing them with concrete content in order 
to facilitate their practical application and implementation on the part of the banking industry 
as a whole. 498 The BNM has been a pioneering institution in developing customised 
guidelines that aim to integrate Basel II accords and the IFSB standards to better adapt to the 
novel aspects of Islamic markets, products and contracts by using analogy with concepts 
arising in the Qur’an and the Sunna.499  It has been able to circumvent the difficulty of ةععب 
bid’ah which roughly translates as novelty, but which has the negative connotation of being 
somewhat heretical if it suggests that the Qur’an is not complete in itself, and needs novelty 
added to it.500 
The IFSB is an international body with its technical committee under the Chairmanship of a 
Member of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA)501, and with the Governor of 
SAMA as a Member of the Board502. It is responsible for setting standards with international 
reach. 503The  prudential standards and guidelines it develops and promulgates, are much like 
those issued under the Basel framework, intend to promote and enhance the effective 
functioning and capital integrity of the Islamic financial banking institutions, capital markets 
and the insurance industry.  For the most part, the standard setting activities of IFSB are 
largely in line with the regulatory and fiscal goals of OECD and BCBS in respect of the 
banking sector.  
To so do, IFSB has outlined 4 overarching standards which all Islamic financial institutions 
are called upon to observe in the operation of their commercial activities. These standards 
demonstrate the pragmatic approach of Malaysia’s SAC in researching methods in which 
innovations in terms of fatawa can be made in keeping with Islamic tradition, and at the same 
time conform to the regulatory structure and requirements formalised under Basel II:504 
i) The introduction of capital adequacy standards for all entities offering Islamic financial 
services, with the exception of insurance companies. These standards were issued in 
2005.  
                                                 
 
498 Bank Negara Malaysia, (2011), Notification to Industry on Basel III Implementation. 
499 Kettell, Brian The Islamic Banking and Finance Workbook: Step-by-Step Exercises to Help You Master the 
Fundamentals of Islamic Banking and Finance, Wiley, 2011, 13. 
500 Ghazālī, Muḥammad , Within the Boundaries of Islam: A Study on Bid'ah, The Other Press, 2010 , 104 
501 Dr Ahmed Abdulkarim Alkholifey, from 10 December 2013 
502 Dr. Fahad Al-Mubarak, Governor of SAMA. 
503 Islamic Financial Services Board. (2005a) Capital Adequacy Standard for Institutions (Other than Insurance 
Institutions)Offering only Islamic Financial Services. December, http://www.ifsb.org/standard/ifsb2.pdf 
504 Islamic Financial Services Board. (2005b) Guiding principles of risk management for Institutions (Other than Insurance 
Institutions) Offering only Islamic Financial Services. http://www.ifsb.org/standard/ifsb1.pdf 
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ii) The provisions of guidelines and practices on finance sector specific risk management 
applicable to Islamic institutions excluding Takaful or Islamic insurance as otherwise 
known. These standards were issued in 2006 
iii)  New rules governing company disclosures on capital structure and risk management 
profiles with the aim of promoting accountability and transparency, again excluding 
Takaful related services. These standards were issued in 2007.  
iv) Regulatory guidance for supervisory control and oversight of Islamic financial services, 
with the exception of the insurance industry and mutual funds. These standards were 
issued in December 2007.  
The standards issued by the IFSB while influential remained largely open ended and 
indeterminate. To this end, the BNM has formulated a number of guidelines which cohere 
with both the Basel II framework and IFBS standards, but are sufficiently well adapted to 
reflect the specific risks related challenges and profiles of banks operating in the relevant 
markets.  In contrast with the IFSB standards which are voluntary and ‘soft’ in nature, the 
guidelines issued by the BNM are defacto binding on institutions who participate in the BNM 
initiative. In the context of Malaysia, the Basel reforms were implemented in a three stage 
process.505 The standards on capital adequacy set forth by the BNB were implemented 
beginning 2008. The internal rating systems developed and advocated by the BNM were 
subsequently rolled out in 2010.  
Before assessing the implementation of Basel III and its impacts on the Malaysian IB sector, 
it is worth noting the two guidelines developed by the BNM which brings into close contact, 
conflict and coherence the standards issued under Basel and the standards developed by the 
IFSB: on the issue of the capital adequacy ratios and measurement methodologies applied by 
the relevant banks. The first of the guidelines concerns the risk weighted capital framework. 
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policy department of Malaysia, largely corresponds to Basel II rules on risk weighted 
assets.506 All financial institutions are obliged to integrate this framework into their internal 
                                                 
 
505 Mohamed, N_390 above.  
506 Bank Negara Malaysia. Risk Weighted Capital Adequacy Framework (Basel II-Risk Weighted Assets Computation), 
BNM/RH GL001-22, 2001. Bank Negara Malaysia. Capital adequacy framework for Islamic banks. BNM/RH/GL/002- 
14, 2002a. Bank Negara Malaysia. Capital adequacy framework for Islamic banks – Internal capital adequacy assessment 
process (Pillar 2). BNM/RH/GL 002-22, 2002. 
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risk management and measurement system for the purposes of computing the minimum 
capital requirements banks must meet to offset and minimise risk exposures. For example, 
IFSB’s GN-6 Guidance note on quantitative measures for liquidity risk management in 
institutions offering Islamic financial services [excluding Islamic insurance (takāful) 
institutions and Islamic collective investment schemes] was issued in April 2015.507  Not only 
does it cover liquidity risk management for Muḍārabah or Wakālah instruments508 but it also 
allows for a deposit insurance scheme for PLS Investment accounts and deposits509, and deals 
with derivatives such as Sharī`ah-compliant hedging assets (e.g. Islamic swaps).510 
By the end of 2011, BNM declared its intention to rollout the Basel III reforms package in 
accordance with the globally agreed 5 year implementation timeframe (beginning in January 
2013).511  The first component of these reforms implemented concerns the Capital Adequacy 
Framework (Capital Components). BNM accepted the new capital structure and threshold 
standards and proceed to begin plans for their formal internal implementation in January 
2013. This complied with the principal rationale of the Basel II framework: firstly, to further 
clarify the definition of eligible regulatory capital held by financial institutions, secondly, to 
secure institutional liquidity, and then to impose greater restraints and criteria on the quality 
and level of capital held in reserves. The proposals adopted by BNM generally converge with 
the minimum requirements formalised under the Basel framework. 512 
The second guideline of interest concerns attempts by BNM to integrate regulatory 
requirements relating Pillar II of Capital Adequacy Framework for International Banks 
(CAFIB) into the internal operations and risk management system of Islamic banks active in 
Malaysia. Such requirements relate specifically to the institution of supervisory review 
processes for governing the capital management of Islamic banks. Under its 2007 standards, 
BNM retains the right to impose higher capital thresholds or prudential restraints on specific 
Islamic banks where the application of general CAFIB standards institutions are found to be 
insufficiently tailored to their risk profiles.513 After 2011, BNM also steered the introduction 
of an Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment (ICAAP) which was subsequently implemented 
                                                 
 
507 Downloadable from http://www.ifsb.org/standard/GN-6%20GN%20on%20LRM%20(April%202015)-final.pdf 
508 in part 2.3.1.1, from para 52 on page 17 
509 In part 2.3.1.2 , from para 56 on page 19. 
510 in para 121on page 32. 
511 Risk-Weighted Capital Adequacy Framework (Basel 1 - Risk-Weighted Assets Computation) **updated 2009/10/23  
512 ibid 
513 Bank Negara Malaysia. Capital adequacy framework for Islamic banks – Disclosure requirements (Pillar 3). 
BNM/RH/GL 007-18, 2007 
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by a number of Islamic banks in accordance with the directives issued under the IFSB and 
BNB guidelines.  
The BNM has also instituted its own internal risk management systems for assessing credit, 
market and operational risks with bearing on continued solvency, stability and capital 
adequacy.514 Such measures include the BNM’s dividend approval schemes which factors in 
continual supervisory assessment of the results of stress tests and supervision of capital 
management practices.515  The BNM, moreover, continues to develop policies and controls to 
ensure that capital to risk ratios are sound and reflective of the bank’s real earnings, growth 
projections and risk profiles.    In capsule, the BNM approved framework sets out 
standardised approaches for assessing and measuring i) credit, ii) market and iii) a Basic 
Indicator Approach for assessing operational risks including a standardised and alternative 
approach The Standardised Alternative Indicator. 516 
With respect to the Basel III approved NVLA trigger, BNM has in its Capital Adequacy 
Framework (Capital Components) attempted to reduce the scope and potential for 
discretionary decision making (and any resulting arbitrariness or lack of transparency) by 
prescribing situations and contexts in which the bank and the Malaysia Deposit Insurance 
Corporation may consider a bank, or instrument, to be non-viable.517 Under Basel III, the 
applicable jurisdiction retains discretion to determine whether the threshold has been met for 
triggering the NVLA safety mechanism is that in which the capital has been given 
recognition for the purposes of capital adequacy regulation. To pick a non-Islamic country 
that does this, for example, Australia does this with Prudential Standard APS 160 and 
Prudential Practice Guide CPG 110 Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process and 
supervisory review.  
The Basel III reform introduced a requirement to ensure loss absorbency of capital 
instruments through a Non-viability Loss Absorption (NVLA) trigger.  NVLA aims to 
minimise the use of taxpayers’ money when financial institutions suffer financial distress, so 
as to avoid any implicit expectation of government support. Previously, taxpayers’ money 
                                                 
 
514 Bank Negara Malaysia. Capital adequacy framework for Islamic banks – Disclosure requirements (Pillar 3). 
BNM/RH/GL 007-18, 2007. 
515 http://www.bnm.gov.my/guidelines/01_banking/02_financial_reporting/Financial%20Reporting.pdf 
516 ibid 
517 Basel Commttee on Banking Supervision. (2006) International convergence of capital measurement and capital standards: 
A revised framework. June, doi: h_p://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf 
 163 | P a g e  
 
163 
would always be provided to save troubled banks, and indeed most European banks that were 
saved during the 2008 financial crisis would not have needed taxpayer funds if the capital 
instruments were used to absorbed their losses and had tier 1 and 2 instruments been 
converted into shares. 518 
As Khalid et al argue, BNM’s innovation with respect to its corporate governance and 
standard setting approach (es) lies in its attempt to balance a strong emphasis on risk 
management, on the one hand, with flexible approaches to an evolving and somewhat novel 
marketplace. It is worth therefore stating their claims in full: 
BNM’s approach to prudential regulation and supervision has also evolved in 
response to the changing landscape and maturity of the financial sector. The 
prudential framework has gradually moved away from overly prescriptive regulations 
and a one-size-fits-all approach to a more principled-based regime that is adaptive to 
changing market conditions and innovations. With the growing maturity of the market 
and its players’ capabilities, this approach facilitates differentiated regulation and 
supervision based on the size, complexity and risk of individual banking institutions. 
It also emphasises improved disclosures to achieve more effective market discipline. 
Greater flexibility is accorded to institutions that have strong risk management and 
corporate governance practices in place. The principled-based regulatory regime is 
reinforced by the adoption of a risk-based approach to supervision. In 2006, the Risk-
Based Supervisory Framework (RBSF) for the supervision of financial institutions 
was further enhanced to facilitate the early identification of emerging risks and 
provided a more structured and forward-looking approach to assess financial 
institutions’ risk profiles and risk management systems.519  
The guideline on Pillar 2 as advanced under Basel II supplements the above discussed IFSB 
and Islamic accounting standards by imposing general disclosure requirements on Islamic 
banks. Islamic banks are, accordingly, required to submit qualitative and qualitative 
information relating to credit, market, operational risks. Such risks also include, importantly, 
disclosures pertaining to their trading book, PSIAs and rate of return risk.  
Having discussed how Basel affected a central bank, the next section considers the unique 
risks to which IFIs are exposed by situating its discussion in the context of a Malaysian retail 
bank’s implementation of the Basel II and III guidelines. 
                                                 
 
518 bin Shamsuddin, Muhammad Syukri Basel III Implementation: Challenges And Opportunities In Malaysia , in 
Karunaratne, J P R, ed, Basel III Implementation: Challenges And Opportunities   The South East Asian Central Banks 
(SEACEN) Research and Training Centre Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, apparently undated. Retrieved 
fromhttp://www.seacen.org/file/file/2014/RP92/BASEL%20-%20chapter%206.pdf. 
519 Khalid, N.M., Paharodzi, D. and Yeo, R.  “Pro-cyclicality Impact of Basel II in Malaysia‟ in SEACEN (2008) 
„Understanding and Addressing the ProCyclicality Impact of Basel II in the SEACEN Countries‟ SEACEN Centre for 
Research and Training, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 2008, 47 
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5.3.1 The Implementation of the Basel Recommendations by the Bank International 
Malaysia Berhad 
The following section examines the implementation of Basel II and III by BIMB. BIMB was 
the first Islamic Bank to be established in Malaysia in 1983, as provided for in the IBA. 
Established as a single branch, the bank now has 93 branches and over 600 terminals 
nationwide. Testament to the bank’s expanding commercial presence both nationally and 
globally, BIMB was listed on the main board of the Bursa520 in January 1992.  Following this 
development, the Bank’s capital reserve increased exponentially, rising from RM 80 million 
(Malaysian Ringgit) in June 2009 to 1.7 Billion.521 BIMB has also won international 
recognition from professional bodies, winning the Best Brands in Banking-Islamic Banks by 
The Asia Pacific Brands Foundation (APBF).522 
Diaw and Mohamed cite that of 2014, BIMB s total assets stood at RM 27,488,204,000 with 
total equity of RM 1,519,553,000.523  It boasts a comprehensive list of more than 40 
innovative and sophisticated Islamic banking products and services, comparable to those of 
their conventional counterparts.524  BIMB has issued annual reports documenting its capital 
levels and risk weighted assets in respect of various categories of risk exposures. BIMB relies 
heavily on the Capital Adequacy standards for Islamic Banks in managing its credit, market 
and operational risks. To calculate its risk weighted assets, the Standardised Approach for 
credit and market risks is employed, while the Basic Indicator Approach is adapted to 
BIMB’s internal operations in the assessment of operational risks.  BIMB has also developed 
its own tools and internal system for measuring Value-at-Risk (VaR) to determine market 
risks.525 
These approaches do not, however, properly measure risk of default526 and there is a need for 
the IFSB to design such a measure.  The focus in VaR is clearly on downside risk and 
potential losses. Its use in banks reflects their fear of a liquidity crisis, where a low-
                                                 
 
520 formerly known as the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
521 Misman, FN and Faridah Najuna Risks Exposure In Islamic Banks: A Case Study Of Bank Islam  Malaysia Berhad 
(BIMB),  School of Economics and Finance  La Trobe University  
522 Mohamed, N_390 above.  
523  IFSB 2005, “Guiding Principles of Risk Management for Institutions (Other than Insurance Institutions) Offering only 
Islamic Financial Services”, Islamic Financial Services Board.  
524 Rahman, Dato' Ahmad Tajudin Abdul,  Workings of an Islamic bank - Case study of Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad 
Speech at the Fourth International Conference on Islamic  Economics, Banking and Finance Loughborough, United 
Kingdom August 13 - 15, 2000 
525 Mohamed, N_390 above. 
526 Hersch Shefrin, “Beyond Greed and Fear”, Harvard Business School Press, 2000. 
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probability but nevertheless catastrophic occurrence creates a loss that wipes out the capital 
and creates a client exodus.  They don’t relate to Islamic finance527 firstly because of the PLS 
method which puts part of the risk of default onto the depositor; secondly because persons 
with investments in PSIA cannot necessarily retrieve them at call, and thirdly because the 
VaR approach reflects in part the cost of capital, 528or riba in other words, a concept which is 
haram. 
Furthermore, as suggested earlier, the capital structure of BIMB, as with most banking 
institutions operating in Malaysia consists of high quality Tier 1 capital, in other words paid 
up capital, common equity and reserves. As the figures reported by Misman and Bhatti 
suggest, the Bank has retained sufficient liquidity to meet offset its on-balance and on-
balance exposures (loan growth, deposit withdrawals and other capital intensive obligations, 
in addition to development appropriate strategies for mitigating credit, market, interest rate 
and operational risks. 529 
In respect of the three exemptions permitted under Basel III (mortgage related financial 
services and equity rights, short term and deferred tax assets resulting from imbalance in 
taxation rates and common shares held in unconsolidated financial entities), BIMB has 
adopted a less permissive stance, choosing to include the above items in the list of deductible 
assets for the purposes of computing their capital ratios. The regulatory framework of BIMB 
may therefore appear more interventionist and punitive compared with that of the relevant 
banking authorities in the UK and USA. However, BIMB insists that such measures are 
necessary for maintaining the capital integrity and liquidity of the banking infrastructure, not 
least in the face of the lessons learned from the irresponsible leveraging practices adopted by 
Western banks in the run up to the financial crisis. The BNM has however sought to lessen 
the possible regulatory burdens or impacts on competition resulting from such rules by 
setting in place a transition period during which banks have opportunity to phase in 
deductions incrementally.  
                                                 
 
527 Aldohni, Abdul Karim The Legal and Regulatory Aspects of Islamic Banking: A Comparative Look at the United 
Kingdom and Malaysia, Routledge, 2011, 155. 
528 VALUE AT RISK (VAR), undated and un-named paper, Appendix 1 page 32, 
http://people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/pdfiles/papers/VAR.pdf 
529 Khan, M. and Bhatti, M. I. (2008). Development in Islamic banking: a financial risk-allocation approach.  The Journal of 
Risk Finance, 9 (1), 40-51.  
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5.4 Potential Effects of the Basel II Accord on the Islamic Financing Modes and Risk 
Exposures 
The following section considers the possible impact of risk exposure in BIMB and the extent 
to which global standards have mitigated their effects.  According to internal Bank Islam 
documents, risk management in IB is not significantly different from CB, but there are 
additional risks that are unique to IB.  BIMB manages risk in terms of “uncertain future 
events that could influence the achievement of the Bank’s objectives, including strategic, 
operational, and financial and compliance objectives”, which include unique Shari’a related 
risks.  The Committee of Basel II defines operational risks as “the risk of loss resulting from 
inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events.” 530  
5.4.1 Credit Risk at BIMB 
 
 
Unsurprisingly, credit risk is identified as the highest risk factor by BIMB. Indeed, the annual 
report of BIMB issued in 2014 indicates that credit risk constitutes the highest risk factor (i.e. 
RM 9,619892,000 over RM 11,133,458,000).531 Furthermore a breakdown of the sources of 
financing in BIMB sheds greater light on the risks associated with certain instruments and 
contracts. Interestingly, funds generated through consumer financing amounts to over two-
thirds of BIMBs total financial portfolio.532  In the Islamic context, credit risk is the most 
important in BIMB and in Islamic Finance Institutions more generally, given the dependence 
on debt financed instruments as opposed to the equity based contracts. 533  Boumediene has 
demonstrated on the basis of empirical research that the credit risk in money lent on PLS is 
less, but that nevertheless Islamic banks make losses because the lesser amount of risk is 
nevertheless managed poorly. 
The difference between both types of Banking is that the latter includes Investment tools 
fueled by Investment accounts which are managed through PLS principle. This provides a 
powerful and compliant securitization to IBs. It was demonstrated empirically, in this article, 
                                                 
 
530.  Monzer Kahf. Basel II: Implications for Islamic Banking 300 
531  BIMB 2012, 2014, Annual Report and Financial Statement 2014 Website ‘down’ but previously available at 
http://www.bankislam.com.my/en/Pages/AnnualReports.aspx?tabs=4 
532  Rahman, Dato' Ahmad Tajudin Abdul,  Workings of an Islamic bank - Case study of Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad 
Speech at the Fourth International Conference on Islamic  Economics, Banking and Finance Loughborough, United 
Kingdom August 13 - 15, 2000, 8 
533 Mohamed, N_390 above. 
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that IBs have lower credit risk than Conventional Banks. The problem of management of this 
risk by IBs is not due to shortage of risk management tools.  
Diaw and Mohamed argue that this is perhaps a consequence of the disparities found in the 
weighting of assets to liabilities in many Islamic partnership contracts. They state, “Such 
imbalances could be addressed if global standards took greater account of the liabilities side 
of Islamic contracts as presented in a bank’s balance sheet.”534 Boumediene says that credit 
risk has not been empirically measured in Malaysia, the only study up until the time of his 
paper being on the basis that the proportion of allowance for loan loss to total assets was a 
proxy for credit risk.   He argues that the devil is in the partnership contract or loan contract, 
and that where IBs study the achievability of every project with due diligence, there is less 
likely to be a credit default. He argues that in cases of PLS, portfolio diversification and 
higher returns, which are not tied to any referenced rate, will absorb any loss.535 
This assumes that there is a profit, but that is a matter of market risk more than of credit risk. 
The risk to be managed is a business risk, and as much a matter of corporate governance as of 
management of any other risk.  The following figures indicate the risk management 
procedures at BIMB, in diagrammatic form, were sourced from Bank Islam, and are included 
because of their official provenance. 
 
Figure 16: Credit risk management in Islamic banks 
 
                                                 
 
534 See diagram 9, infra, for a sample balance sheet. 
535 Boumediene, Aniss, Is Credit Risk Really Higher in Islamic Banks? Sorbonne University, August 2011, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1689885  
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Source: Bank of Islam 
 
 




Figure 17: IFSB Published Standard on Credit Risk 
 
Source: Bank of Islam 
 
Let us briefly examine the liabilities side of an Islamic bank’s balance sheet.  Ahmad and 
Pandey536 have written that, for example, a mudaraba contract is reflected on both the asset 
and liability side of the balance sheet of a bank.  On the liability side, the contract between 
the bank and the depositors is known as unrestricted Mudaraba in which the depositors agree 
that their funds to be used by the bank’s discretion, to finance an unrestricted list of profitable 
investments and expect to share the overall profits earned with the bank.   
Further, as van Greuning and Iqbal argue, 
The structure of a typical balance sheet has demand deposits and investment accounts 
from customers on the liability side and … the equivalent of conventional banks’ 
loans to customers on the asset side. This pattern reflects the nature of banks as 
intermediaries, with ratios of capital to liabilities at such a low level that their 
leverage would be unacceptable to any business outside the financial services 
industry...While the types of liabilities present in an Islamic bank’s balance sheet are 
nearly universal, their exact composition varies greatly... When compared with 
conventional banks, balance sheet risk profile of Islamic banks is different. First, the 
foremost feature of an Islamic bank is the ‘pass-through’ nature of the balance sheet. 
                                                 
 
536 Ahmad, Mareyah Mohammad and Dayanand Pandey, Are Islamic banks better immunized than Conventional banks in 
the current economic crisis? Paper delivered to the 10th Global Conference on Business & Economics, Rome, October 
15-16, 2010 
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This feature removes the typical asset- liability mismatch exposure of a conventional 
bank, as the Islamic bank’s depositors’ return is linked to the return on the assets of 
the bank. However, this feature also introduces some operational issues, such as 
estimation and accrual of ex-post returns and the treatment of intra-period withdrawal 
of deposits. 537  
Second, the nature of assets of two institutions is different. Whereas a conventional bank 
tends to stay with fixed  income very low credit risk debt securities, an Islamic bank’s assets 
are concentrated on the asset-based investments  which has credit risk but are also backed by 
a real asset. As a result, the lending capacity of the Islamic banking sector is bound by the 
availability of real assets in the economy.538  No weighting however applies with respect to 
any provision for a doubtful debt or any risk which seems more likely to eventuate than at the 
commencement of the loan or investment. 
In a concluding section, this chapter will assess the Sharí’a  compliant practice of including 
deposit shares on the liabilities sides of Islamic financial statements and its broader 
implications for the assessment and measurement of capital requirements on particular 
banking institutions.   
5.4.2 Debt Based Risks 
It is worth noting, in connection with the above discussion, that home financing in Malaysia 
is largely based on debt based modes of financing, for example financing the sale of a home. 
Indeed, debt-based financing using baybithaman are widespread and have been since the 
BIMB opened in1983.539 In turn, one risk posed to BIMB concerns the agency costs entailed 
by monitoring the high number of counterparties involved.  
BIMB adopts credit risk reduction techniques formally endorsed under Basel II, for example 
tools devised to promote risk diversification and other information related measures such as 
hedging of funds. BIMB also employs risk management techniques endorsed by the 
CAFIB.540 Its guidelines prescribe restrictions on the forms of collateral used for leveraging 
                                                 
 
537 van Greuning, N_47 above.  
538 Ahmad, Mareyah Mohammad and Dayanand Pandey, Are Islamic banks better immunized than Conventional banks in 
the current economic crisis? Paper delivered to the 10th Global Conference on Business & Economics, Rome, October 
15-16, 2010 
539 Aiza Mohd Jamil and Abdul Rahim Abdul Rahman 2007, “Efficiency of Islamic and Conventional Commercial Banks in 
Malaysia: A Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) Study” Paper presented to IIUM International Conference on Islamic 
Banking and Finance, IIUM Institute of Islamic Banking and Finance, 23-25 April 2007. 
540 BIMB 2012, 2014, Annual Report and Financial Statement 2014 Website ‘down’ but previously available at 
http://www.bankislam.com.my/en/Pages/AnnualReports.aspx?tabs=4 
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including procedures aimed at enhancing legitimate expectations, certainty and 
predictability.541 BIMB’s internal processes and systems monitor the market value of 
collateral including prudential guarantees against defaults (kafalah) which qualify for 
preferential risk weights for the purposes of determining capital adequacy thresholds,542 
weighed against the bank’s fixed or liquid assets.    
In its annual report for 2013, BIMB says, under the heading of Pillar 3: 
The management of credit risk is principally carried out by using sets of policies and 
guidelines approved by the Board Risk Committee (“BRC”), guided by the Board of 
Directors’ approved Risk Appetite Statement. The Management Risk Control 
Committee (“MRCC”) is responsible under the authority delegated by the BRC for 
managing credit risk at strategic level. The MRCC reviews the Bank’s credit risk 
frameworks and guidelines, aligns credit risk management with business strategies 
and planning, reviews credit profile of the credit portfolios and recommends 
necessary actions to ensure that the credit risk remains within established risk 
tolerance levels. The Group’s credit risk management governance includes the 
establishment of comprehensive credit risk policies, guidelines and procedures which 
document the Group’s financing standards, discretionary powers for financing 
approval, credit risk ratings methodologies and models, acceptable collaterals and 
valuation, and the review, rehabilitation and restructuring of problematic and 
delinquent financing.  
The management of credit risk is being performed by two distinct departments within 
the Risk Management Division (“RMD”).... The combined objectives are, amongst 
others:  
o To build a high quality credit portfolio in line with the Group’s overall strategy and 
risk appetite;  
o To ensure that the Bank is compensated for the risk taken, balancing/optimizing the 
risk / return relationship;  
o To develop an increasing ability to recognize, measure and avoid or mitigate 
potential credit risk problem areas;  
o To conform with statutory, regulatory and internal credit requirements.  
 
      The Group monitors its credit exposures either on a portfolio basis or individual 
basis through annual reviews. Credit risk is proactively monitored through a set of 
early warning signals that could trigger immediate reviews of (a certain part of) the 
portfolio. The affected portfolio or financing is placed on a watch list to enforce close 
                                                 
 
541 Akkizidis, N_270 above. 
542 BIMB 2012, 2014, Annual Report and Financial Statement 2014 Website ‘down’ but previously available at 
http://www.bankislam.com.my/en/Pages/AnnualReports.aspx?tabs=4 
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monitoring and prevent financing from turning impaired and to increase chances of 
full recovery.543 
5.4.3 Non-Debt Based or Equity-Based Risks 
In conformity with the firms commercial and governance objectives, both the BNM and 
BIMB have expressed their commitment to offering financial services and products that are 
fully compliant with principles of Sharí’a  law. To enhance compliance, BNM has issued the 
Guidelines on the Governance of Sharí’a Committee for the Islamic Financial Institutions 
known as the BNM/GPS1. Further, Securities Commission of Malaysia issued the 
Registration of Sharí’a Advisers Guidelines 2009 which setting up the criteria for the 
registration of a Sharí’a adviser in the capital market sector.544 
Islamic banks are authorised to accept three types of deposits: commercial investments in the 
form of restricted deposits; unrestricted deposits, and retail banking products in the form of 
deposits made in current accounts. Recourse to Sharí’a  based contracts based on murabahah, 
international murabahah and international Tawarruq were introduced into the Malaysian 
market through products offered by foreign bank such as Kuwait Finance House and al-Rajhi 
Bank set up.545 However, while there has been a slight increase in equity or non-debt based 
modes of financing as a percentage of risk weighted assets, rising from 1percent in 2009 to 
around 5 percent in 2012 such contracts represent a relatively small share of the emerging IB 
market in Malaysia.546 
The above case study can be contrasted with countries such Saudia Arabia, Qatar or Kuwait 
in which equity or non-debt based modes are more heavily relied upon in the asset profiles of 
key banking institutions. Once again, we are called upon to consider the equity of unrestricted 
deposit holders participating in profit sharing investment agreements (PSIA), namely with 
relevance to credit risk exposures faced by investing counter parties in such agreements: all 
parties, including banking institution, share losses, as well as profits, in the event that debtor 
defaults. 547This novel aspect of Islamic non-debt based remains a key issue even in states 
                                                 
 
543 2013 BIMB Annual report at p128. 
544 Zulkifli Hasan Regulatory Framework of Sharí’a Governance System in Malaysia, GCC Countries and the UK Kyoto 
Bulletin of Islamic Area Studies, 3-2 (March 2010), pp. 82–115, 83. 
545 Sundarajan, V. 2007, “Risk Characteristics of Islamic Products: Implications for Risk Measurement and Supervision” in 
Archer, S and Karim, R. A. A. 2007, “Islamic Finance: The Regulatory Challenge”, John Wiley & Son (Asia) Pte Ltd. 
Shaari A. H. and Fadhilah, A. 2001, “Rating of Malaysian Commercial Banks: A DEA Approach”, Banker’s Journal 
Malaysia, Vol. 118, pp. 5-18. 
546 Central Bank of Malaysia, 2012 Reports. 
547 Sundararajan and Errico, N_135 above. 
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such as Malaysia where, precisely because of the high risks involved in PSIA agreements, 
such modes of financing are typically less favoured than debt based modes of financing 
(where risk is lower and return probability higher).548  Boumediene argues with respect to 
these novel forms of financing: 
There are mainly two opinions on the subject. The first opinion is that: if Islamic banks 
respect the rules of Sharí’a in their contracts, “reshaped” modes of financing are not less 
Islamic than the original ones. The opposite opinion says that Ijarah and murabahah are 
not ideal modes of financing and should be utilized only when and where the original 
modes cannot be used. Moreover, “murabahah is only a device to escape from interest”.549 
Consistent with AAOIFI financial accounting statement No. 2, any funds deposited into 
customer accounts are treated as loans which the banks guarantees to lenders. Islamic banks 
are, in such mudarabah contractual arrangements,550 authorised to use these funds as they see 
fit. This has important consequences for Islamic banks with respects to the weighting of risks.  
If we consider once again that the assets and liabilities are recorded on the balance sheet 
under disclosure guidelines, and for the purposes of assessing capital adequacy ratios, the 
natural conclusion one can draw accordingly is that such discretionary uses and investment of 
unrestricted deposits should be treated as eligible common equity as held by shareholders (as 
defined by Basel III). This is especially the case since primary research collated from a 
sample study of 7 banks has indicated that a proportion of funds taken from unrestricted 
deposits used to finance mudarabah contract are often left untouched for periods (and, 
therefore, not reinvested into relevant projects and initiatives. Certain legal questions 
implicating issues of contractual fairness, equity and unjust enrichment are raised 
correspondingly: should depositors be held liable for responsible for any breaches of contract, 
including default on payments or non-performance of the terms of a contract, even in such 
periods when a percentage of those unrestricted deposits are not being used as a mode of 
financing.  
The writer believes this to be an inefficient form of financing because of the risks, but 
believes that these can be managed by regulatory intervention, and draws conclusions for his 
target country of Saudi Arabia in Chapter 7. 
                                                 
 
548 Ibid. 
549 Boumediene, Aniss, Is Credit Risk Really Higher in Islamic Banks? Sorbonne University, August 2011, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1689885  
550 See Chapter 4.6.5. 
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Despite this inefficiency, then the corresponding percentage of idle funds held in common 
equity should not be taken into account when considering how to assess and assign risk 
(between credit risk distributions relating to two types of common equity: equity in use and 
idle equity). On previous instances, and in accordance with the spirit of altruism and 
principles of equity and fair distribution of profits and losses which is assumed to be at the 
core of Shari’a law and Islamic finance, shareholders and banking management have 
demonstrated a willingness to relieve the owners of unrestricted deposit accounts of any 
liabilities arising from default and non-performance of debtors and contractual parties 
financed through PSIAs.551 Yet, such discretionary practices may have significant 
consequences, undermining the legitimate expectation of loss bearing parties, include 
investment equity holders, as well as the stability and profitability of the IB system as a 
whole. To counteract such risks, banking institutions would be required to absorb greater 
losses. In turn, credit risk would be distributed more equally among equity shareholders and 
equity investor counterparties. More equitable distribution of credit risk is normatively 
demanded by the mere fact that PSIA agreements funded by unrestricted deposits are, under 
AAOFI codes, subject to mandatory reporting requirements: any losses and profits obtained 
from these agreements should be reflected in an IB’s accounting and auditing statements, 
owing to the power as an agent (wakalah) invested in that bank to use, invest and redistribute 
such funds at its own discretion. One can logically extrapolate from this requirement that the 
authority to use such assets should be matched by equal and proportionate claims (liabilities) 
on that bank.552   
 
To the extent that due diligence has identified which projects will produce better profits under 
PLS, this form of investment of depositors’ funds is superior to CB because it is likely to 
produce a higher return.  The growth of the value of EPF (pension fund) earnings which are 
Shari’a compliant, which was discussed earlier in this chapter, is evidence of the fact that 
Islamic financing instruments, once poorly performing counterparties are excluded, are at 
least as profitable as conventional instruments subject to equal levels of diligence and 
management.  
                                                 
 
551 Harzi, N_387 above; Archer, S. and Karim, R. A. A. 2007,“Islamic Finance: The Regulatory Challenge”, John Wiley & 
Son (Asia) Pte Ltd. 
552 BIMB 2012, 2014, Annual Report and Financial Statement 2014 Website ‘down’ but previously available at 
http://www.bankislam.com.my/en/Pages/AnnualReports.aspx?tabs=4; Mohamed, N_390 above. 
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5.4.4 Operational Risks 
 
At this juncture, it is worth considering other risks to which Islamic banks are subject. Of the 
risk factors identified by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, operational risk 
exposures take second place behind credit risk. Indeed, based on BIMB’s 2013 annual report 
operational risks are represented as a risk quotient of percent as a proportion of its risks 
weighted assets. This figure has changed from 11 percent in 2009 to less than 8.3 percent in 
2013.553 
BIMB employs the IFSB standardised basic indicator approach for the purposes of 
identifying and calculating minimum capital requirements to offset and manage operational 
risk exposures. Operational Risk capital charge is calculated using the BIA as per BNM 
CAFIB Guideline, which implements the Basel III capital structure with effect 1 January 
2013 The BIA for operational risk capital charge calculation applies an alpha (15%) to the 
average of positive gross income that was achieved over the previous three years by the 
Group. The RWA amount is computed by multiplying the minimum capital required with a 
multiplier of 12.5 (reciprocal of 8%).554 
Sources of operational risk can be endogenous to a company, and result from 
mismanagement by individuals or by internal shifts (collective labour action and so on) or as 
consequence of failures in process or systems. Equally, they may arise from externalities 
including government action, force majeure, social upheaval or shifts in macro-economic 
policy making and planning. As in most banks, the risk management department at BIMB is 
responsible for identifying and developing responses to such risks, where such risks can be 
anticipated (external pressures on a bank which due to their unpredictable and uncontrollable 
causes and effects cannot be managed as well as internal risks, if they can at all.)  BIMB is 
also responsible for evaluating the risk culture, including the spending and saving trends of 
its customer, with the aim of mitigating and preventing excessive or irresponsible consumer 
banking and banking policies.555 
                                                 
 
553 Ibid. 
554 2013 BIMB Annual Report, Financial Statements, 110. 
555 Risk Management, presentation by Thijs, Jeroen P.M.M. Chief Risk Officer Chief Risk Officer BIMB, undated. 
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5.4.5 Market Risk at BIMB 
As per the figures published by BIMB, its market risk exposure have remained low even at 
the pick of the crisis, standing at around 3 percent at 2009, which as a nominal sum of its 
total risk weighted assets is estimated to be worth around RM 297,754,000. In the intervening 
years this figure has risen only slightly. By 2014, the percentage of market risk as a portion of 
RWA counts for per cent.556  
Accordingly, BIMB  has in its own risk management guidelines, as indicated in its 2009 and 
2014 annual reports, highlighted 6 factors of market risk, including: Rate of return or profit 
risk, equity investment risks, interest and foreign exchange related risks, displaced 
commercial risks, trading book risks, and liquidity risks.557 
Prima facie, given that Islamic banks are largely prevented from trading on secondary 
markets, including trading of commodities on the stock market, such risks (for example 
volatility in market prices, or excessive leveraging) appear to be fairly trivial and minor in 
Islamic financing arrangements, compared with conventional banking. Nor do their financial 
positions tend to include short term securities. Indeed, Islamic banks have a relatively limited 
market share in the trade of short term securities and secondary exchange markets, not least 
because once such stock is purchased, it is then typically converted from ‘temporary’ assets 
to debts on sale and transfer to a third party for deferred or instant payment. 
However, such risks could present future challenges, if not contained and well managed. 
Indeed, Malaysian banks, as with the Islamic finance sector as a whole, are not immune to 
sudden shocks or other macro-economic pressures affecting their institutional liquidity and 
funding capacity. As the Islamic markets grow in size and maturity, Sharí’a compliant 
institutions may be exposed to new and particular risks. One relevant factor is that while 
conventional banks have access to a number of derivative instruments and management 
techniques which enable them to hedge themselves against market and credit risks, Islamic 
banks do not have access to risk hedging strategies in part owing to judgments on the 
(ill)egality of such instrument as issued by Islamic scholars and Sharí’a compliance.558  I 
                                                 
 
556 BIMB 2012, 2014, Annual Report and Financial Statement 2014 Website ‘down’ but previously available at 
http://www.bankislam.com.my/en/Pages/AnnualReports.aspx?tabs=4 
557 Ibid. 
558 Fathiyah, N_468 above; Archer, N_256 above. 
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have noted the contrary opinion of Boumediene559 as to Shari’a compliance of these 
instruments earlier in this chapter, and suggest, as I will argue in respect of my 
recommendations for KSA in chapter 7, that the matter is one of Shari’a standardisation. 
5.4.6 Trading Book Risks 
 
A second set of market and credit related risks of importance for Islamic banks concerns what 
the Basel III framework has labelled trading book risks.560 Prima facie, given that Islamic 
banks are largely prevented from trading on secondary markets, including trading of 
commodities on the stock market, such risks (volatility in market prices, excessive leveraging 
etc.) appear to be fairly trivial and minor in Islamic financing arrangements, where short-
selling is haram,561 compared with conventional banking. Nor do their financial positions 
tend to include short term securities. Indeed, Islamic banks have a relatively limited market 
share in the trade of short term securities and secondary exchange markets, not least because 
once such stock is purchased, it is then typically converted from ‘temporary’ assets to debts 
on sale and transfer to a third party for deferred or instant payment.562  Nonetheless, 
Malaysian Islamic banks such as BIMB offers products and hold assets with unique elements 
and risks.563 These include investments in forms of real estate which are typically sold in 
property markets,564 long term investments in the development of business and public sector 
enterprises and investments in sister companies.565  For example, in 2013, according to the 
BIMB annual report, the amount of financial assets available-for-sale were RM 12.4 billion 
and financial assets held-for-trading were RM 1.2 billion. 
Although some of the more novel investments566 such as investments in subsidiary and 
associate companies can be accommodated under the Basel framework on risk-weighted 
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assets for market risk in the trading book,567 they often possess features which are distinct 
from the kind of investments envisioned by the Committee.568 Other types of investments e.g. 
sukuk securities (the Islamic equivalent of fixed bonds) may appear to be rather unfamiliar to 
conventional financial markets,569 and consequently are not typically recognised as trading 
book assets in the conventional sense as formalised under Basel. Yet, while the weight of 
these risks are qualitatively lower that the exposures associated with the exchange markets,570 
they do create trading books risks for Islamic banks which are higher than associated with 
short run securities.571  
In Ijarah-based leasing agreements, to take another example, future claims are made on 
lessees for the provision of future rental payments (by Islamic banks). Accordingly, as 
governed under Standard 8 of the AAOIFI, leased assets are treated as equivalent to fixed-
assets and are, accordingly, made subject to the regulatory requirements applicable to assets 
acquired through investment. However, such contracts ought to be treated novel in so far as 
they create claims on, both, the part of the lessee and or purchaser.572  This is because a 
distinction is made under Islamic law between lease agreements which are still in effect and 
those which are concluded with a transfer of ownership. Ownership, according to AAOIFI, 
take effect at the end of a lease, period usually through sale of that property for its nominal or 
non-nominal value. However, if sold during while the lease contract is in effect, the price to 
be obtained for that asset is, under Islamic law, to be no more than the sum value of aggregate 
rental instalments. 573 Such an arrangement may prove inequitable to the leasing parties: the 
ceiling placed on the proceeds generated from sale of a rental agreement still-in-effect may 
not, for instance, reflect the value on maturity of the rented asset, as well as any losses 
incurred by the lessor upon sale of that asset for below market value.   
In the ending-with-ownership Ijarah, by way of contrast, the lessor assumes liability for the 
asset including through payment of insurance premiums and so forth which have the effect of 
restricting any future claims made by a lessor on the lessee (insurance or supportive 
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maintenance costs and so forth). Such modes of financing and the potential imbalances they 
create on the claims of counterparties cannot be detailed at any length here, but a good 
diagrammatic representation can be found prepared by the Public Bank of Malaysia. 574The 
above analysis simply intends to illustrate the rather novel credit risks associated with the 
claims and receivables which result from Islamic modes of financing. Such risks may be 
mitigated through collateral and other risk hedging related mechanisms as found in 
conventional banking systems, and outlined under the Basel II proposals. However, some 
challenges remain.  
One challenge is that while the AAOIFI Standard differentiates between a binding promise to 
take ownership, known as the concept of Wa’ab, and, on the other hand, a non-binding 
promise, it offers little guidance on how such promises are to be recorded in the balance 
sheets of a bank.575  Rather, such transactions are generally accounted for in off balance sheet 
transactions. This creates possible inequities between two types of contract. In the case of the 
‘in operation’ ijarah contract, the commitment to purchase is binding on the lessee regardless 
of the quality of the leased asset on maturity.  
A second challenge raises broader issues. The above discussion does not yet address how the 
rebalancing of credit risks in the above discussed types of Islamic contract should be assessed 
for risk. In other words to what extent can Basel III approved risk methodologies for 
measuring and calculating capital to risk requirements be applied to the above Islamic 
instruments in the context of Islamic banks, as distinct from the risk parameters applied in 
conventional banking systems. Were risks being uniformly managed well, one might  
conceivably argue that the minimum shareholder equity requirement as assessed under CET1 
under Basel III should be modified, with lower RWA thresholds established for Islamic banks 
than would apply to conventional banks under the existing framework.   This would reflect 
the specificities of Islamic contract in which the usual parity between liabilities as claims 
made on the bank and the minimum capital held by that bank as a percentage of it risk 
weighed assets is made more complex by a third component not reflected in traditional 
accounting practices (namely the binary assets-liabilities trade off normally accounted for in 
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the conventional bank’s balance sheet): the owners of or investors in unrestricted deposits 
who bear sole liability for losses in the event of default.   
Two comments spring to mind: PLS schemes are riskier for the depositor, because deposits or 
investments can be lost.  Therefore, there ought to be less need for a capital reserve in respect 
of such deposits. However, the existence of capital reserves may mean that there is less risk 
of deposits being lost. Secondly, as I will demonstrate in Chapter 6, the losses made at IBB 
even with Basel capital limits indicate that the RWA thresholds may well have seemed 
overcautious at BIMB but that this relates more to internal factors than the nature of Islamic 
finance as a whole. 
The IFSB regulatory framework has, arguably, failed to fully account for the indirectly 
discriminatory application of capital measurement and risk weighting techniques in 
connection with these more sui generis categories of trading book related assets. Indeed, to 
address these imbalances, the disclosure and minimal capital ratios rules formalised under BF 
Pillar 1 would require significant modification and reform. In turn, such modifications would 
accordingly be reflected in IFSB capital measurement guidelines and best practices. Such 
reforms are needed not least of all because primary research taken from 7 banks, over various 
periods dating back to 2002, has indicated that trading book and quasi trading investments 
account for between 5% to 26.3%  of those institutions’ total assets. 576 
 
To address such deficiencies, standard setting bodies such as the IFSB as well as nominated 
supervisory authorities including the BNM in Malaysia are, as argued by Abdou Diaw and 
Mohamed, only as effective as their capacity to reflect the high risk exposures inherent in 
profit sharing investments, particularly the fair credit distribution of financing modes based 
on unrestricted deposits.577 Moreover, a number of these Shari’a compliant modes of 
financing are entirely neglected under the existing international banking regulatory regime.  
By setting qualitative benchmarks which exerts an increasingly powerful ‘compliance pull’ 
on OECD contracting members and non-members alike, the Basel standards may generate 
potentially anti-competitive or discriminatory effects for Islamic institutions (and developing 
nations) relative to conventional banks. Indeed, to the extent that they are treated as 
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equivalent (on a ‘like for like’ basis) to counterpart trading book assets, such investments are 
subject to regulated  risk weighting parameters in the margin of 150%-350%.  However, 
given the competitive environment in which BIMB finds itself, compliance is, it is submitted, 
a point which attracts custom from those who would otherwise see the apparently less risky 
conventional banks, owned by ethnic Chinese, as more profitable or safer than Shari’a 
compliant banks such as BIMB. 
5.4.7 Shari’a Compliance Risks 
 
As discussed above, it is uncommon for IB institutions to trade or hold assets in derivatives 
and other secondary markets, given the injunction on such forms under Shari’a principles.  
Given the haram on Riba, the payment and receipt on interest, traditional debt markets cannot 
flourish in Muslim majority states. Under Islamic law, money and monetisable assets must be 
traded at par value and cannot, therefore,  cannot form the basis of any secondary exchange 
arrangement where debt or the leveraging and financing of debt is traded for the purpose of 
acquiring profit.  As such, the rescheduling of debt for the purposes of profit accrued through 
interest is not permitted in Islamic markets owing to the prohibition on interest.  By 
extension, debt financed instruments such as interest rate swaps or conventional derivative 
markets such as credit derivatives and detachable options are forbidden under principles of 
Islamic law.578  Accordingly, established Islamic financial contracts such as Murabaha and 
Istisna’ cannot be traded in or leveraged as  secondary markets as securitized instruments but 
only as principal contracts which involve the exchange of money between lender and 
borrower. 579 
Derivative markets have been contentious therefore due to concerns that they contravene 
religious injunctions on interests, gambling and undue risk taking. While the creation of 
derivative based products for the purposes or speculating or increasing returns continues to be 
prohibited, in recent years the opposition to derivative based instruments has softened, and 
financial entities operating in Malaysia as elsewhere have utilised Islamic derivatives --- 
including sukuk markets and credit default swaps--- as a means of hedging against currency 
related shifts and shocks, credit exposures, and interest rate fluctuations. This follows the 
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creation of the Islamic International Financial Markets organization as a joint enterprise of 
authorities of Brunei, Indonesia, Bahrain, Sudan, and Malaysia. And Pakistan, with the aim 
of the standardisation of Islamic financial products, documentation and related processes at 
the global level.  
IIFM claims to have achieved Sharī`a harmonization through the functioning of an 
international Sharī`a Advisory Panel, which has permitted the enabling of two documentary 
structures concerning derivatives: 
(a)  Master Agreement for Treasury Placement (MATP) (2008); and   
(b)  International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA)/IIFM Mubādalah al-Arba`ah 
(profit rate swap) product standard (2012), which is to be used for Islamic hedging purposes.  
(c)  The ISDA/IIFM Mubādalah al-Arba`ah, which is a consequent aspect of the ISDA/IIFM 
Tahawwut (Hedging) Master Agreement introduced in 2010, is an agreement to exchange 
profit rates between a Mu`addal Ribh Thābit (fixed rate) party and Mu`addal Ribh 
Mutaghayyar (floating rate) party.580 
BIMB, for instance, holds some derivative based instruments or Tahawwut including profit 
rate swap and forwards in its asset profile as a means of hedging various market related 
risks.581  It is no surprise that the establishment of these Islamic derivatives by the IIFM 
coincided with three interesting developments in the field of Islamic world finance:   
i. International Sharí’a  Research Academy for Islamic Finance in 2008; 
ii. Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) in 2002; and  
iii. Labuan Offshore Financial Services Authority, also in 2002. 
Othman sees these three events as part of the Malaysian government push to establish the 
country as a world Centre of Islamic finance;582 clearly having established pre-eminence in 
Shari’a scholarship through the research academy, Malaysia will be able to implement 
Shari’a-compliant reforms which will entrench its dominance of a competitive market. 
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The design and application derivative financial instruments in the IB context are founded 
upon distinct rationales and principles, at odds with the risk transferring rationale of its 
conventional counterparts. The fledgling market in Islamic derivative based produced are 
rooted in concept of wa’ad as a means of managing market risk factors. Indeed, Islamic 
capital markets bodies such as the International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM) and the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) have been engaged in efforts to 
develop uniform standards and guidelines on the use and development of derivative 
instruments that comply with Shari’a. The standards issued by the ISDA were consolidated in 
the “Tahawwut Master Agreement ”; an instrument which is gaining greater recognition and 
adoption by Islamic banks. Many of the principles on which Tahawwut is based closely 
resemble the standardised rules and procedures which govern derivative markets in 
conventional banking.583 
The Tahawwut system has proven controversial, as are many laws of shari’a concerning 
finance. 584 Hasan writes that some Shari’a scholars are reluctant about full harmonization of 
Shari’a standards because it offends the fundamental premise of Ijtihad, the process of 
deducting Shari’a rules from their authentic sources. If rules become standard, and imposed 
by secular legal authorities, then Ijtihad can no longer be applied, which over time damages 
the very reason why Shari’a can be applied in all circumstances, times and places.  The trick 
is, apparently, to impose the rules only through Islamic sources, rather than secular ones, and 
to make them subject to review, again by religious authorities. 
It follows that until the issue of standardisation is dealt with, this wider service offering will 
always lack the credibility it needs in order to attract and retain its core market, despite the 
need for growth and, as a consequence, developing new halal products.585 With just one 
contract there are different accounting, reporting and disclosure rules laid out by IFRS (i.e 
conventional accounting), National Syariah Advisory Council (SAC) of Malaysia and 
AAOIFI. Islamic banks in Britain and Europe adhere to IFRS, Islamic banks in the Gulf 
region usually follow AAOIFI and in East Asia they follow SAC rules. 
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In the Malaysian context, greater conformity with standards outlined in the new Shari’a 
compliant master agreement may therefore serve to enhance the attractiveness of Islamic 
states and markets for CBs that might otherwise be reluctant to offer Islamic products or 
establish subsidiaries in Islamic host countries. Islamic banks operating across borders ---
including KSA’s Al Rajhi Bank which operates in Malaysia --- have also taken measures to 
hedge more of their risk through for instance currency hedging and through the introduction 
of risk management techniques which aim to mitigate the effects of credit exposures and 
interest rate movements. In turn, greater confidence in the risk hedging capacity of both IBs 
and CBs such as HSBC that operate in these markets, contributes to the overall stability of 
the Shari’a compliant market as whole.586 Such developments are welcomed precisely due to 
the growth of IBs in Malaysia as elsewhere even in the aftermath of the financial crisis. 
Likewise, the growing Malaysian market in Sukuk securities adheres to Sharí’a principles 
through the gifting of a tangible asset in the investment, for instance the partial ownership of 
a property built by the investment company to the bond owner. The bond owner is then able 
to collect his profit as a rent, without breaching the Islamic injunction on interest. However, 
many scholars have questioned whether the structure of sukuk markets do not share more in 
common with conventional bond markets since investors will tend to receive guaranteed 
return in the form of a fixed percentage of the principal at maturity, based on interest rates. 
The existence of guaranteed returns or the invariability of repurchase obligations imposed on 
the issuer appear to be at odds with Shari’a restrictions.  This is, apparently, a matter of 
pragmatism.587  With respect to AAOIFI-FAS 17, Sukor, Muhamad and Gunawa comment: 
The examination of AAOIFI FAS 17 shows that AAOIFI has been pragmatic in its 
approach by considering the requirements to fulfil the need for a codified Islamic 
accounting standard and the need for Islamic accounting …concepts… to be 
developed based on Shari’a requirements.588 
5.4.8 Liquidity Risks 
Like CB systems, Malaysian banks such as BIMB have adopted a range of liquidity 
management strategies, including diversification of its deposit base and through lengthening 
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maturity on its deposits.589  The Malaysian IB sector, and other cross border subsidiaries or 
Islamic arms of companies operating within its boundaries, have benefited significantly from 
the high liquidity levels of the Islamic interbank money market. It has raised capital though 
its investments in a spectrum of liquid (trading book) assets including Islamic commercial 
papers, treasury bills, negotiable instruments as well as mutually assured Islamic bank 
acceptances.  
 
BIMB is required to implement conservation buffer and countercyclical buffers in accordance 
with Basel III. BIMB has determined, in line with its own qualitative systemic risk exposure 
assessments, the scope and operation of its countercyclical buffer based on its domestic credit 
growth and leveraging indicators. As it stands, BIMB has instituted capital buffer thresholds 
of 7 percent. If the capital held in its reserves falls below this level, BIMB is required to 
restore this level until the ratio of 7% is respected (4.5% + 2.5%).590 However, questions 
remains as to whether the computation of theses buffers under Basel II is adequately adapted 
to the regularities of IB, specifically the availability of profit sharing investment accounts.  
At first glance, Islamic banks such as BIMB are less exposed to rate of return exposures, 
including risks associated with variations in exchange and interest rate, principally because 
interest is forbidden under IB. However, IBs may be exposed to such risks indirectly through 
the competitive advantaged gain by CBs in Malaysia through appreciation in the interest 
collected and, correlatively, favourable rate of returns.591  Factors of anti-competitiveness are 
assessed on an ongoing basis by the BIMB including through a daily assessment of 
international rate of return indicators such as the Based Finance rates. Thus, Islamic banks are 
able to assess the relative strengths of their lending and finance rates, as well as those offered 
by parallel CBs operating in Malaysia.592  
Nonetheless, some challenges of note remain. Importantly, the asset structure of Islamic 
banks which display key differences from conventional banking financial statements and 
balance books. One can refer to the risk-return profile of deposit account on the liabilities 
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side of certain equity or non-debt based financing modes of IB systems.593  Profit sharing 
investment agreements (PISA) are or should be treated as or equivalent to common equity 
because they are not, strictly speaking, a liability: the bank is not responsible to the depositor 
for the capital and there is no guarantee of it, absent an insurance scheme as canvassed earlier 
in this chapter. Accordingly, unrestricted deposits owned by equity holders should be treated 
as distinct from the debt based products provided by mainstream banks. 
The next figure shows a stylized Islamic Bank balance sheet.594   
Figure 18: An Islamic bank balance sheet 
 
 
5.4.9 Compliance Risks  
BIMB’s published material shows that it has both the necessary knowledge capacity and 
information management system to assess market trends and volatility.595 Further its internal 
structure helps it better comply with the Tier I and Tier II capital reserves of Basel:  
According to Harzi, the financial structure of an Islamic bank is essentially compounded of 
Tier 1 Capital (bank’s own capital). Having some Tier 2 in the capital of Islamic banks is 
very rare as in general it is capital or hybrid capital linked to the payment of interest. And 
when it is the case, tier 2 capital is restricted to 50% of the total of tier1+tier 2 capital.  He 
continues: 
So, when the redefinition of the capital has a quite important impact on [CBs…], it is 
not the case for [IBs…] because their capital is essentially compounded of common 
equity…On this point, Basel III clearly has a positive impact in terms of 
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competitively for the Islamic banks, as the conventional banks will see their capital… 
decreased by a larger share than the Islamic banks, hence the former will then 
experience higher costs of compliance than the latter. The same phenomenon is likely 
to happen for Tier 2 ratios of CBs: a strong decrease because of the new regulation. 
Meanwhile, the Islamic banks will still have a total capital ratio (Tier 1 + Tier 2) 
approximately equal to their Tier 1 ratio.596  
In this light, the requirement under Basel III for a capital reserve equivalent to 8% of the 
funds held in PLS accounts, which are not seen under Basel as being equity accounts, puts 
additional compliance costs on IBs.  That said, however, if the cost is met there is no 
additional risk.  
5.5 Analysis 
The unique features of Islamic contracts may go some way towards explaining its growing 
appeal for non-Muslim consumers and investors, as well as its more traditional customers in 
Muslim communities.  
On the other hand, such contracts face additional risks and externalities compared with 
traditional banking instruments. Consumer financing represents more than 66% of the total 
financing portfolio. This creates additional challenges in connection with monitoring of 
counterparties. Non debt-based modes of financing mudarabah carry high levels of risk since 
neither the capital (provided by participating investors) nor the profit (in transactions and 
projects financed by pooled resources) is guaranteed.597  In other agreements profits accrued 
by participants to profit sharing arrangements are agreed in advance in accordance with a pre-
agreed profit-to-capital deposit ratio. In such contracts, any loss that cannot be attributed to 
negligence on unlawful act is assumed by equity holding investors. Such arrangements, 
which are unique to Islamic finance, may ironically facilitate unequal bargaining relations 
and inequity, particularly in cases of asymmetrical information.  Whilst Mujtaba suggests that 
“Ghārār can be eliminated by having complete disclosure of all informational elements in the 
deal and when a seller clearly states the purpose or object of the sale along with the price”598 
there has been little comment about the need for buyers to disclose of all informational 
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elements in the deal – such as, for retail consumers, health issues or impending job losses, 
birth of extra children or the impending need to care for elderly parents.   
So whilst PSIAs can be likened to equity agreements, investors in Islamic partnership 
agreements do not enjoy the same rights and privileges as they would in non-IB systems. This 
is, in addition to the information asymmetry, a consequence of the disparities found in the 
weighting of assets to liabilities in many Islamic partnership contracts, itself a broader 
reflection of asymmetries in credit risk distributions among shareholder investors, deposit 
owners and third party equity investors.  
Other regulatory deficiencies extend to risk weighting on the assets side of the balance sheet. 
For example, the IFSB standard on capital requirements on equity based agreements sets a 
threshold risk-weight of 400% (equivalent to a capital charge of 32%) for risk exposures.599 
Such capital charges are prohibitively high compared with other financing instruments and 
thus discourage banks from offering such services. For such reforms to be made, significant 
changes would have to occur in the Islamic business environment and in the attitudes of 
consumers and commercial actors more generally. Indeed, the above risk complications offer 
some insight into the reasons why 95%of the assets managed by Malaysian IFIs are financed 
through debt instruments and Islamic contracts, in comparison with the relative low 
percentage of equity based financing. Banks have proven reluctant to enter into equity like 
partnership contracts on the asset side, precisely because of the high risk of credit default 
involved in mudarabah and musharakah. Rather, they favour debt financing precisely 
because, like CBs, they can make such investments in the knowledge that they can anticipate 
relatively secure profit gains from leveraging.  
These risk complications, as suggested earlier, are not adequately addressed by the Basel III 
accords. It is for this reason that greater attention should be given to regional and context 
standards issued by the IFSB which have been elaborated specifically with such risks in 
mind.)  Moreover, greater consideration should be given to the extent to which such standards 
complement or conflict with the Basel II accords. Remaining challenges concern the lack of 
experts in Malaysia with knowledge and capacity to fully interpret and implement Basel III 
related regulatory requirements or assess complex market trends (e.g. volatility and price 
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fluctuations). Basel II tends to work to the advantage of larger banking institutions who are 
able to fully implement the accords and its risk measurement criteria, thus enabling them to 
qualify for lower capital charges (meaning that they are able to benefit from less stringent 
capital reserve limits). 
5.6 Summary 
In this chapter, we showed the growth in the Malaysian sukuk securities market adheres to  
Sharia principles by way of structures whereby there is a gifting of a tangible asset in the 
investment.  We also showed that Islamic banks are able to access the relative strengths of 
their lending and finance rate as well as those offered by parallel conventional banks 
operating in Malaysia.  In order to understand how these product offerings can come into 
being from a business perspective, we highlighted the style of Islamic banking balance 
sheets.  In addition, we discussed the unique features of Islamic contracts that may go some 
way towards explaining its growing appeal non-Muslim consumers and investors. Their 
appeal to non-Muslim consumers and investors comes not only from a differentiation in 
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Chapter 6: CASE STUDY UK: THE ISLAMIC BANK OF BRITAIN 
 
In this chapter, I will firstly review some of the literature which has been produced in recent 
times and which concerns the fact that, supposedly, the Islamic Bank of Britain fared better 
during the recent financial crisis then did CBs. I will demonstrate that because the time that 
the Islamic bank was incorporated and registered was lighter than the time most sub-prime 
mortgages were advanced in Britain meant that it is an historical accident only that the IBB 
was not affected by the sub-prime crisis. I will then point to the Dubai property bubble to 
prove that the IBB could have been affected by the sub-prime crisis, had it not been 
constrained by FSA lending guidelines and its own marketing program.  I will show that 
despite its exposure to sub-prime mortgages, IBB suffered significant losses and failed to 
engage the confidence of the Muslim community, possibly but not necessarily as cause and 
effect. 
This study will take a different path to that in the preceding chapter – it will attempt to use 
what we know about IB in Malaysia to fill in what we do not know about IB in the UK, so as 
provide lessons which might be drawn to inform the choices which ought be made by bankers 
and regulators in KSA. The knowledge in this chapter and the next chapter will be formed 
through perceiving relationships between the observed phenomena in IBB as viewed against 
the context of Malaysian practice, and by exploring the phenomena of IBB practice in 
relation to other similar kinds of phenomena as demonstrated in the Malaysian case study in 
chapter 5. 
6.1 The Establishment of Islamic Finance in the United Kingdom 
Former Governor of the Bank of England, Lord George chaired a working group to 
investigate obstacles to the establishment of an Islamic finance industry in England in 
2001.600 Since then, the UK and its capital, London, has, according to the magazine, Islamic 
banking, become the European hub for the Islamic finance.601  The UK has proven to be a 
flourishing and profitable investment market, growing at an average annual rate of 68.1% 
between 2001 and 2005.602   It now boasts some of the best education in the area of IB in the 
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world, and was an early European example of accommodation of Islamic practices which 
prohibit riba.  In England, this meant changes to legislation covering capital gains tax, value 
added tax, some capital allowance tax and stamp duty on land transfers603. The UK now 
boasts a secretariat in an Islamic finance and a task force in Islamic finance, the latter led by a 
Minister.604 
As a result of the legislative changes, the market for Islamic financial services group swiftly, 
with Islamic windows being opened in several British banks, together with the opening of 
Britain’s first fully fledged Islamic bank, set up with its major shareholders being leading 
Middle Eastern banks.  The UK had four wholesale Islamic investment banks by 2013, and a 
Shari’a compliant mutual fund was first formed to invest in the London metals exchange in 
1997.  The growth was said to even be a means to solve the problem of the financial 
exclusion of Muslims in the UK605  
However, things have not gone necessarily according to plan, with HSBC closing its Islamic 
window in 2012606 and with IBB Al Rayan having consolidated losses of approximately 25% 
of total depositor funds by the end of 2009.   So whilst, by 2013, it was fair to say that 716 
Islamic financial institutions in the world made over 13.1 billion US dollars in profits, it 
would appear that the retail sector of IB in the UK is not part of that picture.  In 2014, The 
Economist reported on September 13, 2014, that the total value of all sharia-compliant assets 
including sovereign sukuk was approximately $2 trillion.  I investigate the apparent failure of 
the IBB in particular to live up to the standards set by Islamic financial institutions in 
Malaysia in this chapter.  
In discussing the advancement of the IBB, the political will of the UK government as a factor 
for progressive development should be discussed. For instance, as the UK grows as a 
financial hub for Islamic finance, it is imperative that the IBB finds a way to enhance the 
symbiotic relationship between Islamic methods of finance and conventional banking 
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structures. For instance, in 2013, David Cameron once noted that “[he wanted] London to 
stand alongside Dubai and Kuala Lumpur as one of the great capitals of Islamic finance 
anywhere in the world.”607 The political will to want Islamic finance models to co-exist with 
conventional banking standards is a strong one, as there are implications that could affect the 
relationship (financial and otherwise) between Britain and many Islamic nations. Despite the 
fact that HSBC closed its Islamic window in 2012 and there have been major losses from 
2008-2012, it is clear that there is an imperative to want the IBB and other similar models to 
do well, despite low uptake and low levels of confidence displayed by some investors and 
Muslim bankers. 
A comparative time-line between what is happening in the relevant UK housing, banking and 
regulatory spheres with what is happening within the IBB suggests the contrary and is most 
conveniently shown in the form of a table rather than as a narrative. 
 
Table 3: Timeline of events concerning the Islamic Bank of Britain, 2002 – 2014. 
Year Event- outside IBB Event – IBB 
2002 Sub-prime lending commences in large 
volumes in Britain. Property boom 
continues unabated.  
 
2003 Amendments to Stamp Duty Land Tax 
legislation allow Islamic mortgages 
without adverse tax implications to 
individuals. 
 
2004 Property boom continues with many 
properties sold in order to leverage into 
more, or more expensive, properties. 
In August IBB, formerly a private 
financial house owned in part by the Abu 
Dhabi Islamic Bank granted banking 
licence in UK. 
2005 Defaults commence across UK housing IBB Starts with two branches in 2005.  
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market as interest rates begin to rise. 
According an HSBC case study, the 
Muslim families in the UK have taken 
out 134,000 conventional mortgages 
worth GBP 9 billion.   
The SDLT provisions were extended   
to   equity   sharing   arrangements.   
Government   legislated   for   
Murabaha   instruments   as   a   
purchase   and   resale   arrangement. 
Marketing strategy is to appeal to 
Muslims, not to the general public, and 
to offer Shari’a compliant lines. 
Therefore repayment rates are fixed and 
not variable, and deposits tend to be 
higher because of the partnership 
principle. Initially the bank had only two 
branches; one in Birmingham and 
another in London, but in the last five 
years the network of branches has 
expanded and now (in 2009) there are 
eight branches in the major cities where 
the Muslim community has a 
considerable segment of population. In 
London there are four, two in 
Birmingham, one in Leicester and one in 
Manchester. In the annual report of 2008 
of the IBB, the statement of the chairman 
indicates that the bank has shown a 
steady growth in the year and generated 
more income and profits and loss 
decreased up to 15%. IBB mortgages are 
on fixed repayment schedules and not 
affected by default. However, persons 
whose interest rates with conventional 
banks are fixed do not suffer from 
increases in repayments. 
2006 Government legislated for diminishing 
Musharaka or diminishing shared 
ownership for property  or  asset  
financing  arrangements.   SDLT relief 
extended to corporate entities. 
Between the years ending 31 December 
2005 to 31 December 2006, there was a 
120% rise in customer number at IBB 
and the bank’s customer deposits grew 
by 76% to GBP 83.9 million from GBP 
47.7 million. In addition, the bank 
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opened two new branches in 2006, 
reaching a total of eight across the UK. 
2007 Sub-prime crisis reaches new heights.  
On 9 August 2007 bad news from 
French bank BNP Paribas triggered 
sharp rise in the cost of credit, and 
made the financial world realise how 
serious the situation was. At the height 
of the property market in 2007, sub-
prime mortgages – frequently granted 
to people with little proof of income or 
ability to repay – made up more than 
7% of the UK loans market.  The UK 
stock market goes through a period of 
volatility. Banks begin to stop lending 
to each other due to market fears over 
exposure to potential losses on high-
risk US mortgages. 
IBB has not purchased any CDOs and is 
therefore not affected by any reduction in 
the value of its portfolio. IBB is 
supported by its shareholders as it cannot 
borrow money in Britain which might be 
tainted with riba. Its shareholders are 
major Gulf financial institutions and they 
stand ready to assist it. Because its 
borrowers are on fixed repayments they 
tend not to have defaulted. However 
many of the properties are worth less 
than they were when the loan monies 
were advanced. 
2008  Saturday January 26 The Financial 
Services Authority is criticised for 
"systematic failure of duty" by the 
Treasury select committee. MPs 
recommend new protection for 
depositors, and new powers to allow 
authorities to spot and tackle banks at 
risk earlier.  Wednesday March 26 The 
Financial Services Authority admits 
there was a lack of sufficient 
supervision over Northern Rock.  
House prices have fallen at their fastest 
rate since 2002, with International 
Monetary Fund believing that British 
house prices were still overvalued by 
IBB launches its new mortgage product. 
Research has been unable to establish 
how many mortgages were advanced 
prior to the launch of the 2008 product. 
However, as the capitalization of IBB 
only reached £37 million in 2009, there 
cannot have been many mortgages. 
Deposits from customers reach 
£153,280,754 Loss for 2008 £5,910,700 
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as much as 30% and could fall sharply. 
Mortgage lending levels are at their 
lowest in nearly four years, and the 
FTSE 100 index has crept below levels 
registered in 1997. Unemployment rose 
to 5.8% and was predicted to reach 
10%.  
 
2009 Greater London house prices down 
over 20% on two years earlier, from an 
average figure of £249,455 to an 
average figure of £200,441.  However 
average savings for the period per head 
of population do not drop below £1900. 
 
IBB reported a loss £9.5 million in 2009. 
Customer deposits of over £186million, 
customer financing at £46million and 
nearly 50,000 customers in its 2009 
financial statements.  Deposits from 
customers reach £ 185,975,992 However 
net income falls from £4,495,781 in 2008 
to £1,209,741 in 2009. 
 
2010 RBS assets climb to £1453.58 b in 
2010. Barclay’s assets climb to 
£1489.64 b in 2010.  
 
IBB reported a loss of £8.1 million. It 
receives a £20million capital injection 
from founding shareholder Qatar 
International Islamic Bank.   
 
2011 Muslim population of England and 
Wales 2,706,066.  Muslim population 
of Scotland (2009 figures) 75,300  
IBB reported a loss of £8.99 million for 




HSBC Amanah, the Sharia-compliant 
arm of HSBC, withdraws its retail 
offering from the UK in October 2012. 
This leaves only the Islamic Bank of 
Britain (IBB) to service the roughly 2.7 
million Muslims living in Britain.  
 
IBB creates competitive products 79 per 
cent of applications for its 24-month 
fixed-term deposit product were from 
non-Muslim customers in the 3 months 
to Feb 2013.  A variation of the sub-
prime mortgage, with loans to 80% of 
valuation, boasts a fixed rate of “rental” 
of 4.19% for two years then a variable 
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rate of 3.99% above a floating base 
rate.608 
 
2014 Sovereign Sukuk Islamic Bank of Britain becomes the first 
country outside of the Islamic world to 
issue Sovereign Sukuk. The UK’s first 
sovereign receives orders totalling £2.3 
billion 
 
6.2 Comment on IBB  
IBB were not interested in the sub-prime market. IBB offers house financing through 
diminishing Musharikah.  Here, the bank partially invests with the “borrower” in the property 
and gradually reduces its share with each instalment paid by the “borrower” until the bank’s 
investment reaches zero. At the end of the service term, ownership in the house completely 
transfers to the “borrower”. The bank charges rent on its equitable portion. Banks normally 
use the participatory models in combination with others to create services,609 although an 
early problem seems to be that at least in the early days of retail banking, the area of 
mortgages was immature and lacked a consistent and standardised specification products.  
According to Lord George, ‘There were no really standard products, so we couldn’t identify a 
Sharí’a mortgage. It was hard to fit this into the regulatory and legal framework because the 
definition of a Sharí’a mortgage differed from one place to the next.’ 610 
IBB used Ijarah (lease) model for leasing capital assets like cars.611  It offers five savings 
portfolio types for partially tax exempt pension funds, all of which are claimed to be Shari’a 




http://www.theguardian.com/business/2008/apr/10/mortgagelendingfigures.property, local futures group 2008; Halifax, 
http://np.netpublicator.com/np/n28118167/Raconteur---Islamic-Finance-Singles.pdf; 
http://www.relbanks.com/europe/uk,http://www.alrayanbank.co.uk/useful-info-tools/about-us/latest-news/jan-dec-
2010/27-10-10/, UK Excellence in Islamic Finance, UK Government official publication for World Islamic Economic 
Forum, 2013.  Table compiled by the author. 
609  ‘Islamic home purchase plan’, Islamic Bank of Britain [Online]. Available at: http://www.islamic-bank.com/home-
finance/buy-to-let-purchase-plan// 
610 Andreasyan, Tanya Lord Eddie George: The steady hand behind Islamic finance in the UK, New Horizons Magazine, 
Islamic Institute of Banking and Insurance, London, April 2007, 21 http://www.islamic-
banking.com/resources/7/newhorizon%20previouse%20issues/newhorizon_aprjun07.pdf 
611   ‘Islamic home purchase plan’, Islamic Bank of Britain [Online]. Available at: http://www.islamic-bank.com/home-
finance/buy-to-let-purchase-plan// 
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compliant, and each of these operate as a managed trust investment vehicle with investments 
in real estate, shares (equities) and sukuk. No fund appears to invest in financial instruments 
such as derivatives.612 
IBB's point of difference was that it was the first Islamic bank in Britain not operating as a 
branch of a foreign bank. It was a small bank, and by 2009 only had eight high Street 
branches.613 According to an interview carried out by Kok with an un-named but supposedly 
leading Islamic academic, and reported in 2014, IBB looked to many customers to be just like 
any other bank. 
 Islamic Bank of Britain are regulated like any other UK bank so one of the 
sticking points when they first wanted to get their licence was that they had to get 
their licence, they had to... guarantee your deposit... 100% if I put my salary cheque 
every month in... [IBB] and they go bust next month then…  I’m guaranteed 100% to 
get that money back and of course the issue of IBB was well, you know, nominally 
they would be profit and loss sharing so… if they make a loss they can’t guarantee 
and if they make a profit then you get something that doesn’t get called interest but 
looks like interest and one of the things they had to do was persuade what was then 
the [FSA…] that they had to take an  undertaking that if necessary they would borrow 
money from the Bank of England which the Bank of England couldn’t guarantee 
would be Sharia compliant that they would use to make good any money they lost on 
current accounts and they had to do that to get a licence...614 
In other words, the IBB must insure against losses and must offer the depositor the return of 
deposits up to £85,000 in the event of losses. The legal requirements are precisely what they 
would be as to a CB and an unambiguous repudiation of Shari’a. However, the FSA has 
indicated that “after the event” the depositor has the right to decline the repayment and accept 
the loss for his or her own account, and the FCA has not withdrawn that guarantee as nearly 
as the author can establish. 615 It was a very small participant in a very crowded banking 
sector, and it is unsurprising that it offered less risky loans, which therefore were not subject 
to foreclosure nearly as often.  Another reason for failing to compete in the sub-prime market 
is that “Islamic financing agreements, even for Non-PLS methods, are not as straightforward 
as conventional loan contracts and according to anecdotal evidence also take longer to 
process.” 616As has been shown elsewhere in this thesis, it is possible to devise a sharia 
compliant sub-prime mortgage. It simply has different rates of payment, payable at different 
                                                 
 
612 http://www.alrayanbank.co.uk/media/263286/pb1842-al-rayan-discretionary-portfolio-service-brochure.pdf 
613. Rahman, Naeem, Attitudes of Muslims towards Islamic Banking and Finance, Ph.D thesis, Durham University, 2012, 93. 
614 Adapted from Kok, Seng Kiong, Islamic Finance in the Global Economy: An Exploration of Risk Management and 
Governance within Shari’a Finance Ph.D Thesis, University of Liverpool March 2014. 
615 Hamoudi, N_129 above, 136. 
616 Pejman Abedifar, Philip Molyneux, Amine Tarazi. Risk in Islamic Banking. 2012.<hal-00915115>, 12 
 198 | P a g e  
 
198 
times of the cycle of the mortgage, as rental rather than as interest payments. The rental 
figures don't need to be fixed, but merely referencing to a particular figure, such as, possibly, 
increase in the housing price index or a fixed measure of rises or falls in consumer prices.  
However, IBB did not offer these. But despite the lack of exposure to sub-prime mortgages, 
IBB managed to lose £45 million, needing an infusion of £20 million from Qatar.617  If it 
wasn’t a matter of risky products, it must have been a problem of risky management – either 
poor risk management or poor corporate governance, or possibly both. 
6.3 Corporate Governance  
There is little discoverable material on the IBB’s corporate governance. The only comments 
made by the World Bank in a relevant publication 618 relate to governance in accordance with 
Shari’a.  Also, very little can be gleaned from Abdul Karim Aldohni’s two helpful books,619 
apart from the fact that IBs in Britain, like CBs, are formed in accordance with the 
Companies Act 2006.620  Aldohni does, however, raise the interesting point.621 He refers to a 
method (Arabic form ة لا كو رامث ت س ﺍ) whereby Islamic financial institutions manage funds on 
behalf of their customers. This involves providing agency (wakalah) services against specific 
fund management fees. The above issues will be assessed below. 
6.4 Analysis 
As table 6.1 shows, the British market for subprime mortgages was well serviced by 2004, 
and it would not have been advantageous for IBB to compete in this market. Two reasons 
immediately present themselves. Firstly, as Abedifar, Molyneux and Tarazi point out, Islamic 
banks have limited access to wholesale funding. They could not borrow extra funds to on-
lend, and are not authorized to use interest-based assets, like bonds, for security.622 It is 
unclear whether additional funds could have been obtained from Abu Dhabi, although when 
additional share capital was needed to save the IBB from insolvency, it was supplied as share 
                                                 
 
617 Qatar Inc. Inches Up, Qatar Today JUNE 22, 2013 http://www.qatartodayonline.com/qatar-inc-inches-up/ 
618 Grais,  Wafik and  Matteo Pellegrini, Corporate Governance and Sharī`a Compliance in Institutions Offering Islamic 
Financial Services World Bank Publications, 2006  
619 Islamic banking in the United Kingdom: is the current legal and regulatory framework capable of hosting an Islamic 
banking sector, University of Leeds (School of Law), 2008, and The Legal and Regulatory Aspects of Islamic 
Banking: A Comparative Look at the United Kingdom and Malaysia, Routledge, 2012 
620 Aldohni, Abdul Karim the Legal and Regulatory Aspects of Islamic Banking: A Comparative Look at the United 
Kingdom and Malaysia, Routledge, 2012, 79. 
621 Ibid, 104 
622 Pejman Abedifar, Philip Molyneux, Amine Tarazi. Risk in Islamic Banking. 2012.<hal-00915115>, 11 
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capital from Abu Dhabi. Secondly, this is simply a matter of pragmatism: subprime 
mortgages are called subprime mortgages because borrowers who present a risky profile can 
borrow more money, but the right of interest charged reflects the amount of risk engaged in 
by the bank. Under sharia compliant loans, the rate of mark-up or trading profit, often 
reflective of the market interest rate, would simply be adjusted for higher amount of risk. 
However, given the amount of competition in the market place, Muslims needing sub- prime 
loans would have been able to go to sub-prime loan originator.  Abedifar’s team found that 
loan quality, (implicit) interest income and expenses of Islamic banks were less sensitive to 
domestic interest rates compared to their conventional counterparts, and this is possibly due 
to the fixed nature of the various mortgage and other finance contracts. However, they found 
that the sensitivity of IBs’ stability to interest rates did not significantly differ from CBs and 
that IBs otherwise mimicked CBs in terms of returns offered or rents or interest extracted, 
and also terms of insolvency risk.623 In a competitive market such as the UK, where there are 
both conventional and Islamic banks  there is less pressure on Islamic  banks to provide high 
risk products due to the established nature of the competition.  The point of difference for 
small Islamic banks in non-Muslim majority countries such as the Islamic Bank of Britain 
may well be the lack of high risk products. A Muslim wanting a high risk product can simply 
go to a conventional bank, which may reduce the appeal of banks such as the IBB.   
As demonstrated in chapter 5, where IBs are competing with CBs not on the basis that one is 
Islamic and the other not but on the basis of commercial return, as in Malaysia, the product 
mix needs to be more attractive and the need for IBs in Asia to compete with CBs for 
investment funds has, as was demonstrated, led to the creation of the Islamic International 
Financial Market and its approved products of hedges and swaps.  Whether low-risk products 
are made uncompetitive by this lack of product differentiation is a question outside the scope 
of this thesis, but the apparent lack of demand for them, given the low number of customers 
IBB had, might indicate an affirmative answer. As was discussed in chapters 5, in countries 
with Muslim majorities or near majorities like Malaysia and Saudi Arabia, there is increasing 
pressure on banks in these countries to provide higher risk products, as the IIFM has in fact 
done with the introduction of hedging products in the years after 2008. 
                                                 
 
623 Ibid. 
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Despite the lack of competition for high risk mortgages arising from the differentiation 
between Muslim and non-Muslim banks, however, the IBB accumulated losses of over £45 
million in its first 5 years of operation.  This is surprising given the unpopularity of Islamic 
home financing plans. With respect to Muslim households, in 2009 17 percent of them owned 
their homes outright. Nearly 20 percent of the respondents to the study carried out by 
Tameme had conventional mortgages whereas, in contrast, less than two percent had Islamic 
mortgages. Within the Muslim households’ owner-occupations 75 percent have conventional 
home mortgages and only 8.3 percent had Islamic home mortgages.624  
It is difficult to ascribe a reason for this. Lord George625 seemed to be of the view that the 
problem was a lack of standardization of Islamic mortgages, and IBB did not release its 
current version of its mortgage plan until more than four years after it had its banking 
license.626 It is also possible that the time lag itself played a part. Also, the complexity of 
Islamic mortgages may be relevant. If the attack on Islamic mortgages printed in the Express 
newspaper in 2012 is true,627 the need to have an offshore special purpose vehicle for the 
transaction is an extra level of expense and more than unusually complex. However, El-
Gamal suggests that the SPV model is the most prevalent one at least in the USA and there is 
no reason to suspect that the English practice is any different.628 It follows that conventional 
mortgages either are, or at least appear to be, simpler and cheaper.  
 
A brief survey of the timeline shows that contrary to the glowing predictions in many of the 
theses and other commentaries surrounding IB in Britain and the IBB in particular, IB is 
generally unsuccessful. There are many ways of assessing the raw data by a simple exercise 
in hermeneutics: that is, to logically analyze some data using tools supplied by other data so 
as to produce a fortiori argument. If it is true that 79% of customers for one product are not 
Muslim, and one extrapolates from that that 79% of all customers are not Muslim, one can 
                                                 
 
624 Tameme, Mohammed Elkhatim Mamoun Demand and Supply Conditions of Islamic Housing Finance in the United 
Kingdom: Perceptions of Muslim Clients Ph.D thesis, University of Durham July 2009, 252.  
625 Parker, Mushtak,  George: Who put Britain on Islamic finance map  Arab News, 20 April 2009 
http://www.arabnews.com/node/323391 
626 Raconteur- The Sunday Times, http://np.netpublicator.com/np/n28118167/Raconteur---Islamic-Finance-Singles.pdf 
627 http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/235769/Islamic-law-used-to-dodge-stamp-duty 
628 El-Gamal, Mahmoud A, ‘Limits and dangers of Shari [ah Arbitrage’, in S. Nazim Ali, ed, Islamic Finance: Current Legal 
and Regulatory Issues, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Islamic Finance project, Islamic Legal Studies, Harvard Law School. 
2005,117-31.  
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divide the number of Muslims into total bank deposits to establish that the average Muslim 
has invested £320 or less in IBB. If the contrary is true and all of the IBB customers apart for 
the users of that particular product are Muslim, the figure drops to under £70.  Given the 
2009 figure of national savings at over £2000 per person, this means that the average Muslim, 
assuming that Muslim savings are no different from non-Muslim savings, has invested less 
than 16% of his or her savings in what is now the only retail Muslim bank in Britain (on the 
79% assumption) or under 3% (on the zero assumption). 
The causes of this are unsure, and the mere fact that IBB made large losses in the first five 
years of its existence may not establish a cause and effect relationship.  Because of the 
specific nature of IB, many of the reasons ascribed by the Turner Report for the losses of 
British banks in general as a result of the sub-prime induced financial crisis cannot be 
attributed to the IBB, so the reasons for the loss of confidence which affected, say, Northern 
Rock, cannot be visited upon IBB.  This is because concerns about the massive growth and 
increasing complexity of the securitised credit model, or high leverage in multiple forms, or 
the complexity and opacity of the structured credit and derivatives system, or even the rapid 
growth in interest based mortgage lending and the extension of mortgage credit to social 
categories which would not have previously enjoyed access does not affect a bank which is 
not based on riba. 
Some might argue that the difficulties of Islamic banking are caused by the need for Basel 
compliance, but Basel compliance, as demonstrated in chapter 5, did not harm the 
performance of BIMB.  Nor do the annual reports of BIMB make any claim that Basel 
compliance caused any losses either financially or of confidence for depositors and investors 
in Malaysian IBs.  Indeed, as demonstrated, deposits increased.  This is not the case in 
England.  There have been consecutive losses.  Has Basel compliance been the cause? 
Ashby and White629 suggest that the key problem with Basel II is its obsession with 
mathematical models, the idea being that somehow better, more quantitative, capital models 
mean better risk management. They argue that the provision of effective rules and guidance 
for the management of risk for banking institutions and not just insurers would have provided 
a better outcome, and note that the FSA actually scrapped its own proposals to issue a 
Handbook on risk management systems and controls to banks.   Accordingly the losses made 
                                                 
 
629 Ashby, Simon and Nigel Waite, Global Banking Crisis: A Response from the Financial Services Research Forum 
Financial Services Research Forum, 2010, 16. 
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by IBB in 2004-09 might not be entirely the fault of that institution, but the fact that there 
were insufficient standards published by the FSA does not excuse the failure to adopt 
authoritative risk management standards which were in place elsewhere in the UK 630 and it 
follows that a failure of the FSA to prescribe what ought to have been part of good internal 
management culture or good risk management culture is no excuse in and of itself for bad 
internal management culture or bad risk management culture.  Curiously the concept of risk 
management is originally Arabic - the word for livelihood or sustenance, قزر, where there is 
a chance of loss, being pronounced “risk”; it is unlikely that IBB management were therefore 
unfamiliar with the concept. 
So it might be poor corporate governance, with a poor understanding of risk and its 
management, which caused the losses in IBB – and in particular, a failure to follow the 
example of both Audit and Treasury in the adoption of AS/NZS 4360: 1994.  The IBB 
continues to make losses, with a retained deficit in 2010 equivalent to approximately £20 per 
British Muslim. This is hardly a model which encourages confidence. In 2009, £20 million of 
foreign capital was needed to prop up the bank, without any apparent improvement in the 
ranks of financial position as shown in its annual report for 2009. 
A loss of confidence in investors and depositors might reasonably follow. If the 79% figure is 
correct, then it is possible that there are only 11,000 Muslim customers of the bank. However, 
even if all of the 50,000 customers reported in 2009 were customers of the bank that means 
that less than 2% of British Muslims had become customers of IBB by the time the 2009 
reports were closed? That is, some 2.6 million British Muslims have chosen not to invest in, 
or borrow from, IBB. It is possibly for a related reason that HSBC closed its IB window in 
Britain in 2013. Regardless of the causes of the poor management practices, a lack of 
standardization which would have allowed the IBB to undertake even more risk would have 
risked higher losses.  If it is accepted that the loss of depositor funds may be a deterrent, then 
risk of the loss of more depositor funds through a riskier investment strategy would present a 
higher deterrent. 
These massive losses, and the lack of confidence which appears to flow from them, arose 
even with the stringent regulatory supervision of the FSA prior to 2012. There was no 
                                                 
 
630 Basel II might not have provided them but there were international standards in place from 1994 in both Audit and 
Treasury within the UK. See generally   The National Audit Office’s supporting Innovation: Managing risk in 
government departments.  2000 The Stationery Office, London, 
http://www.nao.gov.uk/publications/nao_reports/9900864.pdf and HM Treasury’s Management of Risk: A Strategic 
Overview 2001 the Stationery Office, London http://www.cabinet-office.gov.uk/civilservice/publications/risk.pdf. Both 
adopt AS/NZS 4360: 1994 
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suggestion even in the bank’s 2010 report that the losses were caused by over - regulation, 
and indeed, as Ashby and Waite argue,631 losses in other banks prior to 2010 were caused by 
under regulation. It follows that, and in Chapter 7 I will argue that, any suggestion that 
regulations on IB ought to be relaxed, or reduced because of some cultural difference or 
religious imperative, would be harmful to both depositors and shareholders of banks such as 
IBB.  I will base my argument in part on the findings of the Turner report,632 which found 
that improvements in the effectiveness of internal risk management and governance within 
banks were essential.   According to the Turner Report: 
While some well-run banks were affected by systemic developments over which they 
had no influence, there were also many cases where internal risk management was 
ineffective and where boards failed adequately to identify and constrain excessive risk 
taking. 633 
Turner called for improved professionalism, independence of risk management functions, 
higher technical competence in senior risk managers, risk management considerations to be 
embedded in remuneration policy, and improvements in the skill level and time commitment 
of non-executive directors.634 There are persons who argue in favor of such a relaxation, and 
they have completed Ph.D. theses at British universities.  One such is Hamid, who argues that 
the IB industry has its ideological foundations in a Qur’anic business ethics and stakeholder 
theory which can be traced back to traditional jurisprudential concepts in Islamic law. He 
argues that the current practices in IB fail to follow an ethically sound stakeholder model 
because of competitive pressures from the conventional financial industry and is thus 
modelled more on the neo-liberal shareholder profit maximization ideology, which aims at 
ensuring that the shareholders get maximum returns, thereby foregoing the interest of other 
stakeholders. 635  
This argument that adopting Conventional Banking practices is only done in an attempt to 
maximize shareholder profits would be persuasive had the IBB not managed to lose 
something over £45 million in its first five years of operation.  It is possible that the reverse is 
true; competitive pressures might ensure that investment account holders get more protection, 
                                                 
 
631 Ashby, Simon and Nigel Waite, Global Banking Crisis: A Response from the Financial Services Research Forum 
Financial Services Research Forum, 2010, 15-20. 
632 The Turner Review - A regulatory response to the  global banking crisis, Financial Standards Authority, March 2009 
(“Turner”) http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf 
633 Turner, at pages 90-91 
634 Turner, at pages 92-93 
635 Hamid, Sheharyar Sikander (2014) Efficacy of corporate governance theories in determining the regulatory framework 
for Islamic finance institutions. PhD thesis, University of Warwick. 
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but the author cannot see why one would set up a bank in which the aim was that the 
depositors would actually lose money.  Hamid thinks that the problem is Shari’a compliance, 
and were there not difficulties in reconciling inconsistent Shari’a rulings there might be some 
validity in this suggestion.  There is little inconsistency in international accounting standards, 
and the author sees no validity in the direction of Hamid’s argument that there is a correlation 
between western accounting standards and resistance to Shari’a. 
The many previous discussions and articles comparing and contrasting IB with the 
requirements of the Basel Accords seem to focus on the immorality of sub-prime lending.  
They proceed from the basis that because IB is not based on the immoral payment of interest, 
and because it allows for depositors in a PLS system to make a loss, that depositors will not 
press their bank to engage in risky transactions.   The marketplace shows a lack of 
confidence, and it is evidenced by the losses made by the bank which those for whom it was 
established demonstrably fail to support.  Under true PLS conditions each depositor would 
have lost a shilling in the pound for each year of trading between 2004 and 2009.636  And 
whilst profit-sharing investment accounts are Shari’a compliant, the lack of governance rights 
of a pious Muslim over the beneficiary of his or her investment gives cause for concern when 
such losses are incurred year after year.637  We hope that this brief forensic examination has 
shown that if an Islamic bank can have consolidated losses of about a quarter the value of its 
total depositor funds in five years under fairly stringent controls, reducing controls of the 
risks such a bank can take would hardly make matters better.  
6.5 Summary 
In this chapter, we discussed the differences between Islamic banks and conventional banking 
with an Islamic window.  From the perspective of the conventional bank, an Islamic financial 
product is simply another one of a number of structured products within their portfolios.  This 
is completely different from an Islamic finance product which is originated from an Islamic 
bank in that the Islamic financial product is an integrated part of the Islamic bank.  The 
strength of Islamic banking therefore can be said to come from its liquidity and its whole risk 
management view of this liquidity.   
                                                 
 
636 Which is five pence in the pound in the new money, but a shilling in the pound sounds better.  
637 Archer, Simon and Rifaat Ahmed Abdel Karim Profit-sharing investment accounts in Islamic banks: Regulatory 
problems and possible solutions, (2009) 10 Journal of Banking Regulation, 300–306. 
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Another distinctive feature of the strength of Islamic banking discussed in this chapter is its 
resilience to the manifestation of reputational risk.  This is exemplified by the case study of 
IBB where investors loss 25 percent and despite this huge reputational catastrophe, the 
market for Islamic banking grew to 716 Islamic financial institutions in the world with over 
13.1 billion US dollars in profits as reported in 2013 and by 2014, the total value of all sharia-
compliant assets including sovereign sukuk grew to approximately $2 trillion.   
We showed a timeline of announcements concerning the management and performance of 
IBB with a list of regulatory and economic events that were considered challenges to the 
development of Islamic banks in the UK.  This case study should therefore be considered a 
case in point where despite heavy regulation in the banking sector, i.e., in the form of the 
adoption of Basel rules by the Financial Conduct Authority, Islamic banking can experience 
large losses. 
 
 206 | P a g e  
 
206 
 Chapter 7: POLITICAL ECONOMIC ISSUES IN SAUDI ARABIA & THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC FINANCE 
7.1 Introduction 
In contrast to the case studies conducted on the UK and on Malaysia, this chapter focuses on 
Sa’udi Arabia.   Arguably, there is insufficient reliable evidence from KSA on which to base 
a case study, but there are sufficient comparisons available between KSA, Malaysia and the 
UK for lessons to be drawn with respect to reforms needed in the banking system of KSA in 
order to render it Basel III compliant, to reduce risk to investors and depositors and to ensure 
the stability and integrity of the banking system itself.   Given that Islamic principles in and 
of themselves were insufficient to avoid the stock market crash of 2006 in KSA, the exercise 
is a compelling one.  
7.1.1 Lack of Transparency and Difficulties in Compiling Data 
Complaints made about data access from KSA include missing data, gaps in time series, 
difficulty accessing data (lack of transparency), inadequate sub-national data, and low levels 
of institutional support/capacity. 638 This is often seen as being a function of corruption.  The 
opacity of trade in KSA means that according to Kurzmann, one would need a rate of return 
which was 5.69% higher than one might earn in the USA or some 6% more than one might 
earn in the UK in order to justify the additional risk of doing business in KSA.639  In days 
where returns on investment in AAA rated government bonds are at around 3%, the lack of 
reliable data is a key factor in why, according to the rather dated data of Kurzmann, the return 
one would need in order to justify an investment in KSA would need to be approximately 3.5 
times that of a comparative investment in the UK. 
7.1.2 Brief History of Saudi Banking 
Saudi banks were foreign owned from their inception, the first bank being Dutch owned, the 
Netherlands Trading Society. For many years it was the only operating bank in Saudi Arabia 
and served as the Central Bank, maintaining the country’s gold stock and processing oil 
                                                 
 
638 Galal, Ahmed and  Bernard M. Hoekman, Arab Economic Integration: Between Hope and Reality Brookings Institution 
Press, 2003, 25 
639 Kurtzman, Joel , Glenn Yago and Triphon Phumiwasana The Opacity Index: The Global Costs of Opacity Measuring 
business and investment risk worldwide MIT Sloan Management Review October 2004 
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royalty payments.640  KSA had its first Sa’udi owned private bank, the National Commercial 
Bank,  in 1934, owned by the Al-Kaaki and Mahfuz families, which also owned large trading 
companies.  In 1966, a new Banking Control Law giving SAMA broad regulatory powers 
was promulgated and a few more foreign banks were licensed.641 
By the mid-1960s two more had opened, and by 1974 there were 12 Sa’udi owned banks, 
with 72 permanent branches and offices, as well as 10 foreign banks in KSA. These included 
the successor of the Netherlands Trading Society is the Saudi Hollandi Bank, which has had 
majority Sa’udi ownership since 1974.642 By 1980, the total number of bank branches had 
risen to 247 and covered almost the entire country. Total employees in the sector were around 
11,000.643 
The KSA’s Monetary Authority (SAMA) has long had a keen interest in KSA’s financial 
stability. It acted as a source of emergency liquidity assistance (through soft deposit 
placements) to some of the banks facing acute liquidity problems or potential insolvency in 
the 1980s as a result of the drop in the oil price, which I discuss below.644 In an attempt to 
avoid another financial crisis, it is understandable that SAMA would take necessary steps to 
ensure financial stability in the Middle East, but it is arguable that these precautions marked a 
position in wanting to pause the development of Islamic finance in the international world as 
an over-precaution. The difficulties of the mid-1980s led to a significant increase in banks’ 
capital with the encouragement of SAMA. During the period 1988-93, seven of the 12 Saudi 
Banks increased their capital through new share flotation. As a result, the capital and reserves 
for the banking system had doubled from SAR 15 billion at end-1988 to SAR 30 billion by 
end-1993.645 By 1990, the number of bank branches had reached 1,036 and staff numbers had 
reached 25,000. Major Saudi banks had also opened branches in the United Kingdom, 
Bahrain, Beirut and Turkey. 646 
                                                 
 
640 Tschoegl Adrian E. Foreign banks in Saudi Arabia: a brief history, (2002) 11 Transnational Corporations, 123,128. 
641 Al-Suhaimi, Jammaz Consolidation, competition, foreign presence and systemic stability in the Saudi banking industry, 
BIS papers no 4, 128, http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap04n.pdf 
642 Vassiliev,  Alexei   The History of Saudi Arabia, Saqi,  2013, 157; Tschoegl Adrian E. Foreign banks in Saudi Arabia: a 
brief history, (2002) 11 Transnational Corporations, 123; National Commercial Bank website - 
http://www.alahli.com/en-us/about-us/corporate-profile/Pages/AlAhli-History.aspx  
643 Al-Suhaimi, Jammaz Consolidation, competition, foreign presence and systemic stability in the Saudi banking industry, 
BIS papers no 4, 129, http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap04n.pdf. 
644 Saleh, Gehan, The Dynamic Relation Between Stock Prices and Exchange Rates in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and UAE. 
ProQuest, 2008, 27 
645 Al-Suhaimi, Jammaz Consolidation, competition, foreign presence and systemic stability in the Saudi banking industry, 
BIS papers no 4, 129, http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap04n.pdf. 
646 Ibid. 
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7.2 The Current State of Saudi Banking 
Saudi Arabia, which held $627bn of net foreign assets at its central bank in 2013, saw its 
credit risk drop to the lowest in the Middle East at the start of 2014.  Five-year credit default 
swaps were at 72.8 basis points at one stage during 2014.647  The starting position must be 
that of Saudi Electricity, which has a great degree of state support and is by far the best proxy 
for Saudi sovereign risk in the Eurobond market.  There is not a lot of traded debt in KSA so 
these figures might not be indicative, but 8 months after they went on sale, Saudi Electricity's 
4.211 per cent 10 year Sukuk due April 2022 were sold down 103 basis points since their 
opening price to 3.18 per cent648 
This might be an aberration since according to Bloomberg News, Saudi Electricity’s position 
might reflect the government's tiny domestic public debt stock and high foreign reserves.649 
However, increased borrowing by state-owned enterprises, which arguably benefit from an 
implicit sovereign guarantee, helped to increase the external debt stock from an estimated 
US$44bn in 2005 to US$168bn in 2014. KSA’s state credit institutions had US$80.3bn in 
outstanding loans in September 2014, which potentially burden public finances, given the 
high rate of non-performing loans – which although somewhat reduced from the 1999-2003 
average of around 10% have still doubled between 2004 and 2010 and are on average around 
2.5%, as shown in Figure 20, combined with low domestic savings as shown in Figure 21. 
  . 
                                                 
 
647 Saudi Arabia –  Country Risk report  The Swedish Export Credits Guarantee Board 
http://www.ekn.se/Global/Landriskanalyser/Mellan%C3%B6stern/Engelska/Saudiarabien2013EngExtern.pdf DATE 
14/05/2013 
648 Saudi Electricity Co's Islamic debt sparkles Bloomberg News 18 December, 2012 
649 Ibid. 
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Figure 19: The Saudi Bank non-performing loans 
 
Source: World Bank (2015) 
 
The bank nonperforming loans to total gross loans shown in Figure 14 are the value of 
nonperforming loans divided by the total value of the loan portfolio, before the deduction of 
specific loan-loss provisions where they exist. The loan amount recorded as nonperforming is 
the gross value of the loan as recorded on the balance sheet, not just the amount that is 
overdue.  The Saudi figures shown in the above diagram are approximately at the same level 
as Armenia, Brazil, Belarus and Chile, 25% higher than figures for lesser developed and 
poorer resourced countries such as Indonesia, India, and Uruguay, and are 50% above figures 
for countries such as Australia, Austria and New Zealand.650 
  
                                                 
 
650 World Bank (2015), Bank nonperforming loans to total gross loans (%) 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FB.AST.NPER.ZS/countries  
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Figure 20: Adult savings in KSA 
 
Source: World Bank 
 
The diagram shows the percentage of adults who report saving or setting aside any money 
using an account at a formal financial institution such as a bank, credit union, microfinance 
institution, or cooperative in calendar year 2011 in KSA.  
A 2012 survey conducted by Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Leora Klapper rates people saving any 
money at all.651  However, despite these liabilities and poor savings and loan-performance 
data, sovereign risk indicators are low, with a gross public debt/GDP ratio of 14.1%, 
compared with a median of 26.3% for A-rated countries.652  Saudi FX reserves are high at 
more than US$770 billion, or around 100% of GDP.653   
That’s on the positive side, but at the risk of mixing metaphors, every silver lining has a 
cloud. Forecasts published in November 2014 by Samba Financial Group654 (before the 
recent OPEC meeting) show Saudi GDP growth decelerating from 4.5% this year to 3.3% in 
                                                 
 
651 Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Leora Klapper, 2012. “Measuring Financial Inclusion: The Global Findex,” World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 6025) Source: https://alfred.stlouisfed.org/series?seid=DDAI06SAA156NWDB   
652 Saudi Arabia Country Risk, The Economist Intelligence Unit Last Updated: May 2015 
https://store.eiu.com/product.aspx?pubid=310001031&pid=60000206&gid=310001031 
653 Weltman, Jeremy , Saudi risk score plummets as oil shock intensifies, Euromoney, 16 December, 2014. Retrieved 
fromhttp://www.euromoney.com/Article/3410818/Saudi-risk-score-plummets-as-oil-shock-
intensifies.html?copyrightInfo=true  
654 SAMBA Saudi Arabian Economic Monitor, November 2014. Retrieved from 
www.samba.com/en/pdf/.../Samba_Economic_Monitor_Nov_2014.pdf 
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2015 and 2.9% in 2016, but more recent revisions in February 2015 put the growth figure at 
1.9% for 2015 and sizeable deficits of an average 8.7 percent of GDP during the coming 
period.  As the Saudi-American Bank reported: 
Oil prices themselves appear to have found a floor at around $50/b (Brent) a 57 
percent decline from the most recent high in June 2014 of $115/b.  The slump owes 
much to the perception that geopolitical threats are fading, but more fundamentally to 
supply additions in an environment of anaemic demand. OPEC has backed away from 
any attempt to stanch this supply, calculating that any cuts would need to be deep to 
generate an adequate price response and would mean an unacceptable loss of market 
share… Lower oil prices will clearly weigh on economic activity to some extent, but 
the government remains committed to supporting the local economy, even at the 
expense of large fiscal deficits… A weaker pace of public investment growth will 
clearly feed through into the contracting sector, though that will be more obvious in 
2016-18…. skewed incentives that have put pressure on the public purse…[include 
public sector] employment, where pay and other benefits… are still more appealing to 
most Saudis than private sector employment. Consequently, Saudi public sector 
employment has increased at an annual rate of ...7 percent in the past five years. This 
is the main reason why real government spending has increased from an already high 
51 percent of real non-oil GDP in 2010 to 59 percent last year, and explains why an 
oil price of $100/b—let alone one of $60/b--is no longer enough to guarantee a fiscal 
surplus.655 
The price of oil has since dropped to $50 a barrel. A view of economic history which took in 
Argentina, once wealthy for its silver; New Zealand, for its wool and lamb once with a 
standard of living equal to that of the USA; South Africa, with its gold and diamonds, might 
see similar fates even for an oil rich country which needed a long-term figure for its major 
export roughly 20 per cent above what the most favorable forecast, published by a state-
owned banking enterprise, predicted.   Later in this chapter I will show that this is not the first 
time that Sa’udi banks have been hit by declining oil revenues. 
This gloomy view informs the central theme of this chapter: without a very robust banking 
system, Saudi Arabia will fail; with however a robust banking system, Saudi Arabia may well 
become the central hub of IB and West Asia as Singapore and Hong Kong have become 
financial centers of East Asia.  
There are also substantial governance problems. With respect to the theoretical and 
operational aspect of implementing Basel III capital regulation, the question is whether 
                                                 
 
655 SAMBA Saudi Arabian Baseline economic forecast 2015-8, (2015) 
www.samba.com/Saudi_Arabia_baseline_macro_forecast_2015_2018.. 
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Islamic banks need to be regulated if they operate with PLS capital and deposits as their 
source of funds. PLS investments might have been considered as part of Tier 2 capital under 
Basel I, but the nature of corporate governance which saw such a loss of shareholder value in 
IBB means that PLS investments need an adequate weighting in capital risk calculations.  
KSA has not yet, possibly due to the infancy of the sector, implemented improved internal 
risk measurement techniques or actual reporting. There is no impetus for an investor, 
therefore, to have confidence in any particular IB’s operations in KSA.   
It has been suggested that because Islamic banks undertake profit and loss sharing in projects 
via mudaraba and musharaka, they ought to have higher capital levels to compensate and 
that these be calculated differently than for conventional banks. For example, demand 
deposits might appear on the balance sheet in the banking book and investment deposits 
ought to be reported off balance sheet via the trading book, although AAOIFI supports the 
notion that investment deposits be reported on balance sheet.656 
A failure of the banking system could be fatal to the interests of the citizens of KSA.  Not 
only would a life savings and pension be potentially lost, but as was seen in the USA in the 
early 1930s, the failure of any one bank will infect other banks with the potential of bringing 
the entire economy to a halt.657   The contrast between the British situation and the potential 
for KSA could not be greater: British depositors had their deposits guaranteed; the share 
capital of IBB dropped the equivalent of 25% of all funds held on deposit, and that was even 
with Basel II capital management standards. The potential losses to a KSA citizen saving for 
his or her retirement would be much more, it is suggested, than 25%, unless, as recommended 
by Turner,658 far more stringent management controls then those which existed in the UK 
prior to 2010 were introduced. 
The effect that bad management has not caused a failure in the KSA banking system so far, 
when it is liquid because of oil revenues, does not mean that it could not happen in the future, 
as happened in Dubai, if and when that money runs out.  As I demonstrated in the case of the 
IBB in chapter 6, 25% of depositors’ funds were lost, only to be replaced in part by a capital 
                                                 
 
656 Brown, K, Hassan, K. and Skully, M. (2007). Operational efficiency and performance of Islamic banks, in M. Khabir 
Hassan and Mervyn K. Lewis (eds.), Handbook of Islamic Banking. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 96, 106 
657 Gelinas, Gelinas, Saudi Arabian Baseline economic forecast 2015-8, (2015) www.samba.com/SEncounter Books, 2013, 
21 
658 The Turner Review - A regulatory response to the global banking crisis, Financial Standards Authority, March 2009. 
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injection from one of its shareholders, the Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank.  Expecting a foreign 
bank to come to one’s aid is possibly not a good risk management strategy for KSA bankers. 
The way to ensure a robust IB system is, to extent that it is compatible with Shari’a law, to 
reduce every conceivable risk to the investor, not only to make IB Basel III compliant but 
where possible to ensure the highest level of confidence by transparently providing the 
highest level of compliance with relevant international standards.659 
7.3 The Risks of Islamic Banking in Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
Arakcheev, Baklanova and Tanega show how the political economy creates certain costs to 
the market acceptability which raise additional risks due to their operational complexity, lack 
of transparency, and the need for additional investment screenings and third-party 
involvement in ascertaining Shari’a compliance.660 The next section will assess these issues 
in greater detail. 
7.3.1 Legal Risk:  Inconsistency of Fatwas  
This section will discuss the inconsistency of fatwas with respect to a lack of legal 
development and opinion in the Sunni and Shiite faiths. It should be noted that Jurisprudence 
in Sunni Islam is remarkably decentralized. For instance, Sunnis, unlike Shiites, never 
developed a clerical order or hierarchy, so there is no institution in Sunni Islam charged with 
establishing definitively which legal opinions are authoritative and which are not.  So whilst 
the opinions of certain jurists gain authority over time as they are cited positively by 
subsequent jurists in their own legal opinions, there is neither a formal clergy nor any 
ordination process among Sunni religious scholars.  
For that reason, using KSA’s judicial system also involves risk. Despite growing pressure 
from foreign investors for greater transparency and rule of law, KSA rarely recognizes 
overseas arbitration awards and rulings. It is, however, risky for companies to rely solely on 
the KSA judicial system to protect their interests.  
 
                                                 
 
659 There’s nothing new in this suggestion: it appears for example in Vinnicombe, Thea  and David Park,The Implications Of 
Islamic Jurisprudence For The International Harmonization Of Accounting Standards, (2007) 6 Financial Reporting, 
Regulation & Governance, University of the Sunshine Coast, Queensland, Australia, p.1 
660 Arakcheev, N_168 above.  
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Shari’a law is not in any sense a uniform legal code, but rather, a legal framework within 
which considerable disputation occurs. Foster661 cites Taqi Usmani of the Accounting and 
Auditing Organization for Islamic Finance Institutions as saying that 85 %   of Islamic bonds 
are in truth not Islamic.662  He is not the lone critic in this area.  Vogel and Hayes write: 
In the 1930s, Syrian scholar Marouf al-Daoualibi suggested that the Qur'an bans 
interest only on consumption loans, not investment loans, and in the 1940s Egyptian 
jurist al-Sanhuri argued that the Qur'an sought chiefly to ban compound interest. A 
more extreme and recent example is the opinion of the mufti of Egypt, Shaykh 
Muhammad Sayiid Tantawi, who in 1989 declared that interest on certain interest-
based government investments was not forbidden riba, because the gain is little 
different from the sharing of the government's profits from use of the funds, thus 
joining the thin ranks of prominent religious figures who have issued fatwas declaring 
clear interest practices permissible. This fatwa aroused a storm of controversy, with 
opposition from nearly all traditional religious scholars and warm praise from secular 
modernizers. Later he went even further, saying that interest-bearing bank deposits 
are perfectly Islamic, and more so than 'Islamic' accounts that impose 
disadvantageous terms on the customer.663 
The response of the AAOIFI to Sheikh Taqi Usmani’s remarks was hardly transparent, but it 
has represented an interesting and flexible way to present a Shari’a compliant method of 
delivering the security of capital and of return that international markets demand. It made a 
resolution in relation to musharakah sukuk and other equity-based sukuk (EBS), which 
disallows the two credit enhancements in EBS, namely the use of a top-up mechanism when 
the actual profit is less than the expected profit; and what is effectively a capital guarantee. 
The fatwa does however allow the use of a reserve account to cover any shortfalls and the 
distribution on the account, as well as purchase undertakings to buy the assets for its net 
value, market value, or a price to be agreed at the time of their actual purchase as this will not 
lead to a guarantee of principal.664 
Arguably, senior Wahhabi ‘ulama, (legal scholars), form part of the state apparatus in KSA 
and wield considerable influence.  Despite this, significant parts of the administration are run 
according to secular principles, including the regulation of Saudi banks. Inconvenient fatwas 
have been repeatedly ignored and sometimes ’ulama have been forced to issue new fatwas 
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acquiescing to new facts.665  
According to Foster, Islamic bankers who were unable to get approval for one banking 
product or another from one Shari’a scholar simply called another or another until a suitable 
fatwa could be obtained.    Thus, Malaysian products are often deemed Shari’a complaint, but 
they are not deemed as such in the more austere Gulf, or at least, as was demonstrated on the 
last preceding page, by   scholar, Taqi Usmani.666 
Yet Malaysian Muslims appear to be more supportive of Malaysian IB than British Muslims 
are of British IB, on the basis of the percentages of each population which use the IBs in their 
respective countries.   It would appear that one reason for this is that Malaysia has a simple 
system of a single Shari’a Committee whose fatawa appear on a single website, accessible by 
subscription. The most important fatawa are listed publicly.  The collection is in both English 
(for the international audience) and Bahasa (for the Malaysian and Indonesian Muslim 
audiences) and over 150 fatawa are issued to the Central Bank of Malaysia.667 
The last chapter showed that a lack of consistent fatawa has led to situation where some 
scholars rated products which had first been certified as halal and by other scholars as haram.  
A situation where a senior and respected scholar can brand 85% of sukuk issued in GCC 
states, as haram, where 65% of them are sovereign or semi-sovereign issues, does not 
engender the confidence of the world community.668 
Islamic tradition has a history of practices and institutions known as Khisba’h ةﺒ س ح ,  
specifically set up to ensure that citizens observe Shari’a law. The (Arabic for “verification”) 
is a religious institution under the authority of the states that fulfils the obligatory duty under 
Shari’a of enjoining “what is right and forbidding what is wrong.”  As Shari’a law controls in 
principle economic activities as much as individual behaviors, the Hisbah institutions such as 
the Committee for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice extends to regulating 
business trading, monitoring and supervising commercial activities, market places and other 
secular affairs.  
                                                 
 
665 German Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development, Business Corruption in Saudi Arabia, 
http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/middle-east-north-africa/saudi-arabia/show-all.aspx 
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Several commentators have commented on the ethics of IB and social accountability of the 
system.669 They seem to be based on accountability to Allah and on that basis spend little 
time discussing accountability to humans. This seems to be no need to raise in any of the 
literature for accountability to be done to any person before the Day of Judgment.  This may 
well suit the Islamic clients of an Islamic bank, but it is unlikely to suit a non-Islamic client 
who may well want continuous disclosure. It was further noted by Zubairu particularly in 
relation to Saudi Arabia that there were no measures designed to check whether any 
particular investment of an Islamic bank protected or harmed the natural environment. 
Zubairu found over all that they were poor disclosure practices, even for institutions that 
claimed to be operating on Islamic principles. Whilst the banks were committed to borrowers 
there was little disclosure with respect to vision statements mission statements commitments 
to the community charity and a benevolent loans and even a description of products and 
services. Zubairu claims to be surprised by these findings because Islamic banks as social and 
economic institutions are expected to disclose “more on these dimensions that reflect 
accountability and justice not only to society, but ultimately to Allah.”670  Zubairu complains 
that Zakat, the Islamic charitable tax, which is one of the five pillars of Islam, was not 
appropriately mentioned by any of the Islamic banks.  
For example, fees and charges are levied on debt-based transactions, the most popular of 
which is the Murabaha.  ةح بﺍرم  Murabaha which is the most widely used financing method 
used by Islamic banks today, involves a bank purchasing a good required by a customer and 
then re-selling the good to the borrower at a pre-determined profit repayable by 
installments.671 To be truly in line with Islamic principles, the bank must take actual 
ownership of the good before reselling it to the client. However the practice today in Islamic 
banks more closely resembles conventional interest-based financing whereby the bank does 
not take actual ownership of the good in question, but rather advances the client with the 
money to purchase the good, and which the client pays back over time with an added amount 
which the Islamic banks call profit but in reality is considered a “back door” interest.672 As 
                                                 
 
669 See for example Abdulrazaq, M.T. Banking and Taxation In The name Of God and the Law Wednesday, 28 August 2013, 
http://naijatax.blogspot.com.au/2013/08/banking-and-taxation-in-name-of-god-and.html; Iqbal and Llewellyn, N_176 
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Razali shows, the mark- up added to the original cost of the good is equal to or, in some 
cases, even higher than the amount of interest that a borrower would pay in conventional 
banking practice. He cites a Malaysian example: 
Financing amount: RM 100 000.00  
Profit Rate: 8%  
Monthly instalment is computed using the agreed profit rate on a constant rate of return and 
monthly rest.  
Financing Period: 20 years  
Installment per month: RM 837.00  
Selling Price= (RM 837.00 x (20 x 12) + 0 = RM 200, 880.00  
As a result, the bank experiences a small amount of risk in exchange for a comparatively 
profitable return on an asset-backed basis. 
Elsewhere in this chapter there is a criticism of the 28% profit made by GCC banks on credit 
cards, which have allowed persons earning even modest monthly salaries to accumulate on 
average four months of debt per person and an average of almost two credit cards per person.  
7.3.2 Valuation Risks 
Islamic financial institutions face a variety of types of risks related to Islamic modes of 
investments and finance. It is important to have realistic valuations of assets in order to assess 
the value of guarantees to be required and in order to assess how much money is required as 
an investment in order to secure an adequate partnership between the provider of Capital and 
the entrepreneur. Proponents of Islamic finance argue that it advocates risk sharing, 
transparency, promotion of entrepreneurship, and discouragement of speculative behaviour.  
If too much money is provided to the entrepreneur, there is a danger that the risk profile of 
the joint venture will not adequately secure the funds advanced.673 
But how much is too much? The problem is structural: the method of valuation used in IB 
appears to be deficient.  The IASB is able to specify the use of valuation techniques which 
have recourse to the use of interest rates, the AAOIFI which works without interest rates is 
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largely silent with respect to explicit details. The IASB provides a method for calculation of 
value of impaired and distressed assets; Islamic standard requires recognition if impairment is 
probable, however, it is largely silent on the issue of measurement.  The Islamic standard 
requires recognition when information becomes available indicating that an event will most 
probably result in the impairment of an asset. The issue of uncertainty is not addressed and 
the standard does not consider the recognition of a contingency.674 
Basel III itself attempts to deal with the question of valuations in the following manner: 
When the Effective EPE model is calibrated using historic market data, the bank must 
employ current market data to compute current exposures and at least three years of 
historical data must be used to estimate parameters of the model. Alternatively, 
market implied data may be used to estimate parameters of the model. In all cases, the 
data must be updated quarterly or more frequently if market conditions warrant… the 
bank must create several benchmark portfolios that are vulnerable to the same main 
risk factors to which the bank is exposed. The exposure to these benchmark portfolios 
shall be calculated using (a) current positions at current market prices, stressed 
volatilities, stressed correlations and other relevant stressed exposure model inputs 
from the 3-year stress period and (b) current positions at end of stress period market 
prices, stressed volatilities, stressed correlations and other relevant stressed exposure 
model inputs from the 3-year stress period.675 
This still assumes that a three-year snapshot of past performance is a sufficient indicator of 
future performance.  The writer sees three main reasons why this might not be the case.   
Firstly, oil provides 80-90% of government revenue, and the government has as yet shown no 
inclination to garner new non-oil sources of revenue. Recent falls in oil prices, in part due to 
Saudi overproduction in an attempt to weaken competition from Russia and Venezuela, has 
rendered state finances heavily exposed.676  This has caused Saudi Arabia's sovereign risk 
score to worsened by three points, pushing it to the lower end of the A rating band.677  
The Economist Intelligence Unit expects the fiscal account in 2015 to return its widest deficit 
since 1987, and stay in deficit in 2016, although there are sufficient reserves to cover this 
                                                 
 
674  Vinnicombe, Thea and David Park,The Implications Of Islamic Jurisprudence For The International Harmonization Of 
Accounting Standards, (2007) 6 Financial Reporting, Regulation & Governance, University of the Sunshine Coast, 
Queensland, Australia, p. 
675  Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems. p 30. 
676  Recession in Russia, revolt in Venezuela? The knock-on effects of tumbling oil prices, Guardian, 16 October 2014,  
http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/oct/16/datablog-low-oil-prices-chill-producer-economies 
677 Saudi Arabia –  Country Risk report  The Swedish Export Credits Guarantee Board 
http://www.ekn.se/Global/Landriskanalyser/Mellan%C3%B6stern/Engelska/Saudiarabien2013EngExtern.pdf DATE 
14/05/2013 
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deficit. However, because oil accounts for around 90% of export and government revenue, 
the state of play with respect to oil prices could begin to damage the economy as early as 
2018 if they remain at the present historic lows.678 
Given the huge amount of foreign reserves held by KSA, the oil price ought not to begin to 
affect the value of the Sa’udi riyal for some time, especially as oil is paid for in dollars.  This 
should cushion it from the blow to the entire national value felt for example by Australia, 
when the major export, iron ore, fell in price by half: the Australian dollar lost a quarter of its 
value between 2012 and 2015 and so did, therefore, every asset of everyone in Australia.  
Were a shock of this nature to affect the KSA, the foreign borrowings, valued in US dollars 
or Euros, would suddenly cost many more riyals to pay back. 
Secondly, KSA has poor governance metrics.  Corruption is also widespread both according 
to Transparency International's "Corruption Perception Index,”679 and the World Bank 
"Worldwide Governance Indicators".680   
Even within corporations, the adoption of corporate governance standards is not uniform and 
the Capital Markets Authority compels the adoption of regulations, which merely constitute 
“guiding principles”, for example: 
Article 8: Policies and Procedure related to Disclosure 
The company shall lay down in writing the policies, procedures and 
Supervisory rules related to disclosure, pursuant to law. 681 
 
The State owned shipping company, Bahri, for example, has adopted a corporate governance 
policy which simply allows for the company to adopt policies aimed at securing the 
company’s financial stability and instituting an annual monitoring review program, without 
specifying what those policies might be, or how the annual review might be conducted.682  
                                                 
 
678 Saudi Arabia Country Risk, The Economist Intelligence Unit Last Updated: May 2015 
https://store.eiu.com/product.aspx?pubid=310001031&pid=60000206&gid=310001031 
679 KSA ranks 66th place of 176. www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview 
680 Saudi Arabia ranks worst of the six Gulf countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council. Al-Kuwari, Duha Mission 
impossible? Genuine economic development in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries  
http://www.lse.ac.uk/middleEastCentre/kuwait/documents/Mission-impossible-genuine-economic-development-in-the-
GCC.pdf 
681Corporate Governance Regulations in KSA issued by the Board of Capital Market Authority Pursuant to Resolution No. 
1/212/2006 http://www.cma.org.sa/En/Documents/ CORPORATE%20GOVERNANCE%20REGULATIONS-2011.pdf 
682 BAHRI Corporate Governance Regulations adopted 20 December, 2009. 
http://www.bahri.sa/Bahri_Corporate_Governance_English.pdf 
 220 | P a g e  
 
220 
When comparing these regulations with the equivalent Malaysian or British ones, the level of 
disclosure required pales by comparison.683 
There is a history of poor governance in KSA banks. In 1982, SAMA had to step in when 
irregularities appeared in the operations of Saudi Cairo Bank. Two senior managers were 
involved in unauthorised trading in bullion, and Saudi Cairo Bank had concealed 
accumulated losses that exceeded its share capital. SAMA took legal action against the 
managers and required the bank to issue new shares and double its capital in 1986. The 
increase was taken up entirely by the Public Investment Fund as an “investor of last 
resort”.684 
Thirdly, the Dubai bubble shows that some property speculation takes more than three years 
to unravel.  Relatively sudden crashes in commodity prices can render lending on plant and 
equipment used in mining risky, as witness the falls in iron ore and oil prices over the last 
two years [as of April 2015].685 Those industries begin to shed workers and housing in those 
areas loses value.  Indeed whole national economies begin to falter (Venezuela and oil, 
Australia and iron ore).686 The PLS makes depositors liable for the entire financial shock 
suffered by the borrower and the fact that there may be a pledged asset to be sold does not 
make the depositor’s situation any easier than would be a depositor in a conventional bank.   
Indeed it probably makes it worse, because whilst realised values of security often differ 
widely from book values, the methodology of establishing book values for Islamic banks is, 
as the writer has demonstrated in this section, fatally flawed.    
Fourthly, as Arakcheev, Baklanova and Tanega point out, Murabahah incurs credit risk- 
which includes market risk, which encompasses interest rate risk, foreign exchange risk, and 
spread risk, from its daily exposure to through its escrow agent. 687 This combination of risks 
is inherited in the investment process and depends, inter alia, on the general level and 
volatility of interest rates, currency fluctuations, presence of hedges.  In a market kept 
                                                 
 
683 Errico, N_59 above.; Prates, N_67 above; Lastra, N_68 above. 
684 Al-Suhaimi, Jammaz Consolidation, competition, foreign presence and systemic stability in the Saudi banking industry, 
BIS papers no 4, 131, http://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap04n.pdf 
685 On Venezuela and oil, http://www.bbc.com/news/business-29643612,  On Australia and iron ore, Iron ore price crash 
erases $74b in market value, Australian Financial Review, 20 April 2015,  http://www.afr.com/business/mining/iron-
ore/iron-ore-price-crash-erases-74b-in-market-value-20150419-1mo522 
686 On Venezuela and oil, http://www.bbc.com/news/business-29643612,  On Australia and iron ore, Iron ore price crash 
erases $74b in market value, Australian Financial Review, 20 April 2015,  http://www.afr.com/business/mining/iron-
ore/iron-ore-price-crash-erases-74b-in-market-value-20150419-1mo522 
687 Arakcheev, N_168 above.  
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buoyant by high oil prices, Arakcheev, Baklanova and Tanega   argue that these risks are 
sufficiently mitigated by the high quality of such securities.   If prices fall because the fatal 
flaw in the Sa’udi economy which is identified in this chapter, leads to a fall in the Riyal 
where sukuk and murabahah contracts are denominated in USDs and Euros, the situation may 
well be different.688 
7.3.3 Could There be an Islamic Sub-prime Crisis? 
In a sense the security of the sukuk market is just as confected as conventional credit 
securities was the housing price bubble.  It may well be argued that what caused the global 
financial crisis of 2007 was not the way that the loans on American and British real estate 
were packaged, allowing interest rates to rise from a low rate to a high rate after so many 
years.  This is a view expressed for example by Suleman Muhammad Ali of Meezan Bank 
Limited,689 and in my respectful view it is self-serving and wrong.  
I will demonstrate that a sub-prime scenario with respect to housing could equally occur with 
rental amounts or instalment repayments under an Islamic loan such as Murabahah ہح بﺍرم .  I 
will then demonstrate that the sub-prime crisis was caused by lending on an asset regardless 
of the debtor’s inability to repay on the false belief that the value of the asset will increase.   I 
will finally demonstrate that not only could there be an Islamic sub-prime crisis resulting 
from perfectly acceptable practices supported by fatawa from the central Shari’a Committee 
used by the Central Bank of Malaysia, the committee approving the practices discussed in the 
case study in this thesis, but there is because of the conditions described in Sa’udi Arabia in 
the foregoing part of this chapter a real possibility of a totally halal, totally Shari’a compliant 
but nevertheless totally devastating meltdown of the Sa’udi banking system unless the 
methodologies and systems used in KSA are harmonized with international standards, 
including but not limited to those of Basel III. 
The crisis did not arise because loans were made to people who had no real prospect of 
repayment.  In fact, making “benevolent loans” or interest free loans ضر ق ہن س ح to the poor 
in an attempt to alleviate their poverty is at the heart of Islam.   Indeed it is possible that the 
                                                 
 
688 Ibid. 
689  Suleman Muhammad Ali, The Subprime Crisis and the Lessons for the Islamic Finance Industry, NEW HORIZON,  
April 2013, 15, viewed at www.islamic-banking.com   
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first low-interest period of a sub-prime type mortgage to a Muslim borrower could be a 
benevolent loan with low instalments and the balance of the period could be a Murabahah 
with high instalments, without infringing Islamic principles.  
The sunnah of the Prophet (Peace and Blessings be upon Him) is very clear on this issue. It is 
reported that the Prophet (Peace and Blessings be upon Him)   said,  
In the night of the journey, I saw on the gate of heaven written, 'reward for tzadaqah 
is ten times and reward for qard al-hasan is eighteen times'. So, I asked the angel, 
how is it possible? The angel replied, "Because a beggar who asked had already had 
something but a borrower did not ask for loan unless he was in need.690 
Ibn Kathîr’s commentary on the Qur’ân explains the meaning of a “beautiful loan”691: 
“Whatever you spend, then Allah will replace it, and on Him will be the reward of whatever 
you give away in charity. Allah considered giving charity as if it is a loan to Him.” 692 
Low-doc, no-doc loans to persons with no income and no assets have been decried by critics 
of western decadence as immoral.  However, Ibn Kathîr says, writing of beneficial loans:  
Umar bin Al-Khattab said that this Ayah refers to spending in Allah's cause. It was 
also said that it pertains to spending on children. What is correct is that it is more 
general than that. So all those who spend in the cause of Allah with good intentions 
and a sincere heart fall under the generality of this verse.” 693  
So an Islamic bank lending to a poor person to save him or her from homelessness would be 
acting morally and to the highest standards. At the end of the initial period, the face value of 
the loan (asl al-qard) is to be paid off from the proceeds of a Murabahah.  This allows an 
initial period where the poor person is helped to his or her feet, and thereafter a Murabahah 
with high instalments still does not breach the ban on riba.  
The fatwa of Saleem and Abozaid emphatically declares that any benefit that a Muslim lender 
gets without harming or burdening a Muslim borrower should not be prohibited. They declare 
that the issue of prohibited benefit it is that a haram benefit can harm the borrower, but a 
halal loan can bring benefit to the two parties and no harm to any one of them.  Such a loan 
doesn’t contradict any Shari’a principle will not be prohibited “especially when we know that 
                                                 
 
690 Ibn Hisham & Ibn Majah, cited by Saleem, Mohammad Yusuf and Abdulazeem Abozaid Benefiting From Loan 
Contracts, http://www.kantakji.com/media/9499/file716.pdf 
691 Sûrah al-Taghâbun, verse 17 
692 Abdul-Rahman, Muhammad, Saed Tafsir Ibn Kathir (Part 28): Al-Mujadila 1 to At-Tahrim 12 
693 Sûrah al-Hadîd, verse 11 
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Shari’a does not prohibit interest which will not harm anyone.” 694They explain the juristic 
saying “any loan which results in a benefit is considered usury” a general rule, which cannot 
be applied where the borrower wholeheartedly gives more than what he borrowed on the 
condition that it is not a condition of the lender.   
Saleem has written a fatwa, on behalf of the Shari’a Committee at the behest of the Central 
Bank of Malaysia,695 which declares that financing settlement - in the scenario the writer 
proposes, of the benevolent loan - through the issuance of debt securities to the original 
financier, - in the scenario the writer proposes, of the Murabahah - which will indirectly 
create new financial obligation, is allowed by Shari’a.  The rescheduling and restructuring 
method must be implemented by taking into consideration the Shari’a requirements such as, 
the existence of an unambiguous contract, a Shari’a compliant sale asset, and terms and 
conditions which are not contrary to Shari’a.  Saleem cites the following as the basis for his 
fatwa: 
Islamic restructuring of debt through a separate issuance of debt securities to the original 
financier involves a scenario in which the existing contracting parties enter into another 
separate and independent contract. Generally, there is no Shari’a impediment for the 
contracting parties to execute another separate and exclusive contract amongst them. The 
issuance of debt securities… to the original financier is viewed as a transaction which 
does not affect the validity of the existing financing contract. 696 
This fatwa seems to be at the heart of the case study cited elsewhere in this thesis. That is to 
say, the strength of IB in Malaysia is based on some fairly flexible fatawa. 
It follows that the purchase of housing in a property bubble by a no-income, no-assets 
borrower not only could be made possible by IB but that compassion for the poor means that 
it would be made possible.  According to a further fatwa, there is, according to the view of 
the majority of scholars, no upper limit on the amount of the instalment, in exactly the same 
way as there is no rule which indicates how much profit a trader can make on his or her 
products from an Islamic view.  According to the fatwa of Rabee' Al-Aakhir,  
“A Muslim tradesman should not be greedy… and only interested in material things... 
in his business. Rather, the moral conduct should be his major concern... and he should 
                                                 
 
694 Saleem, Mohammad Yusuf and Abdulazeem Abozaid (2013)  Benefiting From Loan Contracts, International Shari’a 
Research Academy For Islamic Finance, p.8 http://www.kantakji.com/media/9499/file716.pdf 
695 38th meeting of the Shari’a Committee dated 28 August 2003 
696 http://ifikr.isra.my/fatwa/-/fatwa/getFatwa?_7008_WAR_fatwaportlet_fatwaId=4091 
 224 | P a g e  
 
224 
consider the circumstances of the public ...in all his dealings”697 
The writer has not been able to find any ruling which restricts the rate at which a bank 
calculates instalments.  It follows that as long as the instalment rate is fixed, so that the 
contract is certain in advance, there is nothing to stop an Islamic version of sub-prime lending 
as the writer has described it.  There is no impediment to an IB selling its interest in the 
Murabahah. The difference is that what an Islamic bank would be selling is not a 
collateralized debt obligation but an actual share in real estate, which would have a greater 
value and depending on the terms of the underlying contract be just as saleable on an open 
market as any other interest in property.  
There is also a Malaysian Central Bank fatwa permitting the structure I have proposed:  
It is permissible and is not tantamount to the sale of debt with debt, which is 
prohibited by the Shari’a… [if] the transfer of beneficial ownership that is reflected in 
the contract documentation is sufficient, accepted and recognized by the Shari’a 
[because the] sale of debt with a debt, which is prohibited by the Shari’a, does not 
arise because the transfer of ownership takes place automatically given that the 
underlying asset used in the transaction is the lender’s remaining legal interest in the 
property. The documentation on the sale and purchase agreement is the main evidence 
for the transfer of ownership. Therefore, the investor has the right to sell the asset to a 
third party without referring to or executing the transfer of ownership with the 
borrower. There is also reference to a floating rate of instalment payment which 
would in effect allow for a floating rate of interest, due to the principle of muoasah 
(offset) which arises where two parties are indebted to each other and the debts are 
settled based on the payment of the difference between the two debts amount. 698 
 
I have previously discussed the Malaysian moves to have an international voice on Shari’a-
compliance finance in Chapter 5 and therefore, the above fatwa may have more than a local 
significance.  According to the writer’s understanding of that fatwa, the gain or loss on the 
effective market rate is permitted as an amendment to the instalment amount in the contract if 
the contracting parties are convinced that the outcome of the application represents the actual 
loss suffered by a party to the contract as a result of market changes.  This also allows a 
penalty to be charged by the lender as a result of a default by the borrower.  If interpreted 
according to the view of Sanhuri, an eminent modern jurist, it will allow a floating instalment 
rate because if the terms of the calculation of the instalments are certain, the contract is not 
                                                 
 
697 Fatwa No 92029 of Rabee' Al-Aakhir 4, 1427 / 3 May, 2006 viewed at http://library.islamweb.net/ 
698 Shari’a advisory committee, 54th meeting dated 27 October 2005, http://ifikr.isra.my/fatwa/-
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affected by lack of knowledge about the material terms of contract. Such a contract is 
therefore not rendered haram because of Ghārār. Sanhuri says that Ghārār takes place only 
when it is not known whether the subject matter exists, or if it exists at all, whether it can be 
handed over to the buyer, or when want of knowledge affects the identification of the genus 
or species of subject matter - none of which relate to real estate transactions - or when it 
affects its quantum, identity, date of a future performance or other necessary conditions.  It 
follows that a clear and transparent method of calculating installments according to an 
Islamic market rate indicator, rather like the Central Bank of Malaysia’s Islamic Market 
Swap Rate for debt defaults, as mentioned in the cases study in this thesis in chapters 5 and 6 
would allow the final element of a sub-prime mortgage as an Islamic concept, as long as the 
profit component was part of a mudaraba and not riba.699 
Furthermore, there is authority for the proposition that an Islamic form of CDO would be 
halal.  Surah al-Baqarah (2:275) makes it crystal clear that the Lawgiver prohibits riba and 
permits sales transactions in contracts of exchange are clearly allowed in Shari’a, whether 
payment is spot or deferred; and the latter, by definition, creates debt. From the Shari’a point 
of view, IB products are initially permissible as long as the elements of usury, uncertainty, 
injustice, and all other haram activities are eliminated. Why, then, should we call for 
restrictions on the use of debt-based instruments when the original rule for them is that they 
are halal?700 
Saleem allows the issue of receiving a brokerage commission for acquiring a loan for 
someone, with the condition that the broker informs the lender of the financial status of the 
person seeking the loan.  As he states,  
Some people might not be able to find someone who can give them a loan, due to the 
fact that they lack acquaintances. [Therefore…] they need the assistance of someone 
who is of prominence in the community to help them. ”701 
7.3.4 The Benefits of Islamic vis a vis Conventional Banking?   
 
Suleman Muhammad Ali criticizes the sub-prime debacle for being based on the following 
                                                 
 
699 . Razali, Siti Salwani , The Principles Of Ghārār In Bai Bithaman Ajil Contract, Proceedings of The MFA Conference 
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700 Badri, Ustaz Mohd Bahroddin, Islamic Financing: Are Debt-Based Instruments Not Islamic?  ISRA Islamic Finance 
Space Issue 02, International Sharí’a Shari’a Research Academy for Islamic Finance,  December 2014,  16 
701 Saleem, Mohammad Yusuf and Abdulazeem Abozaid (2013) Benefiting from Loan Contracts, International Shari’a 
Research Academy for Islamic Finance, p.11.  http://www.kantakji.com/media/9499/file716.pdf 
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assumptions, and he paraphrases Warren Buffet, CEO of Berkshire Hathaway, speaking at 
the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in June 2010, as follows: 
 
Housing prices would not fall dramatically. Free and open financial markets would 
most effectively support market efficiency and stability, directing funds to the most 
profitable and productive uses; Concepts embedded in mathematics and physics could 
be directly adapted to markets, in the form of various financial models used to 
evaluate credit risk; Economic imbalances, such as large trade deficits and low 
savings rates indicative of over consumption, were sustainable. Stronger regulation of 
the non-banking financial system and derivatives markets was not needed. 702 
Suleman Muhammad Ali then claims that the prevalence of those assumptions, the increase 
in demand for housing and the cheap supply of credit resulted in a boom in the construction 
industry to increase the supply of housing to meet the demand. 703  
In the writer’s view exactly the same criticism can be made about the issue of sukuk.  Let us 
examine these in turn.  Firstly, as the SAMBA report indicates, oil prices have fallen to an 
unsustainably low level.  If as it is suggested, oil prices are some $43 per barrel under way 
they need to be in order to assist sustain KSA’s level of foreign reserves with its current level 
of spending, then assuming a production of 1.8 million barrels of crude oil per day, sales of 
oil are some $28.25 billion per year beneath they need to be.704   Whilst at this level it would 
take a total of some 30 years to deplete the country’s foreign reserves to zero.705 It is 
worrying that even at an optimum sales price, according to the report, KSA will still be losing 
$15 per barrel in the medium to long term.706 It is not entirely unreasonable to suggest that 
the $85 optimum price reflects the cost at which the non-Arab world can produce alternatives 
to oil.707  
                                                 
 
702 Saleem, Mohammad Yusuf and Abdulazeem Abozaid (2013) Benefiting from Loan Contracts, International Shari’a 
Research Academy for Islamic Finance, p.11.  http://www.kantakji.com/media/9499/file716.pdf; but the Guardian had a 
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703 Suleman Muhammad Ali, The Subprime Crisis and the Lessons for the Islamic Finance Industry, NEW HORIZON,  
April 2013, 16, viewed at www.islamic-banking.com   
704 http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21651821-chaos-middle-east-casts-saudi-arabia-arab-worlds-leader-it-must-
reform 
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It is not the first time that this has happened in KSA.  When oil prices tumbled from the all-
time high in 1981 and continued to decline for the next five years, the resultant economic 
slowdown put significant pressure on the quality of banks’ assets. Government revenues rose 
to SAR 333 billion by 1981, but dropped to just SAR 74 billion by 1987. Credit to the private 
sector, which had increased over 500% during the period 1976-81, grew only at an annual 
rate of less than 4% per year in the same period.708 
It is a matter of common knowledge that alternatives to oil have become progressively 
cheaper in the last few years  and it may well be that the market average  oil price  does not 
even return to $85 per barrel.  It is also a matter of record that the Chancellor of Germany, 
Ms Angela Merkel, announced that Europe will reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 40% 
from 2010 levels by 2050.709 
The KSA has based its infrastructure spending on the basis of an increasing demand for oil, a 
higher oil price than its own figures says is possible. This will put pressure on the Saudi 
economy, and ultimately lead to a drop in the value of the Saudi currency. Saudi consumers 
of electricity for example, pay in local currency but their sukuk bonds have to be repaid in 
USDs or Euros.   This will further harm living standards and cause a need for even more 
austerity as money is taken away from needed public works in order to pay foreign debt.  
There is nothing new about this theory - it has caused devaluations in the currency of many 
commodity producing nations including, during the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand. 710 
An analysis of that crisis demonstrates that as foreign reserves become depleted, the value of 
the local currency will fall further.   This leads to a crisis in the value of the secured assets, 
assuming that the sukuk is secured or that there is any guarantee pledged, as they of course 
are valued in the local currency.  An electricity business, to take the Saudi Electric sukuk as 
an example, is only worth what the locals can afford to pay for it.  This presents a risk to 
investors which has clearly not yet been priced into the valuation of the sukuk.  
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Secondly, Suleiman complains that little emphasis on the credit quality of such loans since 
the brokers’ focus was merely to earn large profits through origination fees in the short term 
in the form, inter alia, of profits from the sale of collateralized debt obligations.  The writer 
demonstrated earlier in this chapter that similar fees are permitted both for brokers of 
mudurabah loans and, by extension, for brokers of sukuk.  Suleiman complains that the banks 
dealing in CDOs were not concerned about their long- term quality or the defaults that would 
arise if housing prices started to fall. A similar criticism can be made of Islamic mortgage 
brokers and sukuk brokers, for which we need look no further than the Dubai housing bubble, 
where, for example, Dubai Islamic Bank and Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank each required a 
government bailout during the global financial crisis.711   Although, as argued in this paper, 
the crisis in Dubai was one of its government’s own making, the crisis demonstrated the 
weakness of the IB system.   
Sukuk structures have been used in a number of sovereign and semi-sovereign issues, in 
Malaysia, Qatar, Pakistan and Bahrain, Dubai and the German Bundesstaat of Saxony-Anhalt 
(the first non-Islamic Sukuk issuer) and in each case brokers received fees. 712   Fees on 
broking sukuk for Sa’udi Electric for example were earned by, among others, Al Rajhi 
Capital, a division of Al Rajhi Bank, the biggest Islamic bank in the world.713 According to 
Al Rajhi’s website, in 2014 Saudi Arabia ranked second in the global sukuk new issuances 
with a share of about 13%, with assets of SAR 273 billion (USD 72 billion). 
Al Rajhi Capital manages over US$6 billion of assets and earns heavily from brokerage, with 
a brokerage charge of 1% and an annual management fee of 0.25%.   This contributed to the 
Bank’s recorded SAR 7.4 billion in net profit in 2013.714    Given that the average time that a 
bond is held, according to the Al Rajhi website, is four years, the average amount derived 
annually from fees relating to sukuk brokerage and maintenance is some SAR 110 million.  It 
cannot therefore be said that Al Rajhi brokers have no incentive to sell sukuk.  I summarise 
my arguments as follows:  the criticism Suleiman raises of collateralised debt obligations can 
just as easily be raised against sukuk. 
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The third most important criticism raised by Suleiman is that according to the proponents of 
collateralised debt obligations, stronger regulation of the non-banking financial system and 
derivatives markets was not needed.  The proof that proponents of IB are not immune from 
this criticism is the gap between Islamic and general accounting standards as outlined earlier 
in this chapter.  There is a further argument that the Kafala or guarantee bonds issued for 
many sukuk such as those in Dubai were worthless, or at least unenforceable due to the poor 
legal framework in the issuing country.   That is, there were regulations but the regulations 
were valueless.715 
As to the fourth criticism made by Suleiman, of increasing indebtedness in Western 
countries, there are no reliable Sa’udi figures available to me.  However there are figures 
from the UAE that strongly suggest a trend to growing indebtedness. 
The proliferation of personal finance and credit cards has been amongst the glaring 
examples of this epidemic. A survey conducted in UAE in 2011 found that a quarter 
of UAE residents have debts of over $68,000 while more than 20% are not even 
aware of the size of their outstanding debt. Another 40% of residents have personal 
loans of between $27,000 and $54,000. The result also showed that 12% of its 
residents own more than six credit cards, with 15% of these cards bearing outstanding 
balances of over $27,000… the total consumer debt in GCC countries at $139 
billion…. The tawarruq facility is a highly profitable business where customers often 
end up paying an effective profit rate based on APR of 12% to 28%! 716 
The level of indebtedness cannot be measured in the same way as the indebtedness of US or 
UK citizens prior to the global financial crisis due to a difference in methodology for 
measuring tax liabilities, student loans and contingent liabilities such as variable interest rates 
on mortgages.  However the debt is computed, it appears that in terms of purchasing power 
parity, the average UAE citizen in 2011 has a similar debt profile to the average UK or US 
citizen in January 2015: Outstanding consumer credit—reflecting Americans’ total debt 
outside of mortgages—grew 4.18% or $11.56 billion to $3.33 trillion in January,717 but if 
divided by the population figure shown on the popular US government website “Popclock” 
was approximately 319 million at that time.718 The average non-mortgage debt per head was 
                                                 
 
715 Lahlou, M.S. and  J.A. Tanega  (2007)  Islamic Securitisation: Part II - A Proposal for International Standards, Legal 
Guidelines and Structures  University of Westminster, School of Law, Journal of International Banking Law and 
Regulation Volume 22 Issue 7, 359. 
716 Kasri, Noor Suhaida & Shamsiah Mohamad, Unethical Profit-Making and Islamic Banking Practices ISRA Islamic 
Finance Space Issue 02, International Shari’a Research Academy for Islamic Finance, December 2014, 13-14. 
717 U.S. Consumers’ Credit-Card Debt Falls in January, Wall Street Journal, 6 March, 2015 
718 http://www.census.gov/popclock/ 
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therefore only some USD10,400.  According to the popular my-budget website, the median 
US wage for 2011 was USD 26,965,719 for an average working week (for full time 
employees) of 46.7 hours.  This high figure is not adjusted for the number of part-time 
workers who average 25.7 hours a week, and whose income figures bring the median wage 
down.720  The estimated median wage for full time workers in 2011 was around USD 
40,000.721  Accordingly average debt was about 40% of median salary for all workers or 25% 
of median salary for full-time workers. 
For the corresponding period the median salary for all of those paid in actual money in the 
UAE, working an average 53-hour week, was AED 39000722 or approximately USD 
10620.723   This figure includes, apparently, full-time and part-time workers.724 UAE salaries 
are far higher than those in many other GCC countries, with Sa’udi mid-level managers 
earning a shocking 25% less than their Emirati counterparts in their countries of birth.725  
However, shockingly, one worker in 12 in the UAE does not receive income in cash726 so the 
figures are a bit hard to compare.   
Whilst the ILO does not publish accurate figures on Sa’udi wages, Migrant Rights 
Worldwide claims that the 80% of the Saudi labor force that are “guest workers” – some 5.6 
million workers – earn, if they are Filipino, only USD 9 daily.727  This does not sound like a 
great platform on which to build a massive infrastructure program, much less to issue sukuk 
to the world market in order to fund it. 
In summary, given the much lower incomes across the GCC than in the US, the fact that 47 
million GCC residents728 owed around USD 3000 per head or some 29.5% of annual salary, 
and were working at least 275 hours per year to maintain their lifestyles than their US 
                                                 
 
719 http://www.mybudget360.com/how-much-do-americans-earn-what-is-the-average-us-income/ 
720 McGregor, Jena  The average work week is now 47 hours Washington Post, September 2, 2014.Retrieved 
fromhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/on-leadership/wp/2014/09/02/the-average-work-week-is-now-47-hours/ 
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722 Qingxia Tong Wages Structure in the in the United Arab Emirates Institute for Social & Economic Research (ISER) 
Working Paper No. 2 July 2010 
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724 Qingxia Tong Wages Structure in the in the United Arab Emirates Institute for Social & Economic Research (ISER) 
Working Paper No. 2 July 2010 
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counterparts, is a clear refutation of Suleiman’s fourth point.    
In short, my view is that IB in its present stage, at least as it is practiced in KSA and its 
neighbors’, is a collateralized debt obligation-type crisis waiting to happen.  The capital 
adequacy of IBs at present may look healthy, but no amount of capital reserve will help a 
bank where the assets in which it has invested, as a body, lose their value because of the 
materialization of these valuation risks. Further, any adverse economic change to consumers 
as a whole in a country such as KSA, such as a reduction in wages paid by the Government 
due to a need for austerity measures will present an economic shock to investors. 
The asymmetrical knowledge that this might happen is one form of sovereign risk as well.  
Are there any other forms? 
7.3.5 Sovereign Risk and Risk of Corruption 
No regulatory system can regulate sovereign risk.  Sovereign risk (or political risk) is a 
situation where the political and economic situation creates credit risks.729  It also includes 
government corruption,730 as was seen in the Dubai bubble affair.  One major international 
developer now warns in respect of developments in Bahrain, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Oman, and UAE: 
The common thread in the results is that the broad-level country risk factors – such as 
political and sovereign risk and corruption – dominate shopping center pricing in emerging 
markets when it comes to emerging markets, these have far greater impact on investor 
decision-making than, for example, consumer demand or real estate specific factors.731 
Possibly political and sovereign risk and risk of corruption are worse in Islamic countries 
without an advanced legal system where the courts are not independent of the State, that is, 
there is no separation of powers between the judiciary and the rulers.  Those countries have 
little accountability or transparency in Government and little or no free media which can 
serve to keep any of the branches of Government in check.  The risk to investors, and to the 
IBs in which they invest, is increased because much of the information on which a rational 
investment decision is based comes either from court reports or from the media.  Companies 
which are publicly sued for debt on a regular basis are clearly credit risks; where a legal 
                                                 
 
729 See for example https://www.eiu.com/handlers/PublicDownload.ashx?mode=m&fi=risk-section/country-risk-service.pdf 
730  See for example Moser Christoph et al, (2006) Political risk and export promotion: evidence from Germany Deutsche 
Bundesbank Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies No 36/2006, Frankfurt a.M. 
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system either does not facilitate these actions or does not facilitate them to be reported, the 
lack of transparency obscures the risk.  
The strength of the Malaysian system, which it inherits from the British, is a strong tradition 
of respect for the rule of law with clear statements of what statute and precedent are, and 
severe enforcement mechanisms. By contrast, in the KSA our anti-corruption commission has 
been accused of being toothless by the Shoura Council’s human rights committee of failing to 
fight corruption in the country, handling fewer cases,732 and only clawing back two sums over 
two consecutive years.733  As of August 1, 2015, the draft law on anti-corruption has still not 
passed the Shoura Council for assent by the King.734 
Capital adequacy restrictions are no safeguard against the corrupt theft of a bank’s capital. 
The question is whether others in the KSA share this same understanding.   
7.4 Discussion 
One of the most important features of Basel II and III is their continuous changes to the 
methodologies of assessing risk.  For example, there are significant changes in the risk 
weighting of assets for determination of capital requirements. Depending on the supervisory 
assessment of banks’ risk management capabilities, these changes would give the banks the 
option to adopt either a) the Standardised Approach, b) Foundation Internal-Ratings Based 
Approach, or c) the Advanced Internal-Based Rating Approach. The ultimate objective is to 
develop risk management culture in banks by requiring lesser capital for the adoption of 
appropriate policies by banks. 
The difference in the nature of Islamic modes of finance makes the risks of Islamic banks’ 
assets different from those created by interest-based lending. This makes the risk-weighting 
system more complex in assessing the quality of assets. This is because assets are not risk-
weighted individually in the old Basel system, but rather grouped and bucketed according to 
the different risk categories. The internal ratings-based approach removes this problem by 
requiring the probability of default (quality) of each asset to be determined individually. 
                                                 
 
732 Caseload dropped from 2,622 in 2013 to 1,278 in 2014: http://www.arabnews.com/saudi-arabia/news/767096 
733 http://www.arabnews.com/saudi-arabia/news/767096 
734 Shoura to study anticorruption law http://www.arabnews.com/saudi-arabia/news/755136 
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Let us, for example, take the Sa’udi construction market.  Looking to the West for a moment, 
it is conceded that the sub-prime market allowed borrowers who possibly ought not to have 
received loans to buy real estate because of excessive liquidity in the CB system.  However it 
was not that excessive liquidity alone which caused house prices to rise, as witness the fact 
that in the UK house prices are still rising despite a distinct lack of liquidity in the CB system 
in 2015735 and indeed despite falling living standards in the UK.736  So ratings in the UK 
based on real estate in the UK seem to be relatively reliable.    
The situation in KSA differs.  Currently, there is a large supply of office space and hotels 
under construction in Riyadh and Jeddah. As the projects are completed, the market will need 
time to absorb the new supply, which may lower occupancies, lease rates and possibly sale 
prices.737  Arab News, a State publication in KSA, reported on 19 April 2013 with respect to 
a decree on land values which is yet to fully take effect: 
Real estate experts say the King’s ruling will see a drop in real estate prices. Some 
expect a huge decline in rents because the land will be available to citizens within a 
year…They believe there has been a real estate bubble in the Kingdom, which will 
soon be deflated by the government's action to either build houses and provide them 
to citizens at reduced prices, or provide land and construction loans. 738 
Prudent risk evaluation, based on an understanding of long term macro-economic trends, 
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Chapter 8: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, the conclusions and findings based on the established primary, subsidiary and 
other initial research questions will be provided. To be discussed also, as part of the 
conclusion are the efforts of the IBB to coexist with Islamic financial structures. From the 
Malaysian and IBB case studies using a content analysis approach of the two banks, it is clear 
that risk management practices can be reconciled with Islamic banking practices to a certain 
extent. The extent to which a pragmatic approach is justified, includes a solution that justifies 
Shari’a compliant rhetoric in discussing specific elements that can be reconciled with 
conventional banking methods. Thus, the following sections will discuss how components of 
Malaysian and European banking can be adopted by the Islamic financial model, in order to 
improve the overall banking structure in Saudi Arabia. 
8.2 Malaysian Case Study – Islamic Central Bank and BNM  
The Malaysian case study considered the impacts of regulatory reforms on the Malaysian IB 
sector, which remained well capitalised while remaining largely reliant on debt based (as 
opposed to equity based) financing.739 The regulatory and institutional framework for 
managing and mitigating risks in the Malaysian IB sector was found to be well established 
and defined, relative to less developed markets in the GCC wherein enforcement-related 
challenges and inconsistencies of the interpretation of Shari’a restriction on certain modes of 
financing continue to obstruct regulatory progress.740 We considered the implementation of 
Basel rules in Malaysia, highlighting the apparent tension between global banking standards 
and the regional standards issued by the IBSB, while elucidating the remaining challenges 
faced by Malaysian Islamic finance institutions in the course of complying with these 
rules.741 
8.3 Risk Management Methodologies 
We have also shown that a comprehensive survey of empirical findings and data supports the 
conclusion that many Islamic banking institutions have retained high levels of capital, while 
                                                 
 
739 Ellias, N_264 above. 
740  Meera, N_265 above, 5-30.  
741 Ibid. 
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surviving the worst effects of the global financial crisis.  They have done so by adopting two 
critical strategies:  1) the effective implementation of global capital adequacy thresholds (the 
bank was well capitalised during the onset of the crisis) and 2) its recourse to standardised 
methods and criteria for calculating risk weighted assets (to reflect more optimal risk-return 
trade-offs).  These techniques are not unique to Islamic Banking, however. Indeed, these risk 
management techniques are aligned to regulatory reform measures adopted under the meta-
supervisory authority of the global banking regulatory body, the Basel Committee.  We 
believe that the extent to which IBs have been able to minimise or prevent credit risks, 
relative to CBs, is worthy of greater consideration.   
Much is made of the success of Malaysia’s IB system but the research does not include the 
period of the rapid decline of the Malaysian currency during the Asian melt-down of 1997.  
The research starts somewhat later in most cases.  One who had bought Malaysian Ringgit 
with his or her Saudi Riyals or Emirati Dinars in 1996 would have lost approximately one-
third of his investment over the period of 1996 to 1999.742  If that investment had been in a 
Malaysian company extracting minerals from neighbouring Islamic Indonesia and the 
investment been in rupiah, the currency loss would have been 80%.743 
Nevertheless, as has been demonstrated, the Malaysian IB system is growing – in part 
because it competes with a non-IB system in the same country dominated by banks owned 
predominantly by ethnic Chinese interests, including Standard Chartered, a major shareholder 
of which is the Singapore sovereign wealth fund’s Tamasek.744  The writer infers that there is 
a race to the top to show that the IB system can compete on roughly equal terms, so that a 
Muslim investor with a choice will invest in an IB rather than a CB.  The figure of the 51% of 
the Malaysian population who are Muslim has not translated to a 51% share, or even half 
that, for the IB sector of the entire Malaysian banking system. The figure, however, is better 
than the loss-making IBB, which as the only retail IB in the UK only achieved a client base 
roughly equivalent to 2% of the Muslim population of the UK.  Losses have also been made 
by IBB, a bank which was subject to the Basel regulations, of 25% of the value of its 
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deposits.   
What lessons can the Saudi banking system learn from this?  It is true that the most recent 
macro-economic shock affecting UK, North America and much of Europe was brought about 
by the collapse of the sub-prime mortgage market, but that did not affect, for example, the 
Australians whose economy seemingly sailed through the crisis bolstered by high commodity 
prices, a fairly isolated banking system and a pro-active government stimulus package.  As of 
August 1st, 2015, the UK and US economies show some sign of improvement, the 
Australians, struck by weak commodity prices, are experiencing economic difficulties with 
their currency, which is down by about a quarter against the pound in the last two years.  
KSA, struck in 2015 both by a budget deficit, which threatens to wipe out the country’s entire 
reserves held at the central bank within six years,745 is facing a similar shock. The KSA’s 
GDP is growing at only 1.09% and the oil sector to decline by 7.17 percent.746  
Applying the principles of Shari’a to loans made for infrastructure or even housing in 
Malaysia or Indonesia in 1997, or in the last 10 years to loans in the UK, Australia or 
Venezuela would not have protected depositors from loss in those countries.   In the first part 
of this chapter the writer argues for a series of robust internationally accepted standards, 
which are or can be modified so as to be compliant with Shari’a law, to be introduced to 
govern Shari’a banking.  To some extent these are already part of good banking practice in 
developed economies, and some pre-date all three Basel accords.  This might help protect 
depositors in KSA, if valuations are calibrated to take account of the parlous state of the 
Sa’udi economy and in line with the standards previously suggested. 
On the other hand, no amount of capital reserves will protect a bank from basically bad risk 
management – and it doesn’t matter what sort of risk it is: if it is managed badly, it will hurt 
the banking system. If the banking system is built on an incorrect view of future income 
streams, from which an incorrect view of local economic growth follows, complicated further 
by corruption and a weak internal regulatory framework, capital reserves alone will not 
protect against falling asset prices but prudent risk management practices might.  In 1987, the 
incorrect assumptions in Western countries were based on share prices; in 2006, the 
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assumptions in the USA and the UK were based on land prices, as they were in Dubai in 
2008.  In 2015 in KSA, they are based on the oil price.  The adoption of Basel III capital 
ratios will only assist KSA if risk management, valuation and corporate governance standards 
are also rigorously applied. 
8.4 Conclusions 
To provide pertinent conclusions, it is necessary to present the questions posed at the early 
portion of the thesis along with the corresponding answers. As mentioned numerous times 
within the thesis, the primary research question and the main purpose of this research is to 
find out whether or not Saudi Arabia needs to adopt the risk regulation practices of Basel. 
This thesis question will be answered upon discussion of the other subsidiary and initial 
questions posed throughout the study. 
To reiterate, the following subsidiary questions were posed: 
 Why should Saudi Arabia adopt the risk regulation practices of Basel and other 
specific jurisdictions risk management practices of the UK and Malaysia? 
 Can the Basel framework and other specific jurisdictions risk management practices 
of the UK and Malaysia be internalized by Islamic financial institutions to solve 
issues such as the inadequate coordination of financial markets in Saudi Arabia? 
 How are the issues of legal secularisation to be reconciled in Islamic models of 
finance, particularly in Islamic financial institutions? 
 How can risk management practices be improved by standardising banking across 
jurisdictions? 
 Can the standardisation of accounting practices and regulatory principles enhance 
Islamic finance organisations? 
 How may one employ a content analysis across the three markets of Malaysia, the 
Islamic  Bank of Britain, and Saudi Arabia to determine which accounting standards 
and risk management practices from each market are beneficial in improving financial 
and legal efficacy in Saudi Arabian financial institutions? 
Likewise, a specific question that served as root of this thesis was asked, i.e., “Is the IB 
system of KSA sufficiently robust to survive the eventuation of a credit risk?”  Chapter 2 
provided the answer to this initial question. It served as premise to the central argument of 
this thesis. It noted that the term closest to ‘risk’ in Islamic literature is ‘Gharar’ and unlike 
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the former, the content of the latter is subject to much uncertainty. It is uncertain whether a 
transaction imbedded with risk or Ghārār would be voidable and not void, depending on 
whether the party that exposed the transaction to the risk was honest. Therefore, the first 
obstacle to developing a framework for the standardisation of risk management in Islamic 
banking is the lack of consensus on what constitutes ‘risk.’ However, Chapter 2 examined the 
unique risk characteristics of four modes of financing widely used by Islamic banks and was 
able to show that Islamic banks are required to give priority to the PLS financing modes and 
it was shown that these modes carry even more risks.  
Furthermore, it was shown in Chapter 3 that banking institutions are exposed to a number of 
risks with severe and wide-ranging implications for shareholders, investors and stakeholders 
alike and a large portion of these risks for banking institutions are defined with the Basel 
framework. Likewise presented are the IBB in Chapter 6 and BNM and BIMB in Chapter 5 
which gives us the fundamental data to assess the risks of the Islamic banking institutions.   
As such, in answer to the initial question, it cannot be guaranteed that KSA can survive the 
eventuation of a credit risk. These risks are inherent to the banking system, whether Islamic 
or conventional. Otherwise, there is no further need to continue with this research. Given that, 
it is necessary to delve into further analysis of literature to gain answers to the other 
foregoing questions.  
On the question, “Why should Saudi Arabia adopt the risk regulation practices of Basel and 
other specific jurisdictions risk management practices of the UK and Malaysia,” the answer 
was distributed all throughout the thesis. It was shown that despite the strength inherent 
among IB systems, it is nevertheless shrouded with risks that may render it unable to survive 
financial crises. To make improvements in its structure therefore, it can incorporate some of 
the risk regulation practices of Basel and other specific jurisdictions risk management 
practices of the UK and Malaysia as provided in the literature analysis and case studies.  
These findings lead to the next question, “Can the Basel framework and other specific 
jurisdictions risk management practices of the UK and Malaysia be internalized by Islamic 
financial institutions to solve issues such as the inadequate coordination of financial markets 
in Saudi Arabia?” Chapter 4, after detailing the risk framework of Basel, examined some of 
the major Islamic financial products to illustrate how Basel risk policy, measurements and 
regulatory supervision are likely to be significant considerations of Islamic banking policy 
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and management. It was also established in the Chapter that Basel accords are standards that 
apply to all internationally active banks and thus, include Islamic banks that are connected to 
the global market place. From the aforementioned literature review and analysis, including 
the details provided in the preceding sections of this paragraph, it was clearly shown that the 
Basel framework and other specific jurisdictions risk management practices of the UK and 
Malaysia be internalized by Islamic financial institutions to solve issues such as the 
inadequate coordination of financial markets in Saudi Arabia. 
The question on legal secularisation and how it can be reconciled with Islamic models of 
finance, particularly in Islamic financial institutions is answered through the detailed 
consideration of cases studies conducted on the Malaysian, Saudi and UK banking systems. 
As to the question on how risk management practices be improved by standardising banking 
across jurisdictions, various data also from the same case studies, including those in this 
chapter were provided to explain how this can be incorporated within the IB system. 
As regards the question, “Can the standardisation of accounting practices and regulatory 
principles enhance Islamic finance organizations,” it was first shown that setting standards 
that would govern the interpretation and implementation of the relevant rules remains an 
arduous task among IBs. Although the International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) has 
successfully harmonised accounting standards across hundreds of countries around the 
world,747 some Muslim scholars and academics claim that IFRS is not suitable for Islamic 
banking. This is the main reason why the three banking markets were presented and analysed, 
i.e., to determine which accounting standards and risk management practices from each 
market are beneficial in improving financial and legal efficacy in Saudi Arabian financial 
institutions.  As literature and the case studies showed, these accounting practices and 
regulatory principles can be “Islamicised” and permitted by SAC, thus enhancing the Islamic 
finance organizations through the adoption of Basel standards. The proofs to this claim are 
shown in Chapters 3 to 5. 
In answer to the last subsidiary question, “How may one employ a content analysis across the 
three markets of Malaysia, the Islamic Bank of Britain, and Saudi Arabia to determine which 
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accounting standards and risk management practices from each market are beneficial in 
improving financial and legal efficacy in Saudi Arabian financial institutions,” Chapters 5 
and 6 provided a complex but comprehensive explanation on how this can be done based on 
the case studies conducted on the banking concerned systems. 
To sum it up therefore, it is clear that the answer to the primary research question, i.e., “Does 
Saudi Arabia need to adopt the risk regulation practices of Basel,” is in the positive. To do so 
would lead to considerable improvement to the Islamic banking system that can very well 
prevent highly adverse effects to the financial stability as a whole. The IB system proved its 
strength when faced with the recent financial crisis but to adopt the Basel risk regulations can 
enhance its strength and further develop its structure. It is a matter of prevention over cure. 
8.5 Recommendations 
The following recommendations are based not only on the foregoing analysis and 
findings but also on other pertinent issues that were not given further focus and analysis in 
this thesis: 
a. That risks being managed in accordance with ISO 31000, and that full disclosure in 
accordance with the Basel requirements be made by every enterprise seeking to borrow 
money in KSA. 
b. That the directors and managers of every enterprise in KSA which borrows money from 
a bank be personally liable in a Shari’a compliant manner for funds which are mismanaged, 
stolen, or use other than in accordance with prudent business management practices.  That 
such persons not be able to evade responsibility on the basis that they do not have day-to-day 
supervision but as directors have only general management duties. 
c. That no funds be advanced to a corporation within KSA which does not have an 
effective corporate governance strategy. 
d. That absent a uniform Shari’a supervisory council ruling, representatives of the SACs 
of each country prepare a Shari’a best practice manual. Where best practices cannot be 
agreed upon, national variations be allowed, with the manual detailing a summary of the 
justifications for each. 
e. That to the extent allowed by Shari’a, each SAC include, in each fatwa, the reasons or 
justifications by which that resolution was arrived at or achieved. 
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f. The risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio for an Islamic bank should be higher than 
ratio (of at least 8.5 percent) set by the Basel II because of specific reasons inherent to the 
operation of Islamic banking, as well as more general reasons that are part of the high-risk 
environment in which most Islamic banks operate. 
g. An appropriate risk-weighting structure for an Islamic system should have the 
Mudarabah contracts carrying the highest risk weight, followed by the two other main PLS 
modes, namely musharaka and direct investment. The lowest risk weight should be assigned 
to the non-PLS modes fully secured by a mortgage. All the other non-PLS modes should be 
assigned a risk weight somewhere in between the lowest one in the system and the one 
assigned to Musharaka and direct investment. 
h. Unrestricted accounts should carry the same risk weighted assigned by Basel II of 
100%. This creates the need to establish an institution that would help set regulatory 
standards and a framework for supervisory oversight for Islamic financial institutions. 
i. There will also be the need to train Islamic financial institution regulators and 
supervisors within KSA for developing effective internal risk management, rating and control 
systems and appropriate corporate culture in these banks. This will, in turn, improve the 
external rating of these banks and help them not only in utilising their equity capital more 
efficiently but also in enhancing their growth and stability. 
These recommendations come as a conclusion to what was discussed in Chapter 4. The levels 
of the indicators that the Islamic financial institutions must meet have to be a little higher 
than in Western banks because of the characteristics of the region. Also products specific to 
Islamic banking, such as mudarabah and musharaka have to be identified for the high risk 
they pose to a financial institution and calculated accordingly when the risk exposure of a 
company is estimated. 
8.6 Other General Conclusions 
It should be possible for a group of bankers to run a banking system which does not rely on 
theft or fraud, putting other people's money into their own pockets, lies or deceit. It should be 
possible for the operators of a banking system to live up to their ideals, so that when they say 
that this system and the products comply with an ethical standard they can be believed. It is 
said, but it has been demonstrated in this thesis, that this is not the case, without strong 
oversight and rigorous risk management and reporting standards. Transparency is an 
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important tool in the management of risk. It is a lot harder to mismanage or steal when one is 
under the public eye than when one is not.  
Indeed, Shari’a is meant to be such a dynamic process.  The fact that there is no bankruptcy 
code does not mean that people do not incur debts. Whilst on the topic of developments in 
Shari’ait would be of great assistance if banks who sought Shari’a certification for financial 
products did so in a standard and transparent way, which fully complied with requirements of 
Shari’a. Indeed, ensuring this should be the duty of every member of a Shari’a advisory 
board. However, as our early Jurists say, no two people are alike: just as their faces differ so 
their thinking greatly differs.748  
There are many approaches taken by members of a Shari’a advisory board in order to ensure 
that the banking products under their certification comply with the Shari’a guidelines. Some 
deem the high-road approach to the relationship the better whilst others look for a more 
collaborative relationship.  
Similarly, there are a few significant and some subtle variations between different members 
of Shari’a advisory boards, and different boards, and their attitude towards innovations in 
Shari’a. Some will evaluate the Shari’a, confer with other scholars, possibly from other 
boards or countries, and debate the issues and make a decision to follow a path that is loyal to 
Shari’a and its traditional process, whilst others will simply consult whoever they deem to be 
the senior and respected scholars they follow. 
With regard to the risk of the Fatwa process, it is important to understand that there is always 
a reference to the Qur’an and usually together with a reference to a Hadith, and sources are 
quoted, as are opinions of modern and ancient scholars.  However, there is a significant risk 
that differences emerge as to whether the arguments are presented in terms that are 
favourable to the customers of a bank or to both depositors and borrowers.  In order to 
mitigate this risk, the customers, depositors and borrowers should be able to ask, evaluate and 
question the substance of the Fatwas, so that each party is certain of their duties for Shari’a 
compliance on the deposit or the loan. Further, the scholarship of scholars ought to be 
transparent, so that individuals can distinguish on whose fatwa they are relying: how 
knowledgeable is this person, how learned and experienced is this person, and how did this 
                                                 
 
748 Book of the Jews, Proverbs 27:19. If one face cannot reflect another face, one thought cannot reflect another thought; yet 
all are made in a Divine Image, and this is pre-ordained by Allah. 
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person (or body of persons) reach this decision?749   These recommendations, we hope, will 
help to ensure that the Fatwa process is not mired in arbitrary actions.  
 
8.6 Summary  
In this chapter, we have shown highlights of how the Malaysian banking system operates  
with brief illustrations of the Central Bank and a private bank, BNM, with the general point 
being that Malaysia Islamic banking sector has grown dramatically and currently successfully 
includes 51 percent of the population.  This means that a majority of the population have 
chosen to invest Islamic banks over the large incumbent Chinese conventional banks.  We 
have also discussed that while UK is regulated under the FCA and the Basel Accords, which 
evidences central bank de jure risk controls that are rigorous, the Islamic IBB Bank suffered 
a 25 per cent loss to its investors and depositors.  These losses showed that banking 
regulation no matter how rigorous is not sufficient to protect against management risk at an 
Islamic bank.  These two case studies provide numerous lessons that Saudi Arabia may take 
advantage of including but not limited to taking up the positive coordination and guidance of 
central authority and the private market in the Malaysian example and avoiding the rather 
hands off approach of the UK.  By incorporating the lessons of the two cases, we hope that 
the Saudi Arabian Islamic sector may continue to improve economically with increased 
transparency and enhanced customer participation. More importantly, this chapter provided 
the answers to all the research questions posed throughout the thesis based on the analysis of 
literature and the corresponding findings. 
 
                                                 
 
749 The Post/Ha-Do'ar 42:39 Jerusalem/Al Quds, (27 September 1963), 752-9 
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